The Outlook for European Grocery Retailing: Competition and Format Development

This article analyses retail trends in the main European countries, and particularly format evolution and competition amongst retailing firms. On the basis of the existence of European retailing landscapes that are sometimes similar without ever being identical, the article analyses the impact of the main factors of change on different national markets. Whilst retail internationalisation and new entrants, commercial policy, legislative environments, technological innovations, consumers and buying behaviour will have a convergence effect on different countries' retail structures, substantial differences will still exist. European retailing in the coming years will probably be characterized by increasingly less marked differences between countries than one finds today, but market segmentation, variety and differentiation of retailing formats and brand names will be stronger within each country.     

生产研究的大趋势：管理与技术紧密结合

在进入信息时代和市场需求呈现多样化的今天，工业生产和生产研究依然是创造物质财富和市场需求最重要的基础。信息时代和需求多样化给生产研究领域带来了诸多全新研究课题。下一个世纪生产研究的大趋势将是管理和技术并驾齐驱，二者紧密结合。制约因素管理能够充分利用管理人员的智慧，靠抓住关键因素进行系统整体管理，不断在新的层次上加强管理和技术的密切结合，事半功倍地提高企业经济效益     

话音的频域编码

本文阐述了语言信号的子带及变换编码原理,为了消除分块效应,介绍了一种作为语言编码新方法的搭接式变换和与此有关的快速算法及滤波器设计。最后,对于为实现最佳比特分配所需的提取副信息的一种方法作了简要的说明。     

An Analysis of State-Owned Banks’Behavior in NPL Disposition

I. NPL Asset Settlement in China’s State-Owned Banks Non-performing loans(NPLs)represent the most serious problem hindering China’sbankingsystem, especially the fourstate-owned banks (SOBs).According to statisticsfrom China’sBanking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the banking system has accumulated NPLs tothevalueof3,158 billion RMB,whilethefourSOBsaccountedfor51 percentofthattotalbytheend of 2003 (seeTable 1). While the banking sector disposeslessthan 300 billion NPLevery year…     

Predicting the sample mean by extreme order statistics

Summary This paper considers the prediction of the sample mean by extreme order statistics when the population distribution is known. The predictor and its mean square error are found. The problem is studied in details for the normal model.     

On the solution of a stochastic optimal growth model

This note discusses a stochastic optimal growth model in which the optimal paths can be obtained by a simple direct argument. The structural characteristics of the model are the infinite horizon, the form of the instantaneous utility function, and uncertainty as a Wiener process in a linear production constraint. The note explains that, for optimality, at each point in time a formally identical problem must be solved. This implies that the optimal saving ratio must be constant.A proof, employing the rules of stochastic calculus, that the ensuing paths are the unique globally optimal paths is also given.We are very grateful to two referees of this journal for their invaluable comments and suggestions.     

Fixed price equilibria in an overlapping generations model with investment

We study fixed price temporary equilibria (with rationing) and sequences of temporary equilibria in a three commodities (goods, labor, bonds) overlapping generations model with endogenous investment. Young consumers, living two periods, work, consume, and buy bonds for financing next period's consumption. New firms, existing for two periods, make a production plan for the next period, taking into account expected rationing, assumed similar to present rationing. The plan determines the amount of goods to buy as capital, financed by bonds. Old firms produce, using labor and the previously bought capital. Different regimes exist and expectations can be self-fulfilling and self-destroying.We are grateful to the referees for helpful comments.     

A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

We consider an international financial problem called debt overhang, by which we mean a situation where a sovereign country has borrowed money from foreign banks and has been unable to fulfill the scheduled repayments for some period. The problem is formulated as a noncooperative game withn lender banks as players where each decides either to sell its loan exposure to the debtor country at the present price of debt on the secondary market, or to wait and keep its exposure. This game has many pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show, however, that in any Nash equilibrium, the resulting secondary market price remains almost the same as the present price for a large number of banks. We also obtain the comparative statics result that in a mixed strategy equilibrium, a bank with a smaller loan exposure has a greater tendency to sell than one with a larger loan exposure. We discuss the implications of these results for the functioning of the secondary market and the resolution of debt overhang.We thank J. Crémer, H. Haller, S. Mendes, and the referees of this Journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts.