Loanable Funds, Monitoring and Banking

This paper studies financial intermediation in a general equilibriumoverlapping generations model. Indivisible investment projects combine withinformational imperfections to create a (hidden action) moral hazard problemand introduce a role for third-party monitoring. Agency costs at theintermediary level are also considered. Under some conditions, monitors canbe viewed as banks facing a non-trivial portfolio diversification problem.Equilibria are derived in which a large nationwide bank coexists with anumber of community-regional banks, a structure of strong empiricalrelevance. Policies such as a mandatory reserve requirement are shown tohave substantial effects on the levels of investment in the economy.     

Substance, Form and PFI Contracts

The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched by the United Kingdom Government in 1992 in order to encourage the private sector in the UK to become more involved in public sector development projects. A key theme of the initiative was that the public should receive 'value for money'. This article investigates the accounting issue as to whether or not the private or the public sector should record any property related to PFI projects on balance sheet. It argues that although both HM Treasury and the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) might agree on the accounting principles, the practical impact is that in order for related properties to stay off the public sector's balance sheet, substantial risk needs to be transferred to the private sector. As a consequence of this, the objective of providing value for money to the public may not be achieved.     

TRENDS IN RURAL WAGES,WEST JAVA, 1977–83

This paper examines monthly wage data collected by the Agro Economic Survey from seven villages in the Cimanuk River Basin of West Java, where data on agricultural and non-agricultural wages and prices of nine essential commodities were collected twice monthly between 1977 and 1983. Movements in money wages deflated by both the rice price and a weighted index of basic commodities are analysed in detail and differences between lowland and upland villages are discussed.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN AGRICULTURE (REVISITED): A MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK AND SOME EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This paper explores the methodology of sectoral productivity growth measurement within the framework of input-output analysis. A method which ensures that sectoral productivity growth rates are consistent with productivity growth rates for the economy as a whole (as well as allowing for external trade) is suggested. New estimates are presented on total factor productivity in UK agriculture using a Tornqvist index procedure. In addition, new estimates of agricultural labour productivity growth are presented, taking account not only of labour employed in agriculture but also of labour employed in ancillary industries on the supply side. The empirical results confirm that part of the labour previously employed on farms has shifted “upstream” to industries providing agriculture with fertilises, machinery and other inputs.     

Option-Implied Risk Aversion Estimates

Using a utility function to adjust the risk‐neutral PDF embedded in cross sections of options, we obtain measures of the risk aversion implied in option prices. Using FTSE 100 and S&P 500 options, and both power and exponential‐utility functions, we estimate the representative agent's relative risk aversion (RRA) at different horizons. The estimated coefficients of RRA are all reasonable. The RRA estimates are remarkably consistent across utility functions and across markets for given horizons. The degree of RRA declines broadly with the forecast horizon and is lower during periods of high market volatility.     

Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard

In a Costly State Verification world, an agent who has private information regarding the state of the world must report what state occurred to a principal, who can verify the state at a cost. An agent then has what is called ex post moral hazard: he has an incentive to misreport the true state to extract rents from the principal. Assuming the principal cannot commit to an auditing strategy, the optimal contract is such that: (1) the agent's expected marginal utility when there is an accident (high‐ and low‐loss states) is equal to his marginal utility when there is no accident; (2) the lower loss is undercompensated, while the higher loss is overcompensated; and (3) the welfare of the agent is greater under commitment than under no‐commitment. Result 2 is contrary to the results obtained if the principal can commit to an auditing strategy (higher losses underpaid and lower losses overpaid). The reason is that by increasing the difference between the high and the low indemnity payments, the probability of fraud is reduced.     

Stability, Asymmetry and Seasonality of Fund Performance: An Analysis of Australian Multi‐sector Managed Funds

Using a sample of Australian Multi-sector trusts we examine selectivity and market timing performance and extend the analysis to include the relatively new measure of volatility timing. This is of particular relevance to our data set, as high levels of volatility persistence are prevalent in Australia. In addition we consider the stability, asymmetry and seasonality of the various performance and risk measures. A survivorship adjustment procedure is also employed in order to assess the impact of survivorship on selectivity, market timing and volatility timing performance.     

How Does Size Affect Mutual Fund Behavior?

If actively managed mutual funds suffer from diminishing returns to scale, funds should alter investment behavior as assets under management increase. Although asset growth has little effect on the behavior of the typical fund, we find that large funds and small‐cap funds diversify their portfolios in response to growth. Greater diversification, especially for small‐cap funds, is associated with better performance. Fund family growth is related to the introduction of new funds that hold different stocks from their existing siblings. Funds with many siblings diversify less rapidly as they grow, suggesting that the fund family may influence a fund's portfolio strategy.