RECONSIDERING THE INVESTMENT–PROFIT NEXUS IN FINANCE‐LED ECONOMIES: AN ARDL‐BASED APPROACH

A Post‐Keynesian growth model is developed, in which financial variables are explicitly taken into account. Variants of an investment function are estimated econometrically, applying the ARDL (auto‐regressive distributed lag)‐based approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (Journal of Applied Econometrics, 16 (3), pp. 289–326). The econometric results are discussed with respect to a remarkable phenomenon that can be observed for some important OECD countries since the early 1980s: accumulation has generally been declining while profit shares and rates have shown a tendency to rise. We concentrate on one potential explanation of this phenomenon, which is particularly relevant for the USA and relies on a high propensity to consume out of capital income.     

Investment Incentives Under Emission Trading: An Experimental Study

This paper presents the results of an experimental investigation on incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology under emissions trading. Our experimental design mimics an industry with small asymmetric polluting firms regulated by different schemes of tradable permits. We consider three allocation/auction policies: auctioning off (costly) permits through an ascending clock auction, grandfathering permits with re-allocation through a single-unit double auction, and grandfathering with re-allocation through an ascending clock auction. Our results confirm both dynamic and static theoretical equivalence of auctioning and grandfathering. We nevertheless find that although the market institution used to reallocate permits does not impact the dynamic efficiency from investment, it affects the static efficiency from permit trading.     

Incentives to adopt new technologies under different pollution-control policies

The paper investigates the incentives for polluting firms to adopt new technologies under pollution-control policies such as effluent taxes and auctioned permits. We pay explicit attention to the output market. Firms can choose among two types of technologies, a conventional one with high marginal abatement costs and a new one with low margainl abatement costs but higher fixed costs. We find that taxes almost always induce complete adoption or no adoption at all. Permits, in contrast, allow for partial adoption. Moreover, ex post, permits can always induce first best, whereas taxes cannot if partial adoption is socially optimal.     

Pollution control in a Cournot duopoly via taxes or permits

We consider an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with firms facing linear Leontief technologies. A pollutant is generated proportional to the quantity of output. The government may regulate the firms by imposing Pigouvian taxes or by issuing a number of tradeable permits. We characterize the optimal tax as well as the optimal permit policy as a function of a critical damage parameter. It turns out that in general neither the social optimum is enforceable, nor is one of the two policies always superior to the other. For a wide range of parameters, however, the permit policy leads to a higher welfare.This paper has been written for the most part during a visit to the California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California. The author would like to express his gratitude to the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences for its hospitality, to P. Chander, W. Trockel, the participants of seminars at California Institute of Technology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Purdue University, the universities of Bielefeld, Dortmund, and Mannheim, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments, and especially to Jeanne Netzley for her T_EX-nical support at Caltech. Financial support by the state government of Nordrhein-Westfalen (von Bennigsen-Foerder Preis) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment

We experimentally investigate social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and endogenous ordering of decisions on a continuous action space. We are first in comparing exogenous and endogenous ordering within one framework, which enables a direct comparison of both structures in terms of informational efficiency, strategic delay and welfare. More efficient observational learning leads to more accurate predictions in the endogenous setting and increases informational efficiency compared to an exogenous setting. However, strategic delay induces waiting costs that offset these benefits and lead to a parity of exogenous and endogenous ordering in terms of welfare results. Our results hold relevance for the efficient design of decision regimes in contexts characterized by continuous action spaces.     

Barriers Against Globalizing Corporate Ethics: An Analysis of Legal Disputes on Implementing U.S. Codes of Ethics in Germany

Global firms need to decide on the correspondence between their corporate ethics and the globalization of their activities. When firms go global, they face ethical complexities as they operate in different legal and cultural environments that may impact the admissibility and appropriateness of their approach to institutionalize and implement corporate ethics. Global firms may have good reasons to establish global codes of ethics that are to be obeyed by all employees worldwide. However, developing and implementing such codes can be rather difficult due to various, and partly competing, conditions in the countries of operation. In this article, two legal disputes are analyzed to illustrate some of the difficulties that may emerge when firms globalize their codes of ethics. I argue that these conflicts can be mitigated when firms carefully design their codes and the processes of code implementation.     

Mean-variance cointegration and the expectations hypothesis

The present paper sheds further light on a well-known (alleged) violation of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure (EHT): the frequent finding of unit roots in interest rate spreads. We show that the EHT implies (i) that the nonstationarity stems from the holding premium, which is hence (ii) cointegrated with the spread. In a stochastic discount factor framework, we model the premium as being driven by the integrated variance of excess returns. Introducing the concept of mean-variance cointegration, we actually find cointegration relations between the conditional first and second moment of US bond data.