From knowledge to business ecosystems: emergence of an entrepreneurial activity during knowledge replication

Small Business Economics - Our article emphasizes the relationship between knowledge and business ecosystems. Transformation of a knowledge ecosystem can lead to the emergence of a technological...     

On the definition of externality as a missing market

Within the general equilibrium framework, externalities are regarded as missing markets which invalidate the first theorem of welfare economics. As witnessed by some authors’ positions in the 1970s, this definition does not highlight whether or not it is an exogenous and an unintended effect. These ambiguities raise the issue of the relation between the basic formalisation of an externality (a dependence of individual objective functions) and its economic meaning (a missing market). Finally, they also raise the more general issue of the dilution of externality in the larger notion of individual interaction.     

Knowledge, hierarchy and the selection of routines: an interpretative model with group interactions

The aim of this paper is to analyze the selection of routines inside an organizational structure characterized by different cognitive representations and facing hierarchical pressure leading to either truce or conflict. After a brief discussion of the role of hierarchy and the related problems of organizational practice selection in the evolutionary literature, we model the interactions between different groups within a firm trying to interfere with its coordination mechanisms in order to support their own practices. Numerical simulations highlight the different learning abilities present in various organizational set-ups and their related knowledge distribution. It is shown that networking designs are the most profitable organizational configurations because of their dynamics of learning, though they are very sensitive to the truce problem.JEL Classification: L14, L20, L22, B52, D83Correspondence to: Nathalie Lazaric     

Attention allocation to multiple goals: The case of for‐profit social enterprises

The complexity of issues firms have to attend to make it impossible for CEOs to give their full attention to all issues concurrently. Drawing on the “attention‐based view” of the firm, this paper opens the black box of attention allocation in for‐profit social enterprises by showing how attention structures and the context in which the firm operates interplay. Utilizing empirical data on 148 for‐profit social enterprises, findings show that the attention structures—other‐regarding values, utilitarian identity, and resource availability—have a significant impact on the relative attention to social goals, while past firm performance as a context variable moderates these relations. Applying the principles of structural and situated attention, this paper makes an important contribution to management theory and attention allocation in for‐profit social enterprises. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ambiguous role of cultural moderators in intercultural business negotiations

Many modern business negotiations cross borders, and one plausible idea for successfully managing such negotiations is to equip negotiation teams with a “cultural moderator,” an individual who has the same cultural background as the business partner. This study investigates the effect of cultural moderators on both the negotiation process (e.g., use of integrative strategies) and economic outcomes (e.g., profit). Using German and French negotiators in an experimental setting, the authors show that a cultural moderator's influence on the team's use of integrative strategies depends on the moderator's degree of collectivism. With respect to economic outcomes, the presence of a cultural moderator always improves a team's results. Together, these findings suggest that the benefits of using a cultural moderator are not unconditional; rather, they depend on the cultural moderator's cultural background and on the negotiation goals (process vs. outcome) of the team that employs the moderator.     

Individual utility in a context of asymmetric sensitivity to pleasure and pain: an interpretation of Bentham's felicific calculus

This paper aims at exploring, in a formal way, Bentham's statement that ‘the pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing’, which belongs to those aspects of the principle of utility left aside by Jevons‘ reconstruction. Consequently, the agent’s preference order will be viewed as depending on his initial situation, and on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses, relative to this situation. This leads 1) to discuss the coexistence of multiple preference orders, illustrated by Bentham's analysis of the optimal labour contract; and 2) to introduce true deliberation as a consequence of the gap between positive choice and rival assessments of utility.     

EXPLAINING RISING INEQUALITY: SKILL‐BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE AND NORTH–SOUTH TRADE*

Abstract We review the ‘skill‐biased technological change (SBTC) versus North–South trade (NST)’ debate in order to explain widening wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. The traditional explanations based on exogenous SBTC and on the North–South Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson approach, as well as the early estimates that diagnosed a clear prevalence of the former, are firstly exposed and discussed. A presentation is then made of the recent theoretical literature that endogenizes SBTC, introduces new channels of impacts from NST, and combines both explanations. Finally, the current estimates show that (i) both explanations are relevant, (ii) their impacts differ according to industries and countries, (iii) outsourcing is the main vector of impact from NST and (iv) SBTC and NST interact.     

Risk Mutualization and Competition in Insurance Markets

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of mutual firms on competition in the insurance market. We distinguish two actors in this market: mutual firms, which belong to their pooled members, and traditional companies, which belong to their shareholders. Our approach differs from the literature by one crucial assumption: the expected utility of the consumers depends on the size of their insurance firm, which generates network externalities in this market. Thus, the choice of a contract results in a trade-off between the premium level and the probability of that premium being ex-post adjusted. The optimal contract offered by a mutual firm involves a systematic ex-post adjustment (negative or positive), while the contracts a company offers imply a fixed premium that is possibly negatively adjusted at the end of the contractual period. In an oligopoly game, we show that three types of configurations are possible at equilibrium: either one mutual firm or insurance company is active, or a mixed structure emerges in which two or more companies share the market with or without a mutual firm.     

Programming and Advertising Competition in the Broadcasting Industry

We analyze competition between two private television channels that derive their profits from advertising receipts. These profits are shown to be proportional to total population advertising attendance. The channels play a sequential game in which they first select their profiles (program mixes) and then their advertising ratios . We show that these ratios play the same role as prices in usual horizontal differentiation models. We prove that whenever ads' interruptions are costly for viewers the program mixes of the channels never converge but that the niche strategies are less effective and that the channel "profiles" are closer as advertising aversion becomes stronger.