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OPTIMAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING DRAWDOWNS 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
We analyze the optimal risky investment policy for an investor who, at each point in time, wants to lose no more than a fixed percentage of the maximum value his wealth has achieved up to that time. In particular, if M t is the maximum level of wealth W attained on or before time t , then the constraint imposed on his portfolio choice is that Wt α M t , where α is an exogenous number betweenα O and 1. We show that, for constant relative risk aversion utility functions, the optimal policy involves an investment in risky assets at time t in proportion to the "surplus" W t - α M t . the optimal policy may appear similar to the constant-proportion portfolio insurance policy analyzed in Black and Perold (1987) and Grossman and Vila (1989). However, in those papers, the investor keeps his wealth above a nonstochastic floor F instead of a stochastic floor α M t . the stochastic character of the floor studied here has interesting effects on the investment policy in states of nature when wealth is at an all-time high; i.e., when Wt = M t . It can be shown that at W t = M t , α M t is expected to grow at a faster rate than W t , and therefore the investment in the risky asset can be expected to fall. We also show that the investment in the risky asset can be expected to rise when W t is close to α M t . We conjecture that in an equilibrium model the stochastic character of the floor creates "resistance" levels as the market approaches an all-time high (because of the reluctance of investors to take more risk when W t = M t ). 相似文献
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This paper assesses banking market integration in Japan during the period 1889-1938 using annual data on loan rates and spreads between loan and deposit rates. Banks in prefectures further from the financial centers exhibited higher loan rates and greater spreads than banks closer to the center, however, distance effects diminished over time, suggesting that banking markets became increasingly integrated due to declines in transaction costs. Additionally, loan rates and spreads varied negatively with the intensity of local bank competition, consistent with the notion of market segmentation. We speculate that Japan’s anti-competitive banking regulation might have slowed the process of banking market integration. 相似文献
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We examine two different ways to subsidize charitable giving: by a rebate (returning a portion of the donation to the giver) or by a match (adding additional donations to the giver's donation). In previous experimental research, we have shown that participants give more to charity under the match than under an equivalent rebate. The previous within-subject experimental design required participants to make a series of decisions under both types of subsidy. Each decision consisted of an allocation of an endowment between the subject and a charity chosen by the subject from a specified list. This article examines whether that result is an artifact of the previous within-subjects design: subjects may have failed to fully distinguish the two types of subsidy. In the current article, we report results from a between-subjects design, where participants are required to make only one type of decision—involving rebates or involving matching subsidies. Our results confirm previous findings. 相似文献
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Invariably, studies, proposals, and plans for social programscontain a strong recommendation for evaluation and monitoring.Reliable information about what works and why is clearly vitalfor improving existing programs or designing future ones. Makingsuch assessments requires effective methods of evaluation. Policymakerswho use these evaluations need to know about the methodsthe pitfalls to watch for and the relative advantages and disadvantagesof different techniques in different situations. This articledescribes these evaluation methods and the experience accumulatedin the United States in applying them in practice. 相似文献