Equilibrium asset pricing and the cross section of expected returns

Annals of Finance - In a mean-variance framework with a representative agent, any linear model for the cross section of expected returns can be supported as an equilibrium as long as the market...     

Transaction utility effects when quality is uncertain

The existing literature finds that price discrepancy, which represents the difference between expected and observed price, helps explain brand choice and purchase intention. This effect is often attributed to transaction utility, that is, the incremental utility associated with the surprise of observing a price lower or higher than expected. This research considers the possibility, however, that transaction utility is a less important determinant of choice when quality is uncertain. We propose and find that acquisition utility (perceived value for the money) tends to dominate the explanation of purchase intention, but transaction utility is significant only when consumers are more certain about quality. Our discussion considers the relative role of transaction utility in explaining consumer decision making and how the informative and allocative roles of price might be distinguished. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from Ohio State University and his B.S. from Ohio State University. His research interests include information economics and pricing. Previously, he taught at the University of South Carolina. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research, Journal of Marketing, andJournal of Retailing, among others. He received his Ph.D. at the University of South Carolina, his M.B.A. from the University of Georgia, and a B.S. degree from Clemson University. Previously, he taught at the University of Alabama. His research interests include consumer perceptions of value and interpersonal influences. He has published in theJournal of Consumer Research and theJournal of Marketing Research, among others. He received his Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina and has a Bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Delhi. His research interests include price bundling, price effects on perceived quality perceptions, and segmentation of business-to-business markets. He has published in theJournal of Business Research and theAdvances in Consumer Research series, published by the Association of Consumer Research. He previously taught on the faculty of Valdosta State University. She received a B.S. in statistics, a Ph.D. in marketing from the University of South Carolina, and a M.S. in statistics from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. She previously taught at Lehigh University. Her research interests include market segmentation, discrete data analysis, and pricing. She has published in theJournal of Marketing Research, as well as in theProceedings of the American Marketing Association and theAssociation for Consumer Research.     

Do Taxes Matter for Foreign Direct Investment?

The tax sensitivity of foreign direct investment (FDI) has importantpolicy implications. If FDI is not responsive to taxation, thenit may be an appropriate target for taxation by the host country.This question is examined for Mexico by estimating the responseof FDI from retained earnings and transfers from abroad to thetax regimes in Mexico and the home country, the credit statusof multinationals, country risk factors, and regulatory andtrade regimes in Mexico. FDI in Mexico is found to be sensitiveto the tax regimes in Mexico and the United States, the creditstatus of multinationals, country credit ratings, and the regulatoryenvironment. Thus Mexico's current policies to dismantle regulationsand employ a tax system competitive with the United States areexpected to have salutory effects on FDI in Mexico.     

Disequilibrium theory,waiting costs,and saving behavior in centrally planned economies: A queueing-theoretic approach

An expected-utility maximizer, obliged to make a single purchase from two alternatives, finds that a queue forms for the good that would have been selected had both goods been available. An M/M/1 queue is posited and for each period of delay the maximum additional payment $\text{b}{}^1$ that the consumer would incur to join the queue is determined. This has implications for saving. Not only the availability of the good, but also the delay in obtaining it, the alteration in its arrival rate, and the “stampede effect” determine saving behavior.     

Inflation and the wage lag during the American Civil War

This paper examines the role of inflation in financing the American Civil War, and the effects of that inflation on the level of real wages in the North. A wage determination model is specified in which the equilibrium real wage is determined by real forces and the money wage is allowed to adjust to its equilibrium value with lags. Econometric estimates of the model support Wesley Clair Mitchell's contention that wage movements lagged price movements during the war. Comparison of the estimated equilibrium money wage and the estimated current money wage makes it possible to assess the magnitude and importance of the wartime redistribution of income attributable to inflation.     

Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

A setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered. With correlated productivities, each agent's private information also provides a signal about the other agent's productivity. In contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent, it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents. It is only if the agents are risk-averse that their private information may allow them to command rents. Moreover, when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a Nash equilibrium, the Pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth-telling. This leads to the consideration of truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents. Among all such equilibria, the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a Nash response to truth.