To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints

We compare the performance of markets and tournaments as allocative mechanisms in an economy with borrowing constraints. The economy consists of a continuum of individuals who differ in their initial wealth and ability level. These must be assigned to a continuum of investment opportunities or inputs of different productivity. With perfect capital markets matching is efficient under both mechanisms. Markets, however, generate higher aggregate consumption because of the waste associated with the production of signals under tournaments. When borrowing constraints are present, tournaments dominate markets in terms of matching efficiency and, for sufficiently powerful signalling technologies, also in terms of aggregate consumption.     

Corporate Ethical Identity as a Determinant of Firm Performance: A Test of the Mediating Role of Stakeholder Satisfaction

In this article, we empirically assess the impact of corporate ethical identity (CEI) on a firm’s financial performance. Drawing on formulations of normative and instrumental stakeholder theory, we argue that firms with a strong ethical identity achieve a greater degree of stakeholder satisfaction (SS), which, in turn, positively influences a firm’s financial performance. We analyze two dimensions of the CEI of firms: corporate revealed ethics and corporate applied ethics. Our results indicate that revealed ethics has informational worth and enhances shareholder value, whereas applied ethics has a positive impact through the improvement of SS. However, revealed ethics by itself (i.e. decoupled from ethical initiatives) is not sufficient to boost economic performance. Pascual Berrone is a PhD candidate of the Business Administration and Quantitative Methods Ph.D. program at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. His current research interests focus on business ethics, stakeholder theory, and various aspects of the interface between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate social responsibility. His interests also include ethical, environmental and social issues and their impact on firms' overall performance. Dr. Jordi Surroca is an Assistant Professor of Management at the Department of Business Administration at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. He holds a PhD in Business Administration and a Licentiate Degree in Business and Economics from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His research interests center on stakeholder management, firm strategy, innovation, and corporate governance. Dr. Josep A. Tribó is Associate Professor of Finance in the Department of Business Administration at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. He has a PhD in Economic Analysis from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and a Licenciate Degree in Theoretical Physics by Universitat de Barcelona. His research interests are Corporate Finance and the financing of R&D. His work has been published in journals such as Applied Economics, International Journal of Production Economics.     

The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model

The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which firms’ preference relations are, in addition to substitutable, quota q-separable. We also show that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference profiles if and only if the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of profiles.     

Income measurement and comparisons

The purpose of this paper is to provide a way for better measuring a country's global income when official statistics fail to account for the existence of a thriving underground, or black economy. Another purpose of this research is to discuss adequate ways to perform international comparisons of income, and income per head, and to correct for depreciation. Besides the general interest of this problem, there are two more specific reasons behind this work. First, the allocation of development funds by international agencies (for example, the structural funds in the European monetary system) are conditioned on this measure. Second, the measurement of unemployment may be totally distorted by failing to account for the hidden economy. This paper has benefitted from comments by the participants at the Forty-Seventh International Atlantic Economic Conference, Vienna, Austria, March 16–23, 1999, and especially Michael Pickhardt. Financial support is acknowledged from the Dirección General de Ciencia y Tecnología, under project SEC 98-1112, and the Junta Castilla y León, under project SA 29/99. Comments by the participants at the 1997 Applied Econometrics Association conference on public deficits are also acknowledged. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors.     

Forward induction and entry deterrence: an experiment

The Dixit (Econ J 90:95–106, 1980) hypothesis that incumbents use investment in capacity to deter potential entrants has found little empirical support. Bagwell and Ramey (J Econ 27:660–680, 1996) propose a model where, in the unique game-theoretic prediction based on forward induction or iterated elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, the incumbent does not have the strategic advantage. We conduct an experiment with games inspired by these models. In the Dixit-style game, the incumbent monopolizes the market most of the time even without the investment in capacity. In our Bagwell-and-Ramey-style game, the incumbent also tends to keep the market, in contrast to the predictions of an entrant advantage. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence that forward induction affects the behavior of most participants. The results of our games suggest that players perceive that the first mover has an advantage without having to pre-commit capacity. In our Bagwell–Ramey game, evolution and learning do not drive out this perception. We back these claims with data analysis and a theoretical framework for dynamics. Financial support by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia and Tecnología (SEC2002-01352 and SEJ2006-11665-C02-01) and the Barcelona Economic Program of CREA and excellent research assistance by David Rodríguez are gratefully acknowledged. The authors thank Aurora García Gallego and Armin Schmutzler for helpful comments.     

An Integrated Model of the Adoption and Extent of E-Commerce in Firms

This work aims to explain firms’ decisions to adopt Internet-based e-commerce, and the extent to which the adopters subsequently implement e-commerce to commercialize their products and services. We examine various types of factors previously considered by the literature (competitive environment, organizational characteristics, strategic orientation, innovative capacity, managers’ characteristics, IT equipment possessed and the use made of it). The analytical model developed here on the basis of a sample of 2,038 firms suggests that the factors influencing the adoption decision are different from those that eventually influence the results of firms’ commercial operations on the Internet. Likewise, we discuss the contribution of each type of determinant and the implications.      

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.     

Exchange rate and long run equilibrium in transition economies

The purpose of this paper is to calculate pruchasing power parity rates and the real exchange rate using several methods of calculation to estimate long-run equilibrium real exchange rates in transition economies, mainly in Eastern European countries considered in transition, such as Poland. The authors calculate different measures of exchange rate misalignment (absolute and relative deviations from long-run equilibrium). Each measure is calculated using different price indices, which include consumer price indices, GDP deflactor, and unit labor cost. The expected values of these variables are used. To calculate the long-run equilibrium, different methods such as an error correction equation and a forward-looking model are utilized, and again, the expected values of the variables are introduced along with new variables. The estimation of the long-run cointegration equation of the equilibrium real exchange rate and the corresponding dynamic error correction specification strongly corroborates the model and produced fairly consistent results across the countries under study. Using appropriated proxies, the estimated long run equations were used to derive indices of the equilibrium real exchange rate.     

Automobile demand,model cycle and age effects

This paper is aimed at exploring the existence of typical patterns of automobile model life and the formal test for age effects in a discrete-choice demand framework estimated with data on the models sold in the Spanish market. Estimates show that the evolution of market shares entails and quantifies age effects resulting from consumer demand. These effects are clearly distinguishable from the impacts generated by changes in attributes and firm pricing. They carry an exogenous factor that is full of implications for firm behaviour over the life of a model: the modification of demand price sensitivities. As a result, for example, equilibrium own-price elasticities are observed to decrease until the fourth year of a model life, and then to increase again.