Böhm-Bawerk and Shibata on power or market

In 1935 the Japanese economist Shibata criticized Böhm-Bawerk's discussion to deny the role of power on market and argued that the validity of Böhm-Bawerk's conclusion depends crucially on his special assumptions on the structure of production in his theory of interest. Unfortunately, both Böhm-Bawerk and Shibata used in their discussions an untenable supposition that the value of heterogeneous capital, which depends on values of endogenous variables, can be given exogenously. Our aim is to reconsider the problem in the light of a new interpretation of Böhm-Bawerk's theory of interest, which is free from this supposition.     

A nonsmooth, nonconvex model of optimal growth

This paper analyzes the nature of economic dynamics in a one-sector optimal growth model in which the technology is generally nonconvex, nondifferentiable, and discontinuous. The model also allows for irreversible investment and unbounded growth. We develop various tools to overcome the technical difficulties posed by the generality of the model. We provide sufficient conditions for optimal paths to be bounded, to converge to zero, to be bounded away from zero, and to grow unboundedly. We also show that under certain conditions, if the discount factor is close to 1, any optimal path from a given initial capital stock converges to a small neighborhood of the golden rule capital stock, at which sustainable consumption is maximized. If it is maximized at infinity, then as the discount factor approaches 1, any optimal path either grows unboundedly or converges to an arbitrarily large capital stock.     

Lattice structure of knowledge and agreeing to disagree

This paper is a contribution to the study of the underlying mathematical structure of common-knowledge, which gives the well-known result of Aumann about the impossibility of ‘agreeing to disagree’. We present the Bayesian subjective probability model with player's belief: i.e. a triple (? %plane1D;4AF;, μ), in which i is a player. ? is a lattice in the field of sets of a state space Ω, %plane1D;4AF;, is a correspondence assigning to each state ω a filter %plane1D;4AF;(ω) in ?, and μ is a common-prior. For this model, we impose none of the important restrictions on the information structure in the Aumann-Bacharach model: axiom of knowledge K₁. axiom of transparency K₂ and axiom of wisdom K₃. We can extend both the disagreement theorem of Aumann and the agreement theorem of Geanacoplos and Polemarchakis under the assumption that each ? is an Artinian lattice.     

EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN THE YANO MODEL OF PRICE LEADERSHIP

Abstract. A number of studies have provided a theoretical explanation for the fact that the technologically superior firm becomes a price leader in a duopoly market for a homogeneous product. While previous studies show that the state in which the technologically superior firm becomes a price leader is a Nash equilibrium (superior leader equilibrium), they do not eliminate the possibility that the state in which the technologically inferior firm becomes a price leader is also a Nash equilibrium (inferior leader equilibrium). We demonstrate that an inferior leader equilibrium can be eliminated by the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies.     

Intertemporal substitution, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion

Summary. This paper axiomatizes a form of recursive utility on consumption processes that permits a role for ambiguity as well as risk. The model has two prominent special cases: (i) the recursive model of risk preference due to Kreps and Porteus [18]; and (ii) an intertemporal version of multiple-priors utility due to Epstein and Schneider [8]. The generalization presented here permits a three-way separation of intertemporal substitution, risk aversion and ambiguity aversion.Received: 5 August 2003, Revised: 12 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D80, D81, D90.I am grateful to Larry Epstein for his guidance and invaluable advice, and to a referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

A dynamic quantity adjustment process in a small open economy,and welfare effects of tariff changes

Considered an n-good small open economy where the technology is strictly convex and ad valorem tariffs are imposed. In this world it is known that the tariff-utility relationship may be perverse. The fact is known as the Vanek–Bhagwati Paradox. The source of the perversity is found in aggregate income effects. The present paper shows that D-stability of our dynamic system implies non-perverse aggregate income effects, and hence the non-perverse tariff-utility relationship.     

ON THE MOTHER AND CHILD LABOR NEXUS UNDER CREDIT CONSTRAINTS: FINDINGS FROM RURAL INDIA

There is an emerging consensus that lack of credit is a major cause of child labor and inequality in the intrahousehold distribution of resources. At the same time, patterns in how children spend their time appear to be strongly influenced by maternal employment decisions. This paper includes an assessment of the effect of credit constraints on maternal employment and that of maternal employment on the intrahousehold allocation of labor, a nexus which has been left unexplored by existing studies. Three findings emerge: (1) a mother is more likely to work outside when a household lacks resources, and her domestic labor can be easily replaced by other members, (2) credit market accessibility is one of the major determinants of maternal labor, and (3) elder daughters assume a large part of the burden of maternal employment by providing domestic labor. Under binding credit constraints, results of this study support the collective as opposed to the unitary model of households.     

Monopolistically competitive equilibria with differentiated commodities

Summary. An existence theorem of monopolistically competitive equilibrium of the economy in which commodities are subject to differentiation will be proved. We start with the existence theorem of Negishi (1961) and extend it to the commodity space of measures on a compact metric space. In so doing, we have to handle the price normalization carefully. Received: December 2, 1996; revised version: May 6, 1999