A Model for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Economic Education in Primary Grades

Understandably, many economists have grave doubts about the possibility of teaching basic economic concepts to primary level children. Davison and Kilgore report on the development and use of their Primary Test of Economic Understanding. Some 500 second-grade pupils and 24 teachers were involved in their experiment. A control group made up of children who received regular social studies instruction was compared with experimental groups using primary level economics materials. Differences in the pupils' general academic ability, socioeconomic environment and teacher preparation were taken into account. The authors found that children in early elementary grades can learn certain basic economic concepts.     

El Niño southern oscillation and its effects on world vegetable oil prices: assessing asymmetries using smooth transition models

In this research, we examine the effects of El Niño southern oscillation (ENSO) on market dynamics of major vegetable oil prices. We adopt a smooth transition vector error correction modelling framework to analyse the impacts of ENSO events on the vegetable oil prices and, more interestingly, to investigate the asymmetric nature of the ENSO dynamics and price responses to ENSO shocks. The results confirm self‐exciting type nonlinearities in the ENSO dynamics, and presence of the so‐called transactions cost band in the system of vegetable oil prices. These nonlinearities yield the history‐specific asymmetries in the vegetable oil price dynamics, wherein effects of ENSO shocks on the ENSO dynamics and the vegetable oil prices vary considerably between different ENSO regimes. In general, positive deviations, El Niño events, result in the vegetable oil price increase, while negative deviations, La Niña events, result in decrease in the prices. We illustrate these effects using generalised impulse‐response functions and the derived asymmetry measures.     

Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms

Earlier experimental work on public good mechanisms has focused almost exclusively on stability issues, finding that institutions with robust equilibrium stability properties were better at achieving their equilibrium. In this study, we continue to explore this insight and, in addition, look at issues such as out-of-equilibrium punishment and complexity. The experiment varies stability conditions and group size in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms. These mechanisms have similar stability properties. However, when groups are large, they differ both in the severity with which they punish out-of-equilibrium behavior and their informational complexity. We examine how these differences impact mechanism performance.     

What a Difference a Year Makes: Time Lag Effect of Information Technology Investment on Firm Performance

How long does it take for a firm to realize the performance benefits of its IT investment? This article explores the time lag effects of IT investment on firm performance. Using longitudinal data of 1421 firm-time observations over a period of six years (1991–1996) as the initial time point of IT investment, we examined time lag effect on firm performance in a five-year time window. The performance data for the sample spans 12 years, from 1989 to 2000. The results demonstrate a strong support for time lag effects on the relationship between IT investment and firm performance. Specifically, our study found that it took an average of approximately three to four years after the year of investment for the firms in our sample to realize the greatest performance benefits. The findings offer useful implications for researchers and managers to better understand the link between IT and firm performance so that they can make wiser decisions to maximize the business value of their investments.     

Competition to Save Lives: Political competition and health outcomes in India

Governance indicators have come under fire in recent years, especially the World Governance Indicators. Critics present these indicators as atheoretical and biased. Critics of the critics counter that no better alternatives exist. The authors suggest otherwise, arguing that more appropriate “governance” indicators will: have theoretical grounding; focus on specific fields of engagement; emphasize outcomes; and control for key contextual differences in comparing countries. Such constructs can help indicate where countries seem to have governance problems, allowing second-stage analyses of where and what these problems are; they do not directly point to the presence or nature of problems or provide a measure of the governance concept. Under-5 mortality rates adjusted for country income groups are shown as an example of such a measure, and data presented for contextually compared outcomes in this specific field to show where governance seems better and worse. The USA is shown up as relatively weak, whereas a country such as Pakistan seems to have better governance in this sector than other low-income countries. The indicator has its weaknesses and is partly presented as an illustrative example of a new approach, but also allows questions about why governance of this sector might be problematic in certain contexts and easier in others.     

Television advertising and childrens' attitudes toward proprietary medicine

The effect of exposure to television drug advertising on children's attitudes toward proprietary medicines and medicine use was investigated in two experiments. The first experiment presented the commercials in a realistic program context fashion. The second experiment presented the commercials in a more direct and controlled manner. Using drug questionnaires, the subjects were assessed for their attitudes regarding the use of proprietary drugs. The results of both studies indicated that exposure to drug advertising had little influence on children's attitudes. Furthermore, children preferred not to watch drug commercials in comparison to a TV program or other types of commercials.