Case for Evaluating Protection in an Economy-wide Perspective

‘Whether protectionism spreads, imposing major harm on the world economy, depends on three factors: the costs and benefits of trade for domestic political actors; these actors’ access to and control over the process of government; and the extent to which international commitments and obligations to trade policy are viewed as binding by national governments’ —Costs and Benefits of Protection (Paris: OECD Secretariat, 1985)     

Roles,Authority and Involvement of the Management Accounting Function: A Multiple Case-study Perspective

Recent techniques and shifts in the environment are often viewed as leading management accountants to adopt a business orientation. However, empirical evidence pointing to clear shifts in the role played by management accountants remains relatively scarce. From in-depth qualitative research based on 73 interviews in ten multinational companies, we identify four distinct styles of management accounting function: discrete, safeguarding, partner, and omnipotent. We show that each style can be associated with one main role: discrete control of managerial behaviour, socialisation of managers, facilitation of decision-making, and centralisation of power. From this in-depth analysis of management accountants' styles and roles we move on to discuss the authority they hold and the independence/involvement dilemma they face.     

An investigation of ingratiation as a career management strategy: evidence from Singapore

In spite of the recognition that career politics, and therefore ingratiation, is widely used to manage careers, there is a dearth of empirical studies on ingratiation as a career management strategy. Consistent with Ferris and Kacmar's (1988) suggestion, the study reported here investigated the conditions (defined by situational variables, career concerns and personality variables) under which ingratiation is used as a career management strategy. Data were obtained through a structured questionnaire from professional employees (N = 214) in public and private sector organizations in Singapore.

Factor analysis of the 21-item career concerns scale revealed four solutions representing internal and external career concerns. The results of the hierarchical regression revealed that situational variables explained most of the variance in ingratiation, followed by career concerns and personality variables. Among the individual variables, task ambiguity, supervisor reward power, managerial responsibility and need for achievement were significant while personal success approached significance. Internal career concern of autonomy development was unrelated to ingratiation. Of the interaction terms, only supervisor reward power and Machiavellianism approached significance. Directions for future studies are suggested.     

Random Effects Misspecification Can Have Severe Consequences for Random Effects Inference in Linear Mixed Models

There has been considerable and controversial research over the past two decades into how successfully random effects misspecification in mixed models (i.e. assuming normality for the random effects when the true distribution is non‐normal) can be diagnosed and what its impacts are on estimation and inference. However, much of this research has focused on fixed effects inference in generalised linear mixed models. In this article, motivated by the increasing number of applications of mixed models where interest is on the variance components, we study the effects of random effects misspecification on random effects inference in linear mixed models, for which there is considerably less literature. Our findings are surprising and contrary to general belief: for point estimation, maximum likelihood estimation of the variance components under misspecification is consistent, although in finite samples, both the bias and mean squared error can be substantial. For inference, we show through theory and simulation that under misspecification, standard likelihood ratio tests of truly non‐zero variance components can suffer from severely inflated type I errors, and confidence intervals for the variance components can exhibit considerable under coverage. Furthermore, neither of these problems vanish asymptotically with increasing the number of clusters or cluster size. These results have major implications for random effects inference, especially if the true random effects distribution is heavier tailed than the normal. Fortunately, simple graphical and goodness‐of‐fit measures of the random effects predictions appear to have reasonable power at detecting misspecification. We apply linear mixed models to a survey of more than 4 000 high school students within 100 schools and analyse how mathematics achievement scores vary with student attributes and across different schools. The application demonstrates the sensitivity of mixed model inference to the true but unknown random effects distribution.     

Sharp IV Bounds on Average Treatment Effects on the Treated and Other Populations Under Endogeneity and Noncompliance

In the presence of an endogenous binary treatment and a valid binary instrument, causal effects are point identified only for the subpopulation of compliers, given that the treatment is monotone in the instrument. With the exception of the entire population, causal inference for further subpopulations has been widely ignored in econometrics. We invoke treatment monotonicity and/or dominance assumptions to derive sharp bounds on the average treatment effects on the treated, as well as on other groups. Furthermore, we use our methods to assess the educational impact of a school voucher program in Colombia and discuss testable implications of our assumptions. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of commute time on racial earnings inequality: a case study of the Houston metropolitan statistical area

Data from the United States Census confirm a substantial increase in the racial earnings gap between 1980 and 1990. This paper examines data on whites and non-white wage and salary incomes in Houston TX for 1980 and 1990. Data on time travelled to work is used to simulate what would be the impact of shorter commute times on earnings inequality. The central finding is that a reduction in travel time from residence to work would cause a very small reduction in racial earnings and income inequality. This suggests that advances in urban transportation policy alone are not sufficient to solve the problem of racial earnings inequality.     

Prostitution services: an exploratory empirical analysis

This study provides an empirical analysis of the market for some male prostitution services in the UK. Flexible working hours, part-time working, and multiple job holding are considered as important labour market characteristics in this service sector. Statistical models helping explain the provision of a deviant and a more mainstream sexual service is reported, utilizing cross-section data drawn from individual prostitute advertisements. The significance of various declared intrinsic endowments of the prostitutes are examined in relation to the offer of these services, including age, ethnicity, physique, and masculine demeanour.     

Measuring worker flows

The study explores differences between two measurement concepts of worker flows widely used in the literature referred to as the turnover and reallocation concepts. It is found that measuring worker flows by the turnover concept leads to substantially (about 5% of total employment) higher worker flow estimates and slightly increases age, size and industry group effects on firm level worker flows as well as differences between growing and declining firms relative to the reallocation concept.     

Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”