Public–Private Agreements, Institutions, and Competition: When Economic Theory Meets Facts

While, in practice, the participation of private actors at the local and national government levels through various types of contractual agreements has been increasing over the last decades, there are still few studies on the functioning and performances of such relationships. Our aim is to highlight some significant theoretical and empirical issues concerning Public–Private Agreements. We first assess the potential sources of efficiency of such contractual agreements. We then examine the selection issue which is a crucial stage for the efficiency of such agreement. Finally, we stress the importance of the institutional framework showing how it might affect the agreements’ efficiency.     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

Economic integration and the choice of commodity tax base with endogenous market structures

This paper analyzes the choice of commodity tax base when countries set their taxes noncooperatively in a two-country symmetric reciprocal dumping model of intraindustry trade with free entry and trade costs. We show that the consumption base (destination principle) dominates the production base (origin principle) when trade costs are high or demand is linear. For lower levels of trade costs and nonlinear demand, the welfare ranking of the two tax bases is ambiguous. Hence, there is no clear preference for a tax principle with an ongoing movement toward closer economic integration.     

Words versus numbers: A theoretical exploration of giving and receiving narrative comments in performance appraisal

Performance ratings have long dominated research on performance appraisal yet very little is known about the usage of narrative comments despite the fact that they are a common methodology to assess performance in organizations. Using theoretical streams from the fields of industrial–organizational psychology, communication, and human resource management, this paper explores the implications of using narrative comments for the various stakeholders in the performance appraisal process. The psychological processes underlying the production of narrative comments are explored. The paper also discusses the processes related to the reception and the impact of receiving performance information in this format for evaluatees.     

Firm Productivity and the Foreign‐Market Entry Decision

We use Japanese firm‐level data to examine how a firm’s productivity affects its foreign‐market entry strategy. The firm faces a choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the case of FDI, the firm has two options: greenfield investment or acquisition of an existing plant (M&A). If it selects greenfield investment, it has two ownership choices: whole ownership or a joint venture with a local company. Controlling for industry‐ and country‐specific characteristics, we find that the more productive a firm is, the more likely it is to choose FDI rather than exporting and greenfield investment rather than M&A.     

Taxes,minimum-quality standards and/or product labeling to improve environmental quality and welfare: Experiments can provide answers

This study focuses on the welfare impact of taxes, minimum-quality standards, and/or product labeling. A theoretical framework shows that the combination of a label and a per-unit tax is socially optimal. Alternatively, if the label is unavailable, the theory cannot directly conclude which instrument should be socially preferred. Estimations of willingness-to-pay (WTP) are useful for completing the theoretical analysis and evaluating policies ex ante on case-by-case basis. Using hypothetical WTP for shrimp, we confirm that the combination of a label and a tax is socially optimal. In the absence of a label, simulations show that a minimum-quality standard leads to a higher welfare compared to a tax.     

与权力做斗争——拒绝美国国际关系研究中的实证主义

中国国际关系学的发展受到实证主义和美式方法论幽灵的威胁。如果这个幽灵得逞,中国的国际关系学将不过是美国国际关系学苍白的翻版而已。更有甚者,中国国际关系学者与为数甚少的美国学者之外的世界其他国家学者对话的能力将受到极大局限,而美国学者也缺乏与非美国学者进行对话的兴趣。一些在美国受训的中国学者强调,那种与美国式的形式建模法密切相关的实证主义和方法论胜过其他方法,因而必须为中国学界所采用。这对中国国际关系学的未来是一个非常危险的时刻。作者主张国际关系学采取反思主义研究法,拒绝国际关系研究中实证主义的谬误和美式的科学主张,并呼吁中国学者不要着迷于美国学界的资金能力和慷慨大度,而要认识到美国之外的国际关系理论建设还有更令人感兴趣的发展。