In Search of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area

This paper applies the DSGE‐VAR methodology to assess the size of fiscal multipliers in the data and the relative contributions of two transmission mechanisms of government spending shocks, namely hand‐to‐mouth consumers and Edgeworth complementarity. Econometric experiments show that a DSGE model with Edgeworth complementarity is a better representation of the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy as it yields dynamic responses close to those obtained with the flexible DSGE‐VAR model (i.e. an impact output multiplier larger than one and a crowding‐in of private consumption). The estimated share of hand‐to‐mouth consumers is too small to replicate the positive response of private consumption. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relation among self-efficacy,learning approaches,and academic performance: an exploratory study

Self-efficacy influences students’ activities, effort and persistence, and it can help predict their motivation and academic performance. This study attempts to investigate the relationship between self-efficacy, preferred learning methods, and academic performance under different learning methods in a unique hospitality course setting. The results indicate that hospitality management students prefer a “learn by doing” approach instead of computer-based learning and lecturing. This study concludes that self-efficacy affects the academic performance in both lecturing and practical learning in hospitality education. However, students’ preference in terms of learning methods does not influence their academic performance. Emphasizing “learn by doing” in the hospitality higher education curriculum is recommended in addition to recruiting faculty members with extensive industry experience. Conversely, it is recommended that faculty find the means to increase students’ self-efficacy when adopting different teaching approaches.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

On the Differential Effects of European Patents

Since the invention of the European Patent System, national patent systems have continued to co-exist, although they did lose appeal. How have the different national systems been affected in view of their characteristics? In order to answer this question a constant-market-share (CMS) analysis is carried out. While on a theoretical level, the different elements adding to the appeal of each patent system are discussed, the CMS-analysis reveals the importance of country size in that the national systems of smaller countries lose.     

Mr. Market's Mind: Finance's Hard Problem

The market as a mind is the implicit premise in any discussion on whether the market is rational or not. Still, its implications, in terms of ontology and epistemology, are hardly understood. In particular, this paper defines the market's version of the mind-body problem and labels it as finance's “hard” problem. Its denial by modern finance causes this dominant paradigm to fail in dealing with reality in general and to produce incomplete investment knowledge in particular. Finally, as part of facing up to this problem, this paper offers a glimpse at a practical approach which may enrich investment research.     

Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade‐offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice‐witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice‐witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.