Dynamics of contention in the gig economy: Rage against the platform,customer or state?

Protest in the gig economy has taken many forms and targets (platforms, customers and state officials). However, researchers are yet to adequately account for this diversity. We use a European survey of Upwork and PeoplePerHour platform workers to investigate worker orientation towards different forms of protest. Results reveal that worker anger, dependence and digital communication shape contention in the remote gig economy. Support for collective organisation is associated with anger at platforms as well as their dependence on the platform and communication with other workers. Individual action against clients is associated with anger and communication but not dependence. Support for state regulation is associated only with anger but not dependence or communication. We conclude that the relational approach entailed by Mobilisation Theory can aid explanation in the gig economy by shedding light on the dynamic process by which solidarity and dependence alter the perceived cost/benefits of particular remedies to injustice.     

Economic preferences and trade outcomes

Review of World Economics - Integrating the Global Preference Survey (GPS) and its data of unique scope on national preference structures in patience, risk attitude and reciprocity into a gravity...     

Speculative trading,prospect theory and transaction costs

A speculative agent with prospect theory preference chooses the optimal time to purchase and then to sell an indivisible risky asset to maximise the expected utility of the round-trip profit net of transaction costs. The optimisation problem is formulated as a sequential optimal stopping problem, and we provide a complete characterisation of the solution. Depending on the preference and market parameters, the optimal strategy can be “buy and hold”, “buy low, sell high”, “buy high, sell higher” or “no trading”. Behavioural preference and market friction interact in a subtle way which yields surprising implications on the agent’s trading patterns. For example, increasing the market entry fee does not necessarily curb speculative trading, but instead may induce a higher reference point under which the agent becomes more risk-seeking and in turn is more likely to trade.

     

Rational pricing of leveraged ETF expense ratios

Annals of Finance - This paper studies the general relationship between the gearing ratio of a Leveraged ETF and its corresponding expense ratio, viz., the investment management fees that are...     

On the monetary policy in an economy with banks endogenously creating money

This paper attempts to employ a microeconomic model (industrial-organization approach to banking) to formalize the concept that banks in an economy may also unilaterally create money, at least initially, rather than passively multiplying the base money exogenously issued by the Central Bank in the money creation process. It shows that in equilibrium, banks may indeed create money (bank deposits) when making loans without relying on the newly issued base money from the Central Bank. Instead, the endogenously created money by banks would cause the Central Bank to endogenously adjust base money to hit the target policy interest rate.     

Preferences of Institutional Investors in Commercial Real Estate

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - In this paper we analyze market segmentation by firm size in the commercial real estate transaction process. Using novel micro-level data, we look...     

Executive compensation and corporate risk management

We provide the first evidence on the effects of executive compensation on corporate risk management for insurers. Our unique data set allows the construction of a new, more complete measure of corporate risk management behavior. Specifically, we include hedging-driven usage of not only derivatives but also insurance. To address potential endogeneity, we utilize a difference-in-differences approach, based on the implementation of FAS 123R that required firms to expense stock-based compensation at fair value. We find that the decline in the convexity of executive compensation following FAS 123R led firms to significantly increase corporate risk management, primarily through increased demand for insurance.     

Does information asymmetry predict audit fees?

This study investigates whether and how information asymmetry in the stock market affects the quantum of audit fees paid by auditees. It is based on a sample of 218 US publicly traded companies and adopts two well-established proxies for information asymmetry, namely bid-ask spread (BAS) and probability of informed trading (PIN). Empirical results provide evidence that, after controlling for all main audit fees determinants, information asymmetry is positively related to the quantum of audit fees paid. Overall, evidence supports the contention that less transparent companies convey higher audit risk, and therefore auditors require higher compensation.