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排序方式: 共有90条查询结果,搜索用时 218 毫秒
81.
P. Jean-Jacques Herings Ana Mauleon Vincent Vannetelbosch 《Games and Economic Behavior》2009,67(2):526-541
A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible farsighted pairwise deviations from any network g G to a network outside G are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying conditions (i) and (ii). A non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists. We provide a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks. Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto dominant network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the largest pairwise consistent set and the von Neumann–Morgenstern pairwise farsightedly stable set. 相似文献
82.
In this paper we provide the normative benchmark characterizing the optimal allocation of resources in a gas network. By duality, we determine the consumer and producer prices, at each node of the network, which decentralize this allocation with competitive actors. From the nodal prices we derive optimal transportation charges which turn out to be related to distance, but not always in a straightforward manner. We also consider the issue of pricing on secondary markets for capacity when pricing schedules for the transportation of gas consist of two terms: a capacity charge and a quantity charge. Finally, we explore the role of uncertainty in the planning of network capacity. 相似文献
83.
This paper presents a general framework for analyzing shadow wages in LDCs. We focus on (i) the differences between the domestic and international prices, (ii) the equilibrating mechanisms in the economy, (iii) the endogeneity of earnings in industry and agriculture, (iv) the consequences of industrial employment creation on agriculture, and (v) the nature of migration and unemployment.We identify those reduced form relationships which are central in determining the shadow wage, and use them to obtain general formulae for the shadow wage. These formulae can be specialized to alternative technological, behavioral, and institutional settings. This yields many new results concerning the relationship between the shadow wage and the market wage. Also, earlier results on shadow wages are derived as special cases of our formulae. 相似文献
84.
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86.
Suppose that a firm has several owners and that the future is uncertain in the sense that one out of many different states of nature will realize tomorrow. An owner’s time preference and risk attitude will determine the importance he places on payoffs in the different states. It is a well-known problem in the literature that under incomplete asset markets, a conflict about the firm’s objective function tends to arise among its owners. In this paper, we take a new approach to this problem, which is based on non-cooperative bargaining. The owners of the firm play a bargaining game in order to choose the firm’s production plan and a scheme of transfers which are payable before the uncertainty about the future state of nature is resolved. We analyze the resulting firm decision in the limit of subgame-perfect equilibria in stationary strategies. Given the distribution of bargaining power, we obtain a unique prediction for a production plan and a transfer scheme. When markets are complete, the production plan chosen corresponds to the profit-maximizing production plan as in the Arrow–Debreu model. Contrary to that model, owners typically do use transfers to redistribute profits. When markets are incomplete, the production plan chosen is almost always different from the one in a transfer-free Drèze (pseudo-)equilibrium and again owners use transfers to redistribute profits. Nevertheless, our results do support the Drèze criterion as the appropriate objective function of the firm. 相似文献
87.
We reconsider the allocational invariance of equilibria to different formulations of market completeness. We identify the so-far neglected assumption of sophisticated behavior as being crucial. First, the Arrow–Debreu setting is considered, where markets do not reopen in the future. Second, sequentially complete markets are analyzed, where goods on the spot markets and all contingent one-period ahead commodities can be traded in every state. Finally, complete markets are analyzed, where all possible contingent commodities can be traded at every state. Preferences may be time-consistent or time-inconsistent. A distinction is made between naïve and sophisticated behavior. 相似文献
88.
Alexander Moore Stéphane Straub Jean-Jacques Dethier 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2014,45(2):209-232
We examine the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. We develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. We test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992–2011. For each concession we have data on the regulatory regime, annual financial performance and contract renegotiations. We begin by demonstrating that, although pervasive, contract renegotiations do not fundamentally alter the regulatory regime. Importantly, firms are not systematically able to renegotiate when in financial difficulty, implying that price cap contracts remain high-powered in practice. We use this result for our main empirical work, where we find broad support for our theoretical predictions: when the cost of debt increases, firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage. 相似文献
89.
Summary. The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that
fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to do the computations.
The homotopy path can therefore be followed by several numerical techniques. Moreover, instead of computing some Nash equilibrium,
the algorithm is constructed in such a way that it computes the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure of Harsanyi
and Selten. As a by-product of our proofs it follows that for a generic game the tracing procedure defines a unique feasible
path. The numerical performance of the algorithm is illustrated by means of several examples.
Received: December 21, 1999; revised version: December 27, 2000 相似文献
90.
The Efficient Mechanism for Downsizing the Public Sector 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
This article analyzes the efficient mechanism for downsizingthe public sector, focusing on adverse selection in productiveefficiency. Each worker is assumed to have two type-dependentreservation utilities: the status quo utility in the publicsector before downsizing and the utility that the worker expectsto obtain by entering the private sector. The efficient mechanismconsists of a menu of probability (of remaining in the publicsector) and transfer pairs that induces self-selection. A worker'sfull cost is defined by the sum of production cost in the publicsector and reservation utility in the private sector. It isoptimal to start by laying off the agents with higher full cost.When the public sector before downsizing is discriminating asthe differential of private information about productive efficiencysuggests, there are countervailing incentives. This makes thesize of downsizing smaller under asymmetric information thanunder complete information. 相似文献