Identification of Economies of Scope in a Stochastic Production Environment

This paper extends the definition of economies of scope to multioutput firms that face an uncertain production environment. Identification of economies of scope in this environment, however, requires separability assumptions on the technology. These identification restrictions are demonstrated in the paper. For each identification restriction, the definition of economies of scope is generalized to the case of uncertain production and risk aversion.
L'article que voici élargit la définition des économies de gamme aux entreprises à produits multiples aux prises avec une situation incertaine au niveau de la production. Pour cerner les économies de gamme dans une telle situation, il faut poser l'hypothèse de la séparation des technologies. Les auteurs illustrent ces restrictions et généralisent la définition des économies de diversification pour chacune d'elles dans le cas d'une production incertaine et de l'aversion du risque.     

Assessing and predicting financial vulnerability of Italian households: a micro-macro approach

In this study we develop a micro-founded model to analyse the economic-financial conditions of Italian households. Using household level data, we build an indicator to identify vulnerable households based on their budget constraint and the composition of their financial portfolio. Then, we calculate the impact of the predicted trends of macroeconomic variables on the indicator in order to monitor its evolution in the short term (2015–2017). The empirical analysis is based on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth of the Bank of Italy and on a set of macroeconomic forecasts. Our findings suggest that the macroeconomic scenario for the period 2015–2017 implies a progressive reduction in the percentage of vulnerable households for the full extent of the projection.     

A Study of Why Anomic Employees Harm Co-workers: Do Uncompassionate Feelings Matter?

Although anomic feelings have been found to lead employees to unethical performance, little is known about why this relationship is possible. The aim of this study is to test a compassion-based explanation of why anomic employees harm co-workers by displaying interpersonal deviance. The prediction is made that once sociological anomie (from the Greek, an-: absence, and -nomos: law) enters organizations in the form of employees’ private feelings of anomie—i.e., “anomia”—, this anomia will individually move staff to be uncompassionate in the workplace. Three uncompassionate feelings toward co-workers are then hypothesized to mediate the relationship between anomia and interpersonal deviance: (i) negative judgments about others, (ii) over-identification, and (iii) isolation. Data were collected from 280 employees at ten hotels in the Canary Islands (Spain). The results indicated that (a) anomia was significantly and positively linked to uncompassionate feelings and interpersonal deviance, (b) but only negative judgments about others mediated the anomia effects on interpersonal deviance. Findings suggest to managers that by spreading ethical standards that discourage negative judgments about others in the workplace, they can neutralize the mechanisms leading anomia to interpersonal deviance.     

Opting for Opting‐In? An Evaluation of the European Commission's Proposals for Reforming VAT on Financial Services*

This paper provides a legal and economic analysis of the European Commission's recent proposals for reforming the application of VAT to financial services, with particular focus on their ‘third pillar’, under which firms would be allowed to opt in to taxation on exempt insurance and financial services. From a legal perspective, we show that the proposals’‘first and second pillars’ would give rise to considerable interpretative and qualification problems, resulting in as much complexity and legal uncertainty as the current regime. Equally, an option to tax could potentially follow significantly different legal designs, which would give rise to discrepancies in the application of the option amongst Member States of the European Union (EU). On the economic side, we show that quite generally, when firms cannot coordinate their behaviour, they have an individual incentive to opt in on business‐to‐business (B2B) transactions, but not on business‐to‐consumer (B2C) transactions. We also show that opting‐in eliminates the cost disadvantage that EU financial services firms face in competing with foreign firms for B2B sales. But these results do not hold if firms can coordinate their behaviour. An estimate of the upper bound on the amount of tax revenue that might be lost from allowing opting‐in is provided for a number of EU countries.