Ethics,gratuities, and professionalization of the purchasing function

This study investigated (1) whether potential future purchasing agents were predisposed to accept gratuities or whether the practice of gratuity acceptance is a manifestation of the job itself, (2) whether the existence of a code of ethics forbidding gratuity acceptance curtails the occurrence, and (3) whether disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions affect gratuity acceptance. Hypotheses based upon the concepts of organizational concern and institutionalized ethics are developed and empirically tested. Results suggest that future purchasing agents are predisposed to accept gratuities and that formal written ethics policies decrease the acceptance of gratuities. Disparities in ethics policies between the sales and purchasing functions concerning gratuities failed to affect gratuity acceptance significantly.Gregory B. Turner is assistant professor of marketing at Livingston University. He has published inThe International Journal of Logistics Management and theTransportation Journal.G. Stephen Taylor is Associate Professor of management at Mississippi State University. His research interests include ethics in computer usage, performance appraisal, and turnover control.Mark F. Hartley is Assistant Professor and National Association of Purchasing Management/Carolinas-Virginia chair of Purchasing at the College of Charleston. His research interests include ethics and professionalization of the purchasing function.     

Manifestations of compulsiveness in the consumer-marketplace domain

The marketing literature exhibits a consistent lack of concern to recognize the distinct differences among the various possible manifestations of compulsiveness in the consumer-marketplace domain. The practice of using terms pertaining to different manifestations of compulsiveness synonymously, especially when the meaning of the term “compulsive behavior” is itself under debate, creates further semantic uncertainties that hinder typological endeavors in the budding area of abnormal or deviant consumer behavior. This article attempts to remove such uncertainties by elucidating and establishing the differences among the above manifestations.     

Evidence on the motivation for management forecasts of corporate earnings

A multivariate model of the process by which managers decide to release public forecasts of their firms' earnings is developed, based on factors that are hypothesized to affect the demand for and the willingness to supply such forecasts. We test the model on data from a comprehensive sample of earnings forecasts, and find support for our hypotheses about the likely joint influence of those factors. Larger firm size, greater leverage, higher and more stable earnings rates and less rapid growth rates are found to be associated with an increased propensity for management to provide earnings forecasts for their firms.     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.     

Options on bond futures: Isolating the risk premium

The introduction of unspanned sources of risk (and frictions) implies that option prices include a risk premium. Prima facie evidence of the existence of risk premia in option prices is contained in the implied volatility smile patterns reported in the literature. This article isolates the risk premium (defined as the simple difference between estimated and observed option prices) on options on U.K. Gilts, German Bunds, and U.S. Treasury bond futures using models that include price jumps and stochastic volatility. This study finds that single and multi‐factor stochastic volatility models with jumps may explain the empirical regularities observed in bond futures. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:169–215, 2003     

Responsibility, Taint, and Ethical Distance in Business Ethics

Much light can be shed on events which characterize or underlie scandals at firms such as Enron, Arthur Andersen, Worldcom, ImClone, and Tyco by appealing to the notion of ethical distance. Various inquiries have highlighted the difficulties in finding or identifying particular individuals to blame for particular events, and in the context of situations as complex as these it can sometimes be helpful to investigate the comparative ethical distance of various participants in these events. In this essay I offer a characterization of ethical distance in terms of moral responsibility, and in doing so I describe and illustrate the rough inverse correlation between moral distance and degrees of moral responsibility. I urge that the concept of ethical distance is capable of shedding light upon situations in which several people are involved in bringing about a state of affairs. I then argue that moral responsibility cannot do justice to all situations involving ethical distance. When the distance between a person and a state of affairs grows sufficiently large, a different type of treatment is called for, and I introduce the notion of moral taint to describe the moral status of agents in these situations.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES: SOME EMPIRICAL MODELS

This paper proposes a model of audit fee determination based upon size and other characteristics of the auditee and the auditor, and upon whether there has been a recent change of auditor (which might lead to a low-balling effect). A novel feature of the model is that auditee size is measured in two dimensions, sales and assets, and is allowed to have a quadratic relationship with audit fee. The model was estimated for a sample of large listed UK companies for the years 1981 to 1988. The results support the low-balling hypothesis and also provide insights into the distinctive role of the Big 8 firms in the audit market.