An Investigation of Policy Administrative Costs Using Panel Data for the English Environmentally Sensitive Areas

This paper explores transactions costs in the context of agri‐environmental policy schemes based on management agreements. While transactions costs encompass a wide range of organisational costs, the focus here is on the public‐sector administrative costs of policy implementation. Empirical administrative cost functions were estimated to investigate the factors affecting the magnitude of such costs, using panel data spanning five years for the 22 English Environmentally Sensitive Areas. The extent of participation appears to be important in explaining administrative cost variability across areas. The data suggested the existence of size economics with regard to the numbers of agreements made in any one ESA, and a significant effect of scheme experience in exerting downwards‐pressure on administrative costs. Policy budgeting and evaluation should take into account the non‐trivial costs of organisation, particularly if agri‐environmental schemes based on the procurement of conservation goods through management agreements are to be extended in future.     

Dynamic Factor Demands and Technology Measurement under Arbitrary Expectations

We present a dynamic model of factor demands based on expected discounted costs minimization. While making only very mild assumptions on expectations and technology, we are able to establish a duality relationship between contemporary factor demands and the technology, and we provide formula for easily recovering marginal products, returns to scale, and technological change from estimated factor demands. Parametrization and implementation are illustrated in a detailed example.     

The Role of Knowhow Acquisition in the Formation and Duration of Joint Ventures

We analyze the role of knowhow acquisition in the formationand duration of joint ventures. Two parties become partnersin a joint venture to benefit from each other’s knowhow.Joint operations provide each party with the opportunity toacquire part of its partner’s knowhow. A party’sincreased knowhow provides the impetus for the dissolution ofthe joint venture. We characterize the conditions under whichdissolution takes place, identify the party that buys out itspartner, determine the time to dissolution, establish its comparativestatics, and examine the implications of knowledge acquisitionfor the desirability of joint venture formation. (JEL code:G34)     

Intraday Value at Risk (IVaR) using tick-by-tick data with application to the Toronto Stock Exchange

This paper investigates the use of tick-by-tick data for intraday market risk measurement. We propose a method to compute an Intraday Value at Risk based on irregularly spaced high-frequency data and an intraday Monte Carlo simulation. A log-ACD–ARMA–EGARCH model is used to specify the joint density of the marked point process of durations and high-frequency returns. We apply our methodology to transaction data for three stocks actively traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Compared to traditional techniques applied to intraday data, our methodology has two main advantages. First, our risk measure has a higher informational content as it takes into account all observations. On the total risk measure, our method allows for distinguishing the effect of random trade durations from the effect of random returns, and for analyzing the interaction between these factors. Thus, we find that the information contained in the time between transactions is relevant to risk analysis, which is consistent with predictions from asymmetric-information models in the market microstructure literature. Second, once the model has been estimated, the IVaR can be computed by any trader for any time horizon based on the same information and with no need of sampling the data and estimating the model again when the horizon changes. Backtesting results show that our approach constitutes reliable means of measuring intraday risk for traders who are very active in the market.     

Price competition during and after promotions

We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform

It is generally accepted that moving from an unfunded to a funded social security system implies a welfare loss for the transition generation—that is, the generation that has to pay twice: first, saving for its own retirement and, second, contributing to the pensions of the then retired generation. This article shows that in a setting of endogenous growth with positive externality such a transition can be Pareto improving. But it argues also that social security reform is more a pretext than a requirement for internalizing such a positive externality.     

Product Unbundling in the Travel Industry: The Economics of Airline Bag Fees

This paper provides theory and evidence on airline bag fees, offering insights into a real‐world case of product unbundling. The theory predicts that an airline's fares should fall when it introduces a bag fee, but that the full‐trip price (the bag fee plus the new fare) could either rise or fall. The empirical evidence presented in the paper provides strong confirmation of the first prediction. The data also suggest that the average fare falls by less than the bag fee itself so that the full price of a trip rises for passengers who choose to check bags.