Standardization Process of Systems Technologies: Creating a Balance between Competition and Cooperation

Many firms are experimenting with how to standardize new technologies. They may use proprietary technologies for their products and services, and let them compete in the market selection. Alternatively, they can cooperate to jointly set a standard and experiment with combinations of market process and cooperation. If firms let the market decide, they can compete with technologies and need not invest time and effort in hammering out a standard. If they do incur the costs of negotiated standardization, they may enable end users to realize the benefits of standards. A hybrid standardization process combines the advantages of both market selection and negotiated decision making. This paper presents a contingency framework to identify conditions that will affect the preferred standardization process for vendors who introduce new technologies. A major contingency that this paper points to is the systemic nature of technologies in information and communication technology industries. The more systemic the technology is (in a way to be clarified), the less likely that firms will establish a hybrid standardization process. One advantage of decomposing technology systems in smaller components (modules) is that this approach enables firms to combine market selection with negotiated selection of standards.     

Quality Management Systems Certification: Research Note

Although International Quality Standards 9000 certification is one of the most popular quality assurance systems in the world, its contribution to a firm's value is still a controversial issue. This project re-examines this issue by using stock market reactions to the announcements of the award of certification made by a sample of Hong Kong listed companies, as a proxy for its contribution to a firm's value. The results suggest that on average certification increased a firm's value. However, most of this value increase was incorporated into stock prices before formal announcements were published in newspapers. In addition, the contribution of certification to value was greater in smaller firms than in larger ones. This can be attributed to fewer stock traders and professional analysts following smaller firms.     

Central bank transparency and market efficiency: An econometric analysis

Blinder (1998) argues that more open public disclosure of central bank policies may enhance the efficiency of markets. We examine this claim by studying whether the Federal Reserve System's 1994 policy shift toward more open disclosure improved or worsened the predictability of financial markets. Employing methods analogous to Campbell and Shiller (1991), we find that since 1994, the forecasting error has decreased for interest rates on U.S. bonds of most maturity lengths, and that the expectations hypothesis has performed better at the low end of the yield curve. These findings are inconsistent with the view that increased central bank transparency will decrease the efficiency of financial markets. The authors would like to thank participants of the 2001 Midwest Macroeconomics Conference and 2001 Missouri Economics Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are, of course, the author's.     

Regulating Banks through Market Discipline: A Survey of the Issues

Abstract.  The interest in the application of market discipline to regulate the financial industry has boomed recently due to the proposed New Capital Accord. This paper reviews the potential role market discipline can play in financial regulation. We start with a discussion of the rationale for financial regulation and with a brief history of the current regulatory mechanisms. Next, a definition of market discipline as a regulatory mechanism is advanced. We evaluate the disciplining power various market participants have. Finally, we argue that more external risk management disclosure is a condition sine qua non in order to enable market discipline as a regulatory mechanism. In this respect, the Basle Committee has taken the right approach.     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.     

Game theoretic derivations of competitive strategies in conjoint analysis

While conjoint analysis has been applied in a wide variety of different contexts in Marketing, most applications fail to explicitly consider retaliatory reactions from competitors. In this paper, a methodological extension is developed for conjoint analysis by explicitly modeling competition in a game theoretic context. The Nash equilibrium concept is employed to model competitive reactions to produce design, and its implications for reactive product strategies are discussed. The optimal product design problem for each firm is formulated as a nonlinear integer programming problem, which is solved via a specialized branch and bound method combined with a heuristic. In order to compute a Nash equilibrium, a sequential iterative procedure is proposed. The proposed procedure is illustrated under several scenarios of competition using previously published conjoint data.This research has been supported by the Henry Rutgers Research Fellowship, Rutgers University.     

Price-volume relation in stocks: A multiple time series analysis on the Singapore market

We examine the price-volume relation in stocks using the multiple time series approach due to Tiao and Box (1981). This approach has the advantage of treating price and volume jointly and symmetrically (without enforcing the roles of input and output). It is free of the simultaneity bias in regression analysis and the unidirectional dynamics imposed by transfer function models. Empirical results show that there is implicit positive correlation between price and volume through their residuals. However, the results for the explicit lead and lag relations are mixed. The technical analysts' adage that volume often leads the trend of price is not supported. Nonetheless, the implicit relationship between price and volume confirms the usefulness of incorporating volume data to forecast future return. Our analysis shows that the multiple time series models outperform the univariate models in post-sample forecasts.     

Daylight saving effect

Kamstra et al. [Kamstra, M.J., Kramer, L.A., Levi, M.D., 2000. Losing sleep at the market: the daylight saving anomaly. The American Economic Review 90, 1005–1011] argue that the mean weekend return following the changes in daylight saving time is less than the mean weekend return throughout the rest of the year. Opposing studies, such as Pinegar [Pinegar, J.M., 2002. Losing sleep at the market: comment. The American Economic Review 92, 1251–1256), reason that the observed results depend upon methodology. We extend the ongoing discussions by providing further evidence for equity markets and bond markets in Germany and across Europe. We further demonstrate that the daylight saving effect does not serve as a potential rationale for the weekend effect.     

Game-theoretic properties of Final-Offer Arbitration

Final-Offer Arbitration (FOA) is a dispute settlement procedure in which an arbitrator chooses one side's final position as the resolution. Game-theoretic models of FOA in two-sided interest disputes are reviewed, especially models of the disputants' final offer choices under uncertainty about the arbitrator's preferences. The extent to which the Brams-Merrill Theorem (1986) reveals optimal strategic behavior under FOA, and the implications for efficiency and equity, are assessed. Analysis of a model not satisfying the hypotheses of the Theorem suggests that, for some arbitrators, FOA can have an undesirable tendency. Another game model is used to address the question of how disputants' differential risk-aversion is reflected in their strategic behavior, and in the fairness of FOA outcomes. This calculation clarifies some apparently contradictory empirical evidence about FOA.