Book reviews

The Co-operation Phenomena: Prc)spects for Small Firms and the Small EconomiesDermont O'Doherty (Ed.)London, Irish Science and Technology Ajrency, Graham & Trotman, 1990, 270pp.

Flexible Manufacturing Technologies & International Competitiveness J. Tidd London, Pinter, 1991, ll3pp., £35.00.

Technology Strategy and the Firm: Management and Public Policy Mark Dodgson (Ed.)London, Longman, 1990, 252pp., £25.00 pb.

Computerization in Developing Countries: Model and Reality Per Lind London, Routledge, 1990, 175pp., £35.00 hb.

The Fifth Branch—Science Advisers as Policy Makers Sheila Jasonoff Cambridge, MA, Haroard University Press, 1990, 302pp., £22.50.     

Frequent issuers’ influence on long-run post-issuance returns

Prior studies conclude that firms’ equity underperforms following many individual sorts of external financing. These conclusions naturally raise significant questions about market efficiency and/or about the techniques used to measure long-run “abnormal returns.” Rather than concentrating on a single security type or issuance, we examine long-run performance following any and all sorts of security issuances. Initial financing events do not associate with underperformance; however, subsequent financings do. Our results suggest that negative post-issuance returns have nothing to do with the specific type of security issued, and everything to do with the number of types of securities issued.     

The business case of a network that serves both public safety and commercial subscribers

Deploying a single nationwide broadband wireless network to serve all public safety users would have great advantages over the existing fragmented public safety systems. A nationwide system could be created to serve both public safety and commercial subscribers, which would allow a provider to exploit important economies but force it to meet the more costly requirements of public safety. This paper analyzes the viability of a public-private partnership that serves public safety and commercial subscribers from a for-profit provider's perspective. A model is presented that estimates the net present value (NPV) of a wireless network by calculating costs based on the number of cell sites required and revenue based on the projected number of subscribers acquired. The model is applied to both a network that serves only commercial subscribers on 10 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum and a public-private partnership that serves commercial subscribers and public safety personnel on 20 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum. It is found that NPV is greater for the public-private partnership than for the commercial-only network for any population density, which shows that the value of 10 MHz of spectrum exceeds the cost of meeting public safety requirements. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that NPV/cell increases with population density, so urban areas are profitable and rural areas are unprofitable. The paper demonstrates that a partnership covering 94% of the US population breaks even because the most urban 56% of population subsidizes coverage for the next 38%. If initial deployment is subsidized, a financially sustainable public-private partnership can serve much more than 94%. Additionally, it is shown that allowing urban municipalities to opt-out of the partnership can significantly increase the subsidies required.     

What Makes an Independent Regulator Independent?

As private capital is increasingly invested in utilities across the globe, the issue of regulation and its inferace with different types of government, culture and society has become every more complex. This article focuses on the design of regulatory systems outside the US and the UK. With references to current practice in many countries, the author argues that formal regulatory independence and accountability is not always a necessary condition for effective regulation (though where feasible and effective it carries potential economic benefits). On the other hand, he also argues that an informal or advisory regulatory system may work better in some situations. In all circumstances, informal accountability and a clear understanding of the "rules of the game" are crucial for effective regulation.     

Democracy,Veto Players and the Depth of Regional Integration

We examine how domestic political factors influence the type of regional integration arrangement (RIA) that states enter. States can pursue at least five types of RIA, in order of their depth of policy integration: preferential trade agreements, free trade areas, customs unions, common markets and economic unions. We argue that a country's regime type and the number of institutional ‘veto players’ strongly affect the type of arrangement that states choose. Democracies are more likely to form an RIA than other states, a tendency that becomes more pronounced as the proposed level of integration in an arrangement rises. However, all democracies are not the same. As the number of veto players rises, the likelihood of a democracy entering an RIA declines. Furthermore, veto players are expected to have a larger effect on the odds of a democracy forming an RIA, the greater is the extent of integration that the arrangement aims to achieve. A series of statistical tests, based on analysis of all pairs of countries from 1950 to 2000, support our arguments.     

Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating

This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure contracts and supporting institutions. We focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government purchasers of infrastructure services by the supplying companies and by the governments themselves. In particular, we allow for trust updating and trust misalignments, which may give rise to ‘undertrusting’ and ‘overtrusting’. The core of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts with dynamic adjustment of trust perceptions, which we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic efficiency (measured by expected welfare) and on investment levels. We explore flexible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do not allow for post-investment renegotiation), and hybrid contracts. We then compare the efficiency of the flexible contracts to that of hybrid contracts using as a criterion the expected welfare implications of each contract. The model is used to shed light on current issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts in developed and in developing countries, including the role of regulatory institutions.     

Rural Industrialization: A comparison of development planning in China and India

This paper attempts to show the very considerable differences in rural industry promotion and development in China and India. Both countries have a rural industrial sector with employment levels in the region of 20 million. Overall figures and characteristics are compared and contrasted. The Chinese planners stress skill formation and the development of regional industrial structures while employment per se is emphasized in India. This has considerable consequences for urban–rural relations, which are specifically discussed in the Chinese context. Finally, the paper shows how the expansion of the rural industrial sector enables the consolidation of the collective economy at a higher level and thus assists the implementation of socialist transformation.     

Abstracts

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