Technology adoption in autocratic economies: The role of fiscal capacity

What determines technology in autocratic regimes? In this paper, I assume that a rent-extracting regime can adopt technology from the global technology frontier, tax-paying citizens can oust the regime, and technology can decrease the ousting cost. I show that a lack of fiscal capacity can increase technology by preventing the ousting constraint from binding. Consistent with this prediction, tax collections and total factor productivity are negatively related in autocratic regimes. Extensions show that natural resources can divorce fiscal revenues from technology, which can encourage technology blocking. However, if technology adoption is socially costly, autocratic regimes can adopt too much technology.     

Cheaper by the bundle: The interaction of frictions and option exercise in variable annuities

Typical Variable Annuity products combine complex baseline contracts at substantial fees with optional guarantees. We argue this product design aligns with the benefits of bundling to the provider, to the extent that the baseline option features can reduce total replication value. This is possible due to market frictions, and particularly taxation rules, affecting policyholder exercise behavior. We demonstrate the relevance of this mechanism in the context of popular withdrawal guarantees, both theoretically and empirically. Specifically, we show that in the presence of personal taxes, adding on a common death benefit at baseline may decrease the total contract value to the provider.