PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION: COSTS AND BENEFITS IN THE PRESENCE OF WAGE-BARGAINING

ABSTRACT ** :  The most important economic motive for privatization and liberalization is to reduce costs, which are believed to be higher in a public monopoly for several reasons, including internal rent capture. We assume that there is wage-bargaining both before and after privatization and liberalization. Wages are then in most cases reduced by liberalization but not by privatization as such. Social welfare may increase after liberalization with decentralized wage-bargaining if many firms enter, if the employees' bargaining strength is high and if there is no need of vertical separation. However, the social costs of privatization and liberalization are more likely to dominate despite free entry if sunk costs are high, and will always dominate under central wage-bargaining or vertical separation.     

Accountability and transparency in relation to human rights: A critical perspective reflecting upon accounting, corporate responsibility and ways forward in the context of globalisation

In this paper we critically theorise accountability and transparency, and accounting, in relation to human rights. Consistent with our perspective, we articulate human rights as a complex and very important construct. We link human rights to notions of accountability and transparency (and hence to accounting) and elaborate how theoretical debates and developments in the humanities and social sciences refine but do not displace the argument that governance for human rights is a meaningful pursuit and policy. Indeed, they in some ways promote the mobilisation of accounting in the context. We go on to elaborate further how accounting (we especially focus upon corporate accounting and reporting) may come to the service of human rights. Developing our critical perspective more concretely and positively, we reflect, giving consideration to real world happenings and relevant illustrations, upon the interface of accounting, various actors (especially corporations) and human rights in the context of globalisation. And we reflect upon ways forward.     

Electronic customer care: The innovative path to e-loyalty

In this paper, the authors argue that the use of an electronic customer relationship management system (eCRM system) enables traditional ‘physical’ customer proximity to be substituted by ‘digital’ proximity, within the scope of a multi-channel approach. This method of substitution presents enormous potential for cost reduction, profit maximisation and customer loyalty. The main intention of the paper is to illustrate how electronic customer care tools can be used to create customer e-loyalty in the field of private internet banking. The knowledge is supported by findings of a questionnaire survey based on a sample of 45 bank experts involved in eCRM and private internet banking in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the USA. This empirical study of the capability of electronic customer care technologies to enable individual customer banking relationships in the private internet banking field demonstrates the potential for customer loyalty specifically for the internet channel of distribution.     

THE SCOPE FOR NON‐PROFIT OBJECTIVES IN A MIXED OLIGOPOLY UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We ask how the scope for non‐profit objectives in a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) in a mixed oligopoly changes because of competition from firms in another country. There is no change if costs and demand are given, unless the trade partner is a low‐cost country. However, the scope for non‐profit objectives is limited by the country's relative size if wages are market‐clearing and if workers and firms are stationary, because of reduced competitiveness caused by higher real wage rates. The total surplus is then not affected by the actions of the SOE. International trade does not otherwise reduce the scope for its non‐profit objectives if workers and firms are mobile, but productivity differences might require restrictions in order to avoid a complete relocation of the workforce in either country.     

Do We Really Need a European Agency for Market Regulation?

In November 2007, the European Commission suggested that an EC regulatory agency should be set up for the telecommunications markets. The following paper examines the key tasks and structure of the proposed agency and identifies the limits to the delegation of powers involved by reflecting on the relevant case law and the existing doctrine. It compares the concept with a recently published rapporteur report to the European Parliament and an alternative model of a joint body of national regulatory authorities. The authors wish to thank Martin Busch, Student of Law and Politics at the University of Bonn, for his valuable assistance.     

Editorial

Original Papers

Editorial     

Private Debt and Timely Loss Recognition

Abstract

In this study, we investigate whether private debt contracting provides incentives for borrowers to recognize economic losses earlier in accounting earnings. Focusing on the window around firms' issuances of private loans, we document that timely loss recognition significantly increases following an issuance. This effect is significantly stronger for debt contracts that include performance covenants acting as trip-wires when firm performance deteriorates. We also find that timely loss recognition is particularly used when writing debt contracts is hampered by uncertainty about a firm's future development. These findings are consistent with timely loss recognition being used to increase contract efficiency by facilitating state-contingent control allocation based on a borrower's performance over the loan term.