Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments

Arrow's “impossibility” and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but “saturating” domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly) monotone “economic preferences” for private and/or public goods. For strongly saturating domains of more general utility profiles, this paper provides similar extensions of Wilson's theorem and of the strong and weak “welfarism” results due to d'Aspremont and Gevers and to Roberts. Hence, for social welfare functionals with or without interpersonal comparisons of utility, most previous classification results in social choice theory apply equally to strongly saturating economic domains.     

Optimal Hedging under Intertemporally Dependent Preferences

This paper examines optimal hedging behavior in a market where preferences for current consumption are partly determined by the consumer's past consumption history. The model considers an individual exposed to price risk, who allocates wealth between consumption and futures contracts over a (continuous-time) finite planning horizon. The speculative component of the hedge ratio is shown to be smaller and the consumption path smoother than in models where preferences are separable over time. Some comparative-static properties of the hedge ratio are also examined.     

Purchasing Power Parity in the Long Run

This paper re-examines the evidence on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) in the long run. Previous studies have generally been unable to reject the hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random walk. If true, this implies that PPP does not hold. In contrast, this paper casts serious doubt on this random walk hypothesis. The results follow from more powerful estimation techniques, applied in a multilateral framework. Deviations from PPP, while substantial in the short run, appear to take about three years to be reduced in half.     

Web‐Based Disclosure About Value Creation Processes: A Monitoring Perspective

Adopting a monitoring perspective, this study aims to explain how and why firms provide web‐based disclosure about their value creation and its underlying processes. We rely on the balanced scoreboard approach to measure disclosure. Our results suggest that costs incurred by capital markets' participants as well as monitoring by the board and the media drive disclosure. Moreover, we argue and document that a firm's disclosure is actually a part of its governance configuration and influences some board processes.     

The Pricing of Default-free Interest Rate Cap,Floor, and Collar Agreements

The paper focuses on the valuation of caps, floors, and collars in a contingent claim framework under continuous time. These instruments are interpreted as options on traded zero coupon bonds. The bond prices themselves are used as the underlying stochastic variables. This has the advantage that we end up with closed form solutions which are easy to compute. Special attention is devoted to the choice of the stochastic process appropriate for the price dynamics of the underlying zero coupon bonds.     

Currency Hedging for International Portfolios

This paper examines the benefits from currency hedging, both for speculative and risk minimization motives, in international bond and equity portfolios. The risk-return performances of globally diversified portfolios are compared with and without forward contracts. Over the period 1974 to 1990, inclusion of forward contracts results in statistically significant improvements in the performance of unconditional portfolios containing bonds. Conditional strategies are also implemented, both in sample and out of sample, and are shown to both significantly improve the risk-return tradeoff of global portfolios and to outperform unconditional hedging strategies.     

The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Indirect Taxes

The objective of this paper is to understand the determinants of the enforcement level of indirect taxation in a positive setting. We build a sequential game where individuals, who differ in their willingness to pay for a taxed good, vote over the enforcement level. Firms then compete à la Cournot and choose the fraction of sales taxes to evade. We assume in most of the paper that the tax rate is set exogenously. Voters face the following trade‐off: more enforcement not only increases tax collection but also increases the consumer price of the goods sold in an imperfectly competitive market. We obtain that the equilibrium enforcement level is the one most preferred by the individual with the median willingness to pay, that it is not affected by the structure of the market (number of firms) and the firms’ marginal cost, and that it decreases with the resource cost of evasion and with the tax rate. We also compare the enforcement level chosen by majority voting with the utilitarian level. In the last section, we endogenize the tax rate by assuming that individuals vote simultaneously over tax rate and enforcement level. We prove the existence of a Condorcet winner and show that it entails full enforcement (i.e., no tax evasion at equilibrium). The existence of markets with less than full enforcement then depends crucially on the fact that tax rates are not tailored to each market individually.     

Make Trade Not War?

This paper analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between military conflicts and trade. We show that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is economically beneficial, military conflicts reduce trade, and leaders are rational. When war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information, the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains. However, countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country and the cost of a bilateral conflict. We test our predictions on a large data set of military conflicts on the 1950–2000 period. Using different strategies to solve the endogeneity issues, including instrumental variables, we find robust evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade openness. For proximate countries, we find that trade has had a surprisingly large effect on their probability of military conflict.     

Foreign Exchange Fixings and Returns around the Clock

The U.S. dollar appreciates in the run-up to foreign exchange (FX) fixes and depreciates thereafter, tracing a W-shaped return pattern around the clock. Return reversals for the top nine traded currencies over a 21-year period are pervasive and highly statistically significant, and they imply daily swings of more than one billion U.S. dollars based on spot volumes. Using natural experiments, we document the existence of a published reference rate determines the timing of intraday return reversals. We present evidence consistent with an inventory risk explanation whereby FX dealers intermediate unconditional demand for U.S. dollars at the fixes.