Basic Insights in Pricing Basket Credit Derivatives

Basket credit derivatives are those financial contracts whose pay–out depends on the credit events ('failure to pay', 'default', etc.) characterizing a portfolio of bonds or loans over a determined time horizon.
We have two main categories of basket credit derivatives. The first is characterized by a pay–out depending on the temporal ranking of the credit events: first–to–default, second–to–default, etc. The second is characterized by a pay–out depending on the percentiles of the portfolio's loss distribution induced by the credit events. The latter is often embedded in securitizations of portfolios of bonds or loans, i.e. CDO.
This paper proposes some basic insights in the pricing of these particularly complex credit derivatives. Whenever possible, we will try to find an analytical approximation to the exact pricing formula, if a closed form solution is not available.
(J.E.L.: G13).     

Switching costs in local credit markets

Switching costs are a key determinant of market performance. This paper tests their existence in the corporate loan market in which they are likely to play a central role because of the complexity of contracts and the relevance of informational problems. Using very detailed data at bank-firm level on four Italian local credit markets we empirically show that firms tend to iterate their choice of the main bank over time. This inertia is not related to unobserved and time invariant firms' preferences across banks and can be attributed to the existence of switching costs. Moreover these costs are higher for single-bank firms. We also offer evidence that banks price discriminate between new and old borrowers by charging lower interest rates to the former in order to cover part of the switching costs. The discount amounts to about 44 basis points and is equal to 7% of the average interest rate. These results prove robust to a number of other potential identification drawbacks.     

A Primer on Financial Contagion

Abstract.  This paper presents a theoretical framework to highlight possible channels for the international transmission of financial shocks. We first review the different definitions and measures of contagion adopted by the literature. We then use a simple multi-country asset pricing model to classify the main elements of the current debate on contagion and provide a stylized account of how a crisis in one country can spread to the world economy. In particular, the model shows how crises can be transmitted across countries, without assuming ad hoc portfolio management rules or market imperfections. Finally, tracking our classification, we survey the results of the empirical literature on contagion.     

Comply or Explain: Investor Protection Through the Italian Corporate Governance Code

Nearly 86% of listed Italian companies now claim to be in formal compliance with the provisions of the Italian Corporate Governance Code, which, like many codes in EU countries, give companies the option to either comply or explain their decision not to do so. But in the wake of the recent financial crisis, the effectiveness of such self‐regulatory corporate governance codes has been subjected to increasing skepticism. In particular, critics wonder whether such governance codes actually encourage the adoption of best practices and promote better governance. This article presents a governance indicator (CoRe) devised by the authors that attempts to assess the actual, or effective, levels of compliance with the Italian Corporate Governance Code in terms of listed companies' procedures for dealing with related party transactions (RPTs). The authors report that the companies' level of effective compliance with regard to RPTs is considerably lower than their publicly reported levels of formal compliance. The authors also report that higher levels of effective compliance tend to be found in companies where (1) minority shareholders have appointed one or more directors; (2) independent directors serve on important committees; and (3) there are significant holdings by institutional investors—particularly foreign investors—who participate in general shareholder meetings.     

Sulla dinamica dei processi di scambio monetari

In questa nota si propone una estensione del modello dinamico di economia monetaria di puro scambio sviluppato da D. Friedman in un lavoro recente [5]. Lo schema analitico mantiene il carattere non deterministico e non tâtonnement introdotto da S. Smale nello studio di processi transattivi [9]. Ammettendo che la merce usata nel sistema come moneta sia richiesta dagli agenti non solo sulla base delle sue caratteristiche fisiche, ma anche a partire dal ruolo istituzionale assolto, si prova che il processo economico converge ad una varietà di configurazioni finali che è strettamente più ampia dell'insieme degli equilibri walrasiani.     

Redenomination Risk and Bank Runs in a Monetary Union with and Without Deposit Insurance Schemes

Open Economies Review - This paper develops a basic framework characterized by a monetary union in which a shock to the policy interest rate, i.e. the determinant of a recessionary stance in the...