Rates and Biases of Technical Progress and Returns to Scale in the Multi-output, Multi-input Production: Primal Versus Dual, Output-augmenting Versus Input-saving and Long-run Versus Short-Run

I examine the relationships among various dual concepts of output-augmenting and input-saving rates of technical progress as well as various dual concepts of returns-to-scale measures in the long run and short run. Output-augmenting rates of technical progress are all equal, and so are input-saving ones. Returns to scale plays an important role in the relationship between output-augmenting and input-saving rates of technical progress. Capacity utilization plays an important role in the relationship between the long run and short run. The bias of technical progress is also briefly referred to.
L Classification Numbers: D24, O030, O047.     

Endogenous Timing in a Strategic Trade Policy Game: A Two-Country Oligopoly Model with Multiple Firms

This paper examines strategic trade policy games where the number of firms in the importing and exporting countries differs and all firms play as Cournot oligopolies. Under the assumption of linear demand and constant marginal cost, we show that, if the number of firms in the exporting country exceeds that in the importing country by more than three, the government of the exporting country chooses to move as a leader, imposing an export tax on firms. The government of the importing country then becomes a follower and imposes an import tariff. This lies contrary to the previous study, which assumed that there is only one firm in each country.     

Modeling Methods for Discrete Choice Analysis

This paper introduces new forms, sampling and estimation approaches fordiscrete choice models. The new models include behavioral specifications oflatent class choice models, multinomial probit, hybrid logit, andnon-parametric methods. Recent contributions also include new specializedchoice based sample designs that permit greater efficiency in datacollection. Finally, the paper describes recent developments in the use ofsimulation methods for model estimation. These developments are designed toallow the applications of discrete choice models to a wider variety ofdiscrete choice problems.     

On Professor Takashi Negishi's contributions to economic theory

Professor Takashi Negishi has made fundamental contributions to economic theory on an extremely broad range of topics. As the editors of this special issue, we feel extremely fortunate that each of us has worked on topics with respect to which Professor Negishi's influences have been particularly large. In this introductory article, each of us will discuss Professor Negishi's influence on the topic we are most familiar with. For the entire spectrum of his research, readers are referred to the list of Professor Negishi's publications presented at the end of this article.     

The incentive for export subsidies under imperfect competition

By taking into account factor market interactions, the theory of strategic trade policies can consistently explain the fact that less efficient countries offer greater export subsidies to the most technologically advanced industries because in these countries there may be greater differences in efficiency of production technology between industries than in more efficient countries.     

Does agricultural trade liberalization increase risks of supply-side uncertainty?: Effects of productivity shocks and export restrictions on welfare and food supply in Japan

Agriculture is the focus of much contention in free trade negotiations. The Japanese government is against liberalizing the rice trade on the grounds that it would threaten “national food security” in the events of such shocks as crop failure and embargoes. Trade liberalization is expected to make the Japanese economy more dependent upon food imports and, thus, more susceptible to these risks. Using a computable general equilibrium model with a Monte Carlo simulation, we quantify the welfare impacts of productivity shocks and export quotas by major rice exporters to Japan and found little evidence of Japan suffering from such shocks.     

Effects of international sharing of pollution abatement burdens on income inequality among countries

Improvements in environmental quality will boost output production and hence economic growth. However, although environmental abatement equally benefits all economies in the world, it is shown that, if the private productive resources are not yet accumulated sufficiently in low income economies, income inequality among economies can be widened in the short term not only under equal burden sharing of pollution abatement but even under income-proportional burden sharing. When the marginal productivity is diminishing, the negative effect of the burden is large relative to the positive effect of the improved environment in economies in which resources are not accumulated sufficiently.     

Conjectural Variations and Voluntary Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting

The purpose of this paper is to show how conjectural variations can be derived as a reduced form in an infinitely repeated game of private provision of public goods. We obtain explicit closed forms of conjectural variations associated with maximal sustainable equilibria in which the sum of the utilities of all of a community's members is maximized for both quadratic and Cobb–Douglas preferences, provided that the resulting sequence of contributions can be sustained as a Nash (or subgame perfect) equilibrium in the underlying repeated game. We also show that positive conjectural variations will emerge as long as people place positive weight on the future, and that those conjectures are positively related to the discount factor.     

Trade and Gains from Trade Between Profit-maximizing and Labour-managed Countries with Imperfect Competition

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of trade and the gains from trade in general equilibrium under imperfect competition by assuming that all firms in one country are of the labour-managed type (maximizing the income of labour) while those in the other country are of the profit-maximizing type. Our main conclusion is that if the labour-managed country is larger than or equal to the profit-maximizing country, the profit-maximizing country exports the imperfectly competitive commodity and gains from trade while the labour-managed country exports the perfectly competitive commodity and may lose from trade.