The reliability of self-reported home values in a developing country context

This paper provides an analysis, in the context of a developing country, of the reliability of homeowners’ estimates of the value of their houses, as obtained through a household survey. We show that non-response to the home value question by the owner is uncorrelated with the appraised value of the house and other demographic characteristics of the respondent. We also document that homeowners with long tenure largely overestimate the value of their home. Moreover, both the bias and the lack of precision in homeowners’ estimates are correlated with tenure, but not with socioeconomic characteristics. However, we also show that self-reported home values from short-tenure homeowners can be used to obtain unbiased and precise estimates of the average house value at the census tract level.     

TECHNICAL CHANGE AND FORMATION OF EXPECTATIONS

The aim of this paper is to discuss the implications for the process of expectation formation as developed by Keynes and the Post‐Keynesians when technical change (as understood by the Evolutionary and Institutional school of thought) is taken into account. The claim made here is that the traditional division of expectations in short and long period is insufficient to deal with all features of technical change, and thus, a new type of expectations (medium‐period) is proposed. Moreover, it is claimed that the independence among different types of expectations cannot stand when medium‐period expectations are taken into account.     

Intergenerational mobility and sample selection in short panels

Using data from the first 11 waves of the BHPS, this paper measures the extent of the selection bias induced by standard coresidence conditions—bias that is expected to be severe in short panels—on measures of intergenerational mobility in occupational prestige. We try to limit the impact of other selection biases, such as those induced by labour market restrictions that are typically imposed in intergenerational mobility studies, by using different measures of socio‐economic status that account for missing labour market information. We stress four main results. First, there is evidence of an underestimation of the true intergenerational elasticity, the extent of which ranges between 12% and 39%. Second, the proposed methods used to correct for the selection bias seem to be unable to attenuate it, except for the propensity score weighting procedure, which performs well in most circumstances. This result is confirmed both under the assumption of missing‐at‐random data as well as under the assumption of not‐missing‐at‐random data. Third, the two previous sets of results (direction and extent of the bias, and differential abilities to correct for it) are also robust when we account for measurement error. Fourth, restricting the sample to a period shorter than the 11 waves under analysis leads to a severe sample selection bias. In the cases when the analysis is limited to eight waves, this bias ranges from about 40% to 65%. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategy of professional forecasting

We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded. The second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated.     

The Effects of Performance Measurement and Compensation on Motivation: An Empirical Study

Summary This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between pay and performance. Economic and psychological theories predict that the design and implementation of a performance measurement and compensation system affect the motivation of employees. Our survey results demonstrate a positive relationship between the perceived characteristics of the complete compensation system and extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic motivation is not affected by the design of monetary compensation, but by promotion opportunities. The compensation system also significantly affects work satisfaction and turnover intent. Our results have both managerial as well as policy implications. We would like to thank the organization and the participants of the 2002 conference of the Performance Measurement Association in Boston for helpful discussions and also seminar participants of the Dutch Labor Market Conference. We are grateful for the comments provided by Bruno S. Frey. The paper has also significantly benefited from the suggestions and comments of two anonymous referees.     

Firms' financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition

Thin capitalization rules have become an important element in the corporate tax systems of developed countries. This paper sets up a model where national and multinational firms choose tax-efficient financial structures and countries compete for multinational firms through statutory tax rates and thin capitalization rules that limit the tax-deductibility of internal debt flows. In a symmetric tax competition equilibrium, each country chooses inefficiently low tax rates and inefficiently lax thin capitalization rules. We show that a coordinated tightening of thin capitalization rules benefits both countries, even though it intensifies competition via tax rates. When countries differ in size, the smaller country not only chooses the lower tax rate but also the more lenient thin capitalization rule.     

News shocks or parametric indeterminacy? An observational equivalence result in linear rational expectations models

This paper studies identification in linear rational expectations models with news shocks. We show that news-driven models and indeterminate equilibrium economies with i.i.d. fundamentals are observationally equivalent. This finding calls for carefully designing empirical investigations of news shocks in estimated DSGE models.     

Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power

We match individual senators’ voting behavior on legislative proposals with 24 real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues with identical wording. This setting allows us to evaluate the median voter model’s quality with revealed constituents’ preferences. Results indicate a limited explanatory power of the median voter model: It explains 17.6% points more than random voting and that a senator’s probability to accept a proposal in parliament increases on average by 8.4% points when the district median voter accepts the proposal.     

Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?

A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often targeted by their peers for punishment. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself as a second-order public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment; subjects are engaged in a cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment.