Work redesign: Eight obstacles and opportunities

Successful work‐design initiatives must overcome many obstacles in order to have their intended impact.This article outlines eight obstacles to work redesign: (1) influences on multiple outcomes, (2) trade‐offs between different approaches, (3) difficulty in choosing appropriate units of analysis, (4) difficulty in predicting the nature of the job, (5) complications from individual differences, (6) job enlargement occurring without job enrichment, (7) creating new jobs as part of growth or downsizing, and (8) differences between longterm and short‐ term effects. This article examines the nature of these eight obstacles, reviews prior research on this topic, and outlines suggestions for managing these obstacles in practice. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Equilibrium Selection and Stability for the Groves Ledyard Mechanism

In their seminal paper Groves and Ledyard (1976) construct a balanced incentive compatible mechanism that solves the free rider problem. In subsequent research, Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus (1983) prove that there exist numerous asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium. In the present paper, we explicitly solve for the additional equilibria and use computational experiments to examine the structure and stability of the set of equilibria of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism. We find that all of the equilibria found by Berstrom, Simon, and Titus are unstable and that for a high level of the punishment parameter these equilibria do not exist. Further, we find that there exists an additional boundary equilibrium for each of the equilibria found by Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus. The boundary equilibria are all stable.     

Congressional Memberships as Political Advertising: Evidence from the U.S. Senate

The present article analyzes signaling by elected officials of moderate or centrist legislative behavior from a benefits/costs perspective. To do so, we provide statistical evidence regarding the tendency of senators to join the U.S. Senate Centrist Coalition, a congressional membership organization of moderate legislators. We find that changes in party loyalty, perhaps due to changes in constituent preferences, and U.S. Senate tenure are both important determinants of membership in the Centrist Coalition. Tests also point out that freshman senators are more likely than more senior senators to seek membership as a form of information provision.     

Pricing Efficiency in Hog Markets

Weekly hog prices for Edmonton, Toronto and an average of mid-west United States markets are analyzed for lead-lag structure or Granger Causal ity. These price series are analyzed over six time periods from January 1964 to December 1983, corresponding to changes in marketing structure by the Alberta Pork Producers Marketing Board. Both ARIMA filters and a restricted-unrestricted ordinary least squares test for Granger Causality are employed. Results indicate an increase in isolation of markets, possibly illustrating the effectiveness of the local marketing board in its efforts to relate prices to local supply and demand conditions.
Les prix hebdomadaires du pore à Edmonton, Toronto et d'une moyenne de marchés du mid-west ameYicain sont analysés pour evaluer les directions des mouvements de ces marchés les uns par rapport aux autres ou la causalité de Granger. Ces séries de prix de Janvier 1964 à décembre I983 sont divisées en six périodes qui correspondent aux changements structurels de la mise en marché effectués par la régie albertaine du pore. L'analyse utilise des filtres ARIMA et un simple modéle linéaire restreint ou non restreint pour faire l'épreuve de causalité de Granger. Les résultats indiquent une augmentation de I'isolation des marchés les uns les autres; il semble que la régie de mise en marché locale réussit à relier les prix aux conditions locales de l'offre et de la demande.     

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF METROPOLITAN MARKET CONDUCT IN FOOD RETAILING

Market conduct in food retailing has a major effect on social welfare and, therefore, warrants empirical examination. An urban center – Edmonton – was studied to determine the nature of price behavior as a signal of market information and as a tool of competitive price strategy. Market performance evaluation reveals numerous deficiencies. Market imperfections such as price discrimination and market segmentation, price inefficiency, and deceptive advertising, are readily apparent. The analytic results suggest that socioeconomic improvements and market reforms are necessary in the areas of competition policy, advertising regulations, consumer education programs, and opportunity development.
UNE ÉTUDE EMPIRIQUE DU MARCHÉ MÉTROPOLITAN AU NIVEAU DE V ALIMENT AT ION DU DÉTAIL –La maîtrise du marché dans le commerce alimentaire de détail a un effet majeur sur le bien-être social et par conséquent, justifie cette analyse empirique. Un centre urbain, Edmonton, a étéétudié afin de déterminer la nature du comportement des prix en tant qu'indice d'information du marché et outil d'une stratégie concurrentielle des prix. L'analyse des structures du marché révèle de nombreuses déficiences. Des défauts tels que: discrimination des prix et segmentation des marchés, prix inefficaces et publicité inadéquate sont facilement apparents. Les résultats suggèrent que des améliorations socio-économiques et des réformes de marché sont nécessaires dans le domaine de la concurrence, de la publicité, dans les programmes d'éducation du consommateur et dans les occasions de développement.     

Informing or obfuscating stakeholders: Integrated reporting and the information environment

The global development of integrated reporting (IR) is underpinned by the recognition of increased complexity of businesses and stakeholder demands for information relating to financial performance, management, corporate governance, and sustainability being provided in a single, coherent document which facilitates stakeholder decision making. This paper examines the lexical properties of IR following the introduction of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) Framework. Using an international sample, we find that when adopted voluntarily, IR are lengthier, use more complex language, and contain more boilerplate statements. Our findings suggest that without regulation, firms may continue to produce long and difficult to understand reports in fear of being perceived as omitting “bad news.” This fear might be justified as we find loss of analyst following and greater analyst uncertainty when voluntarily adopted IR is concise. In the regulated setting of South Africa, however, we find IR has become more concise, and firms that produce longer and more complex documents suffer from a deterioration of their information environment. Our findings suggest that regulators and practitioners need to be cognizant of the potential for an increased volume in reporting to obfuscate the message rather than inform stakeholders.