Parametric and nonparametric statistical modelling of crop yield: implications for pricing crop insurance contracts

This article considers alternative methods to calculate the fair premium rate of crop insurance contracts based on county yields. The premium rate was calculated using parametric and nonparametric approaches to estimate the conditional agricultural yield density. These methods were applied to a data set of county yield provided by the Statistical and Geography Brazilian Institute (IBGE), for the period of 1990 through 2002, for soybean, corn and wheat, in the State of Paraná. In this article, we propose methodological alternatives to pricing crop insurance contracts resulting in more accurate premium rates in a situation of limited data.     

Behavioral Finance in Brazil: A Bibliometric Study from 2007 to 2017

This article analyzed 58 Brazilian journals in order to address the gap unexplored in the past 10?years by congresses and periodical journals. In this research, an analysis based on keywords was used, followed by analysis of citations and co-citations that allowed to verify: an average growth of 20% p.a. of publications; the most common focus was replication of Kahneman and Tversky; the most studied group tended to be university students; quality has failed to accompany the increase in publications; public institutions publish more. A gap was perceived in the surveying of financial managers and investors, as well as bias and heuristics as a subject.     

The Prestige disaster: risk or danger?

The sinking of the Prestige off the coast of Galicia in north-west Spain in November 2002 was an enormous environmental disaster and it had an immense media impact both nationally and internationally, lasting weeks as a social and political phenomenon. Five days before the ship sank, the captain had reported to the maritime authorities that the old tanker was damaged and in trouble. During these five days leading up to the shipwreck, a crucial decision had to be made: what should be done with this dangerous oil tanker? Temporality is a property of the hazardous events which, after being noticed, are evaluated as imminent or deferred. This temporality makes a clear difference between a risk and a danger. Whereas the risk has time to anticipate the events, danger has just a very short time or even has no time. At this point, the Prestige disaster turns to be paradigmatic. To tow away this damaged oil tanker was a risk decision which estimated that there was still a time to prevent its running aground what meant to follow the story repeatedly told by the narrative context of risk. However, the Prestige had been spilling out oil all the time and the damage was not a probability but a fait accompli. This accident has not a risk temporality; in fact, it had not temporality at all because it demanded an immediate intervention. My conclusion here is that this crisis was managed in terms of risk when it should have been treated as a danger situation.     

Inequality and trade

Abstract.  We incorporate demand‐side considerations in trade in a systematic but straightforward way. We do so by focusing on the role of inequality in the determination of trade flows and patterns. With non‐homothetic preferences, when countries are similar in all respects but asset inequality, we find that trade is driven by specialization in consumption , not production. Besides, these assumptions allow us to generate some interesting international spillover effects of redistributive policies. Finally, we study a model of monopolistic competition and find a novel V‐shaped relationship between the ratio of inter‐industry to intra‐industry trade and a country's inequality. JEL classification: F11, F12     

Apple's disaster: Linking two‐sided markets and strategic delegation

Asymmetric pricing structure and different intergroup network externalities are characteristics of two‐sided markets not captured in the analysis of one‐sided markets. Focusing on Cournot duopoly where membership decision may be delegated to a manager, several equilibrium regimes are sustained depending on the fixed cost of managerial hiring and strength of the network externality exerted by the side whose demand is more price sensitive. The change from null to full delegation sharpens the asymmetric pricing structure and reduces the price level in two‐sided markets. Contrary to one‐sided markets with direct network effects, the prisoner's dilemma holds for sufficiently strong indirect network externalities. Imperfect interside discrimination of managerial incentives ensures profit maximization and efficient consumers' allocation. Private hiring should occur when the two‐sided market exhibits symmetric pricing structure. An explanation for Apple's unprecedented event is provided. The reduction of revenue and managerial bonus in 2016 may be justified by the dissemination of full delegation in the Chinese information technology industry. Apple's upcoming strategy may consist on reducing both access prices, although the side whose demand is more price sensitive should have a greater price reduction. Alternatively, improving the content quality may constitute Apple's corporate strategy, thereby inducing a skimming pricing strategy on Chinese rivals.     

Paradoxical Relationships Between Cultural Norms of Particularism and Attitudes Toward Relational Favoritism: A Cultural Reflectivity Perspective

We examined how the cultural dimension of universalism–particularism influences managers’ attitudes toward relational favoritism (such as favoring friends or relatives in HR decisions). Paradoxically, we found in a survey study that Brazilian and Chinese managers perceived more negative consequences of relational favoritism than did American managers—even though the Brazilians and the Chinese perceived stronger particularistic cultural norms in their countries than Americans did in the United States. We attribute this pattern of results to “cultural reflexivity”—the ability of people from transforming economies to be culturally self-critical during a period of dramatic societal change. This pattern of results also emerged in a scenario study in which we asked these same Brazilian, Chinese, and American participants to assess managerial succession decisions made by a General Manager. We varied the scenarios so that the promoted manager was either a colleague with no pre-existing relation with the GM or a colleague who was a relative, a close friend, from the same town, or from the same school. Consistent with the results of the survey study, we found that perceived cultural norms of particularism were negatively related to perceptions of fairness. In other words, Brazilians and Chinese, even while living in more particularistic cultures, were more harsh in judging relational favoritism. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of these paradoxical relationships.     

Anticipating the location of a waste collection point: an application based on Portugal

Portuguese Economic Journal - We study the optimal location of a waste facility in a horizontally differentiated duopoly where firms choose their location and price. The policymaker decides the...     

The impact of the European Union fiscal rules on economic growth

This paper analyses whether Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules have affected growth in the European Union negatively. A growth equation is specified for a group of 15 European Union countries (and 8 OECD countries) over the period 1970-2005 to analyse this issue. Panel estimations using fixed-effects, pooled mean group and system-GMM estimators show that the institutional changes that occurred in the European Union after 1992 were not harmful to growth. Moreover, results show that growth is slightly higher in the period in which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed, i.e. after 1997.     

Fiscal consolidation and financial reforms

We use a rare events logistic regression model as well as traditional probit and logit models to investigate the impact of fiscal consolidation on the likelihood of financial reforms for a panel of 17 countries over the period 1980–2005. We show that large austerity plans, mainly implemented through spending cuts rather than tax hikes, promote financial reforms. By considering reforms affecting specific areas of the financial sector, we find that the banking sector reforms and domestic finance reforms are more likely to occur when fiscal adjustments are put in place. Interestingly, while banking sector reforms are mainly prompted during periods of tax-driven consolidations, spending cuts driven consolidation packages seem to propel the implementation of domestic finance reforms. Finally, we show that higher inflation, lower degree of trade openness, a deterioration of financial conditions and, to some extent, a fall in the degree of competitiveness enhance the probability of financial reforms.