Do international labor standards contribute to the persistence of the child-labor problem?

In recent years, a number of governments and consumer groups in rich countries have tried to discourage the use of child-labor in poor countries through measures such as product boycotts and the imposition of international labor standards. The purported objective of such measures is to reduce the incidence of child-labor in developing countries and thereby improve children’s welfare. In this paper, we examine the effects of such policies from a political-economy perspective. We show that these types of international action on child-labor tend to lower domestic political support within developing countries for banning child-labor. Hence, international labor standards and product boycotts may delay the ultimate eradication of child-labor.     

The effect of working time and labor force participation on unemployment: A new argument in an old debate

This paper introduces a new argument into the theoretical literature on labor market effects of changes in working hours and labor force participation. We advance a general equilibrium model in which increased labor supply reduces unskilled unemployment via consumer demand: longer work hours and higher labor force participation imply higher incomes and less (leisure) time. In consequence, home production is reduced in favor of outsourcing domestic tasks to the market, shifting consumer demand toward unskill-intensive goods. Relative demand for unskilled labor rises and unemployment falls.     

Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments

This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. At the first stage, the owners choose a linear combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. At the second stage, the two managers compete in an oligopolistic tournament against each other. The findings substantially differ from the results for Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly: There exist asymmetric equilibria where one owner puts a positive weight on sales and the other a negative one, although the structure of the game is completely symmetric. If the influence of noise vanishes, the owner of the more aggressive firm will even induce sales maximization to his manager in order to preempt his competitor. Received: 22 April 2004, Accepted: 25 December 2005 JEL Classification: L1, M2 I would like to thank the editor Semih Koray, two anonymous referees, Ulf Schiller, Dirk Sliwka, Gunter Steiner, and the participants of the Microeconomics Seminar of the Humboldt University at Berlin for very helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant KR 2077/2-3 and SFB/TR 15 ("Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems"), is gratefully acknowledged.     

Methoden zur allokation von sicherheitskapital Darstellung und Beurteilung aus Sicht der Unternehmungsleitung

If the board of an insurance company wants to allocate capital to its business fields it is worth-while to base this decision on a conceptual distinction between profit and risk (safety first-principle). For calculating the amounts of capital allocated five methods can be used. These methods differ in the way risk is measured. To evaluate strengths and weaknesses of these methods four criteria are introduced: power, compatibility regarding the board’s preferences, costs and board involvement. Checking the criteria for each method gives the result that three methods are dominated. The board, therefore, has to choose only between the volatility based method (in its variance-proportional form) and the shortfall based method.     

Export Behavior and Firm Productivity in German Manufacturing: A Firm-Level Analysis

This paper examines the causal relationship between productivity and exporting in German manufacturing. We find a causal link from high productivity to presence in foreign markets, as postulated by a recent literature on international trade with heterogeneous firms. We apply a matching technique in order to analyze whether the presence in international markets enables firms to achieve further productivity improvements, without finding significant evidence for this. We conclude that high-productivity firms self-select themselves into export markets, while exporting itself does not play a significant role for the productivity of German firms. JEL no. F10, F13, F14, D21, L60