A Cross‐National Study of Fairness in Asia: How Perceptions of a Lack‐of‐Group Bias and Transparency in the Performance Evaluation System Relate to Job Satisfaction

This study explored how managers’ fairness perceptions of performance evaluation systems differ across countries and relate to their job satisfaction. Lack‐of‐group bias and transparency were the constructs used to assess fairness perceptions. The data sample consisted of 903 Asian managers from the subsidiaries of a leading multinational corporation (MNC) strategically expanding its retail markets in Japan, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand. Results showed that the fairness perceptions of lack‐of‐group bias and transparency concerning the common performance evaluation system varied within these Asian countries. Furthermore, those fairness perceptions were significantly related to job satisfaction among Asian managers overall, as well as in each of the five geographical subgroups with the exception of Hong Kong, where the perception of a lack‐of‐group bias was only marginally related to job satisfaction. These findings offer theoretical implications regarding organizational justice, cross‐national management, and performance evaluation, as well as practical implications for leveraging organizational justice perceptions of performance evaluation systems for the effectiveness of MNCs. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Does free trade promote environmental technology transfer?

We investigate how environmental and trade policies affect the transfer of environmental technology in a two-country model with global pollution. By comparing free trade and tariff policy with or without commitment, the following results are obtained. First, firms avoid the implementation of environmental tax by contracting technological transfer. Second, there is a case in which free trade is preferable to a tariff policy for both countries when there is no commitment to a tariff level. Third, free trade is not Pareto-preferred to a tariff policy when there is a commitment.     

On blocking coalitions: Linking Mas-Colell with Grodal–Schmeidler–Vind

In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Warlasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$ between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between α$\alpha$ and β$\beta$, is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.     

The Spatial Dimension of Welfare and Poverty: Lessons from a Regional Targeting Programme in Indonesia

This paper examines the spatial dimension of welfare and poverty in Indonesia and explores the effective policy interventions to remedy the regional economic disparity which was most vividly shown during the recent economic crisis. The econometric estimations confirm the existence of a spatial poverty trap, where poverty persists for generations. The inclusion of the placement of Impres Desa Tertingal (IDT) implemented during 1994–96 suggests that the regional targeting programme could fail to achieve its policy goal when the empowerment of local communities is insufficient. It is suggested that full–scale decentralization could remedy the targeting policy failure.
JEL classification : O 15; O 18; R 15     

Excess demand functions when new assets are introduced

We demonstrate that information on the aggregate excess demand function of an incomplete real asset market economy is not helpful toward predicting the equilibrium of a new economy to which unredundant assets are added. An innovation of assets can completely change the aggregate excess demand functions.     

Excess demand function around critical prices in incomplete markets

We show that the aggregate excess demand function in an economy with incomplete real asset markets can be characterized by Walras’ law, homogeneity, and continuity around critical prices that cause one-dimensional drop of the dimension of the budget set.     

The effect of mergers on credit union performance

The motivation for mergers in the credit union industry differs from the commercial bank industry due to the lack of residual claimants to benefit from wealth gains. In the cooperative ownership environment of credit unions, the owners/members gain utility via the rates offered for loans and deposits. Credit union regulators also gain utility when mergers remove risky credit unions from the industry. We measure these utility gains using the event study method of Bauer [Bauer, K., 2008. Detecting abnormal credit union performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 573–586] employing quadrant tests based on a multivariate test of equality of centroids. We find gains to the owners/members of the target credit union and to the regulators but not to the acquiring firm. We posit that the acquiring credit unions may encounter regulatory pressure to merge. In addition, the owners/members of the acquiring firm may avoid potential disutility in the cooperative insurance environment were the target firm allowed to fail.