Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Information–driven trading at the Prague Stock Exchange: Evidence from Intra–Day Data

Many observers argue that informed and insider trading is widespread in the emerging financial markets of transition countries, yet rigorous treatment of this issue has been virtually non–existent. The current paper estimates the extent of informed trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) using intra–day transaction data. Our estimates confirm that the average share of informed trading is equal to 0.32, which is high relative to developed markets and varies considerably among stocks. Using the Easley et al. (1996) approach on the very best segment of the PSE we obtained a high average probability of informed trading. Since data used in this study cover the period after the major attempts to improve market regulations, our results indicate that the PSE needs further strengthening to recover credibility and to become a real source of corporate financing. JEL classification: G14, G15.     

Are recent segment disclosures of Japanese firms useful?: Views of Japanese financial analysts

Since 1990, the Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) has required Japanese firms to disclose segment data in annual financial statements. Using a survey instrument, we examine whether Japanese analysts find these segment disclosures to be useful. Our study finds that analysts perceive that segment data aid them in forecasting consolidated sales and net income. However, results also show that analysts are concerned that Japanese firms do not define segments meaningfully and consistently and are arbitrary in the allocation of common costs. Further, the analysts do not believe that the usefulness of segment data improves when it is audited. These results have implications for investors in Japanese stocks and accounting policy bodies, such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).     

Komplexität erfolgreich steuern — 27. Österreichischer Controllertag in Wien

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Trade Creation,Replacement, and Destruction in Regional Trade Agreements: Micro‐level Evidence for the UK*

Empirical questions surrounding the effect of regional trade agreements on international trade have typically been answered with reference to macro‐level gravity equations. Prominent within this has been whether they create or divert trade. In this paper, motivated by the recent development of theories of export‐platform FDI, we use micro‐level data to explore the part of trade diversion that follows from FDI. Using information on acquisition FDI in the UK manufacturing sector between 1988 and 1998 we find evidence of trade creation, replacement, and destruction from FDI external and internal to the EU.     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Background Risk and the Performance of Insurance Markets under Adverse Selection

Background risk can influence the performance of insurance markets that must deal with adverse selection when applicants are risk vulnerable, since they are more averse to bearing the insurable risk as a result of their exposures to background risk. We show that background risk always results in a lower deductible for the incentive constrained contract, and that a broader range of markets attains the stable sequential equilibrium cross-subsidized pair of separating contracts. We conclude that background risk always improves the performance of markets for coverage against (insurable) foreground risks that must deal with adverse selection. We also find, however, that these improvements are never sufficient to offset the cost to insureds of bearing the background risk.