Incentives,wages, employment,and the division of labor in teams

We develop a theory of incentives, wages, and employment in the context of team production. A central insight is that specialization and division of labor not only improve productivity but also increase effort and the sensitivity of effort to incentives under moral hazard. We show that employment and incentives are complements for the principal when the positive effects of specialization and division of labor outweigh the increase in risk associated with additional employment and are substitutes otherwise. We provide new characterizations of the partnership, the firm, and the role of the budget‐breaker that are quite different from the classical literature.     

Retaining a diverse workforce: the impact of gender‐focused human resource management

Demography theory suggests that high gender diversity leads to high turnover. As turnover is costly, we tested the following: a main effect prediction derived from demography theory, and a moderating effect prediction derived from the relational framework. Data on 198 publicly listed organisations were collected through a human resources decision‐maker survey and archival databases. The results indicate that higher gender diversity leads to lower turnover in organisations with many gender‐focused policies and practices. Findings suggest that organisations can lower their turnover rates by increasing their gender diversity and by implementing gender‐focused policies and practices.     

Do Sovereign Re‐Ratings Destabilize Equity Markets during Financial Crises? New Evidence from Higher Return Moments

This study investigates the effects of S&P's sovereign re‐ratings on the higher moments of equity market returns over recent financial crises. Using a set of intraday stock market index prices and sovereign credit ratings for a sample of 36 countries that experienced sovereign rating changes over the period from 1996 to 2013, we find that the higher moments of stock market returns are significantly more responsive to sovereign re‐ratings during financial crises, but the effects on stock markets are not the same across different financial crises. The effects during crises are, however, magnified for large downgrades and those that are associated with a loss of investment grade status. We find that there are asymmetric effects during financial crises in that downgrades are consistently more significant than upgrades in increasing realized volatility and realized kurtosis. Both upgrades and downgrades affect realized skewness in times of crises in the expected direction.     

Combining “real effort” with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications.     

Offshoring and the Elasticity of Labour Demand

This paper examines the impact of offshoring on labour demand and labour demand elasticities for a sample of 40 countries over the period 1995–2009 using the World Input–output Database (WIOD). Estimating the conditional labour demand model we find that offshoring impacts negatively labour demand, and in particular the demand for low- and medium-educated labour, with some evidence indicating that offshoring has tended to increase labour demand elasticities. Of particular interest are results for the subsamples of developed and developing countries. Most notably, we find that the negative effects of offshoring in developed countries are largest for high-educated labour, an outcome which we show is due to the offshoring of developed countries with other developed countries.     

Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally, under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.     

Activity of the Russian monetary and banking sector in conditions of adverse external factors of 2014–2015 affecting the economy

This article represents a discussion on how the adverse external factors of 2014–2015 affected the banking system and financial conditions of the real economy sector. The analysis is based on the data of bank accounting statements. The work also uses statistical data on the turnover and concentration obtained by aggregating the accounting statements available online on the Russian Central Bank’s official website.     

Corporate diversification and innovation: Managerial myopia or inefficient internal capital markets?

Which is more innovative: the decentralized, diversified firm, or the centralized, more narrowly focused firm? The economics and finance literatures argue that diversified firms have innovation advantages as their operating units have access to an internal capital market. In contrast, the strategy and entrepreneurship literatures argue that managers of these firms suffer from “managerial myopia,” discouraging them from investing in projects with long-term, uncertain payoffs. We take a fresh look at the relationship between innovation and diversification using a comprehensive sample of diversified and nondiversified firms and a novel approach that teases out the mechanisms influencing the relationship between diversification and innovation. Consistent with conceptual and empirical work in strategy, we find a robust negative correlation between diversification and R&D intensity, suggesting that diversification reduces innovation by discouraging investment. However, our analysis suggests that internal capital market inefficiencies, rather than managerial myopia, is responsible for this observed negative relationship.