MONETARY CREDIBILITY VS. VOTER APPROVAL: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND EXCHANGE‐RATE STABILIZATION DURING CRISES

This paper analyzes how political institutions affect the execution of exchange‐rate policy. By focusing on policy‐makers' responses to the emergence of speculative pressure on their currencies, we argue that the effect of democratic institutions on exchange‐rate stability is likely to be conditioned by the officially announced exchange‐rate regime. Officially fixed exchange rates are the main instrument of autocrats to signal commitment to long‐term stability. Autocratic governments with strictly fixed exchange rates are thus more likely to defend their exchange rates than autocrats with an intermediate regime because the latter implicitly signal that they care less about monetary stability. In contrast, democrats defend more often in intermediately than in fully fixed official regimes by using a combination of external and internal adjustments, which reduce the negative effects of a devaluation on voters. Our analysis of 189 currency crises between 1975 and 1999 supports this conditional effect.     

Perceptions of environmental conditions and confusion about action to improve the environment

Data from a 1990 Washington Post poll centred on environmental issues were used to ascertain whether individuals' perceptions of environmental conditions - better, worse or stayed about the same - in the past 20 years result in confusion about knowing what should be done to improve the condition of the environment. A probit analysis found the perception that the condition of the environment in the past 20 years has stayed about the same to result in confusion. This perception was a more powerful predictor of confusion than were sociodemographic characteristics. More highly educated persons, individuals living in the suburbs and more conservative people were less likely to be confused.     

Underpricing of Newly Issued Bonds: Evidence from the Swiss Capital Market

The pricing of newly issued bonds on the Swiss capital market is investigated over the years 1980–1982. The results reveal a slight underpricing of new bonds at the issue date that is roughly equal to the difference in transactions costs between the markets for new and seasoned bonds. Underpricing is no longer observed when the new bonds start to be traded on the stock exchange, that is, after about two days. Tests of several hypotheses show that unexpected changes in interest rates over the offering period explain part of the underpricing.     

Web‐Based Disclosure About Value Creation Processes: A Monitoring Perspective

Adopting a monitoring perspective, this study aims to explain how and why firms provide web‐based disclosure about their value creation and its underlying processes. We rely on the balanced scoreboard approach to measure disclosure. Our results suggest that costs incurred by capital markets' participants as well as monitoring by the board and the media drive disclosure. Moreover, we argue and document that a firm's disclosure is actually a part of its governance configuration and influences some board processes.