Understanding hospital quality: the case of cumulative and balanced quality

A more precise way to conceptualize and operationalize hospital quality is needed to increase hospitals’ productivity. This paper investigates how hospitals’ conformance quality (CQ) and experiential quality (EQ), in terms of their combined magnitude (i.e. their interaction) and relative balance (i.e. the absolute difference between them) impact hospital productivity. First, we explore the impact of both the ‘combined dimension of quality’ and ‘balance dimension of quality’ on hospital productivity. Second, we investigate quality dominance to analyze its impact on productivity when CQ is greater than EQ, and vice versa. Secondary data (January 2015 to December 2015) were collected from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and American Hospital Directory (AHD) for US acute care hospitals. The results provide strong empirical support for the benefit of minimizing the gap between the two types of quality. In addition, the results suggest that considering quality dominance (experiential vs. conformance) might be useful in shedding light on the inherent tension that exists when firms are forced to allocate resources to provide different types of quality simultaneously.     

Asymptotic behavior of market shares for a stochastic growth model

Consider a market with finitely many firms, each enjoying an uncertain growth. We assume the (random) growth rates of these firms are independent and identically distributed. We show that the asymptotic probability distribution of the market shares gives each firm an equal probability of dominating the market (while all other firms are almost extinguished). In particular, these conclusions are independent of the initial market shares of the firms. We conclude that sample paths fluctuate between almost domination and almost extinction. We also demonstrate that these fluctuations may be very slow. Extensions to situations where the total demand is restricted are discussed.     

Agency Costs in Apartment Property Management Contracts

Because fees for property management services are based on gross rental collections rather than on net operating incomes, property managers may not always act in the best interest of property owners. This study is an examination of the agency costs that result from the conflict of interests between owners and managers. A nationwide proprietary sample of 242 apartment properties is analyzed to compare agency costs of four distinct types of ownership structures. Agency costs, measured as operating expenses per square foot, are found to be significantly higher for institutional owners than for noninstitutional owners, but not significantly higher in cases where no competition for property management services exists. We conclude that agency costs of property management contracts are significant and the fee provisions of standard property management contracts should be changed to better align the interests of managers and owners.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

The co‐evolution of capabilities and transaction costs: explaining the institutional structure of production

This paper proposes that transaction costs and capabilities are fundamentally intertwined in the determination of vertical scope, and identifies the key mechanisms of their co‐evolution. Specifically, we argue that capability differences are a necessary condition for vertical specialization; and that transaction cost reductions only lead to specialization when capabilities along the value chain are heterogeneous. Furthermore, we argue that there are four evolutionary mechanisms that shape vertical scope over time. First, the selection process, itself driven by capability differences, dynamically shapes vertical scope; second, transaction costs are endogenously changed by firms that try to reshape the transactional environment to increase their profit and market share; third, changes in vertical scope affect the nature of the capability development process, i.e., the way in which firms improve their operations over time; and finally, the changes in the capability development process reshape the capability pool in the industry, changing the roster of qualified participants. These dynamics of capability and transaction cost co‐evolution are illustrated through two contrasting examples: the mortgage banking industry in the United States, which shows the shift from integrated to disintegrated production; and the Swiss watch‐manufacturing industry, which went from disintegration to integration. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.