Market Instability and Revision Error in Risk Premium

This paper provides a theory and evidence that the risk premium puzzle is viewed as a phenomenon pertaining to the unstable foreign exchange market. In an unstable market, revision error uncompensated by an initial risk premium accrues due to consumer expectation revision about the ex ante uncertainty of the exchange rate. The risk premium widely deviates from its initial level, depending on the frequency of the consumer expectation revision and the degree of risk aversion. Subsequent evidence shows the existence of the revision errors for the risk premium during the Asian currency crisis and the recent financial crisis periods.     

投资者非理性假设下公司金融决策前沿理论评述

随着行为金融理论的逐步发展,市场错误定价的稳定存在已经得到越来越多学者的认可。本文对行为公司金融理论中投资者非理性范式下的前沿理论进行了综述,从投资和融资决策两个方面分析了面对错误时的外部市场定价行为,以及理性的财务决策者如何利用这种市场无效率来为长期股东获利,或迎合非理性投资者预期来实现自己的短期目标。     

基于人类学视角对“旅游体验”的新思考

“体验经济”概念提出后,很快成为全球热点。受其影响,我国旅游学术界和业界也开始了对“旅游体验”的关注。但由于长期受“经济产业”思路的局限,我国的“旅游体验”研究还缺乏系统性和较深层次的思考。旅游作为人类社会的一种精神文化活动,从本质上决定了文化因素是“旅游体验”成败的关键,而文化往往是通过一些符号或物质载体体现出来的,这就涉及到“真实性”的问题。因此。“旅游体验”问题还应结合人类学相关理论从“文化真实”及“主客关系”等方面进行深入分析。“旅游体验”的研究还需把握真实性、社区参与及文化涵化三个重要概念。同时,旅游体验的“虚拟真实性”应作为一个全新的概念被提出和界定。     

Robust Event Studies for Derogation from Suspension of Concentrations in Greece during the Period 1995–2008

This paper examines the possible effect of the derogation from suspension of concentrations by the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC) on the stock performance of the requested companies. For this reason, we examined 16 companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (A.S.E) that are involved to 13 requested derogations from suspension during the period 1995–2008 by applying and assessing the results of three different event study methodologies (market model, mean adjusted return model and market adjusted return model). From the empirical findings, we conclude that the argument of the requested companies concerning the subsequent negative effect on their stock performance if the derogation from suspension by the HCC is delayed or not granted does not hold. On the contrary, the average abnormal and cumulative returns of the requested companies are positive and statistical significant. In addition, the results of the three event study methodologies are robust.     

Barcode Empires: Politics,Digital Technology,and Comparative Retail Firm Strategies

Like other service sectors, information technology has dramatically altered the growth and character of the retail trade sector in the affluent economies. Nevertheless, significant variation exists in the typical strategies of retail firms in different countries. This article explores this variation and proposes an explanation for why retailers achieved scale and solved their make, buy, and partner decisions along such different trajectories. It argues that national bases for scale retailing were shaped by a series of political negotiations starting in the 1960s and 1970s. This demonstrates once again that technology implementation is rarely determined by the technology itself, but more often by social and political rules. Future technology platforms, such as web-based or mobile commerce, should be expected to follow similar political logics. As multinational retailing firms spread around the globe, this has important implications for national competition policy.     

Value Capture and Policy Design in a Digital Economy

Pervasive information and communication technology (ICT), intertwined with global dispersion of supply chains, is inducing a sizable structural transformation. All the articles in this special issue highlight that even though technology is the key driver, the reactions of businesses and countries to these transformations will depend on economic, political, and social arrangements within each organization and society. The competitive landscape of the ICT industry itself is likely to remain in flux. Also in other industries, both value creation and value capture are becoming increasingly complex—and remain more favorable for the developed countries than some commonly used measures suggest. According to the prevailing economic thinking, public policies should set market-friendly “rules of the game” and then stay out of the way. In the ICT domain, technical standards, spectrum allocations, and market power associated with various types of lock-ins play crucial roles calling for more active public involvement. In particular, the dynamic aspects of competition and anti-trust policies are important yet complex. While there is limited scope for sectoral or horizontal industrial policies, this special issue provides alternative avenues for considering matrix or systemic policies emphasizing education, openness, and national competitiveness.     

Minimax price bounds in incomplete markets

This paper develops an approach to tighten the bounds on asset prices in an incomplete market by combining no-arbitrage pricing and preference-based pricing, and the approach is applied to a call option in the absence of dynamic rebalancing. With the no-arbitrage pricing, it is straightforward to obtain the initial bounds, which are too wide to be of practical uses. By accepting that a representative agent exhibits risk aversion from a benchmark pricing kernel, it is possible to narrow the bounds considerably. Using the unbiased minimax deviation implicit in the parameters, one can restrict further the set of reasonable values on assets in incomplete markets.     

Monday returns and asset pricing

The seasonal patterns observed on Monday stock returns are still unexplained by different asset pricing models. We attempt to fill this gap in the finance literature by using the Fama-French (Journal of Financial Economics 33:3–56, 1993) risk factors to explain the Monday seasonal. The results in the study show that Monday returns are explained by risk factors such as the market return, the size of the firms, and the book-to-market ratios of firms.     

Endogenous elites: power structure and patron-client relationships

In weak institutional settings, autocrats barter political and economic concessions for support to remain in power and extract rents. Instead of viewing the favors’ beneficiaries, i.e. the elites, as an exogenous entity, we allow the king to decide whom to coopt provided the subjects are heterogeneous in the potential support—their strength—they could bring to the regime. While the ruler can select the elites on the basis of their personal characteristics, an alternative strategy consists in introducing some uncertainty in the cooptation process. The latter strategy allows the king to reduce the clients’ cooptation price since in the event of a revolution the likelihood of being included in the future body of elites is lower. We show that weak rulers are more likely to coopt the society’s strongest individuals, while powerful rulers diversify the composition of their clientele. Moreover, when agents value more future discounted outcomes, the king is more likely to randomly coopt subjects.