Executive stock options,differential risk-taking incentives,and firm value

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.     

A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

I Want You Back: The Interplay Between Legal Availability and Movie Piracy

Abstract

Although it is well known in the academic literature that anti-piracy measures can reduce the demand for pirated content, there are relatively few papers analyzing how legal availability impacts piracy. In this study, we answer two relevant research questions: (1) Does the availability of movies in legal digital channels reduce the demand for digital piracy? (2) Is the level of piracy prior to a movie’s release in a legal digital channel a reliable signal of legal demand after release? We answer these questions using a unique data set provided by a major motion picture studio. Our data contain 1520 catalog movies introduced to iTunes between April 2011 and April 2012. We find that iTunes availability leads to an 11.8% decrease in monthly piracy. We also find that pre-release piracy positively correlates with post-release electronic sell-through sales but not with video-on-demand sales.     

Testing alone is insufficient

Review of Economic Design - The fear of contracting a serious illness caused by a contagious disease limits economic activity even after reopening. Widespread testing alone will not alleviate this...     

Regulatory independence and thermal power plant performance: evidence from India

Journal of Regulatory Economics - We examine the role of regulatory independence on electricity generation performance in India. Electricity generation in India is exposed to several regulatory...