Enforcement Actions and Auditor Changes

In this paper, we examine whether the uncovering of erroneous financial statements by German enforcement agencies is related to subsequent auditor changes. We argue that enforcement actions are likely to reveal information about the client or its auditor, which might affect auditor choice by initiating an update of mutual expectations. Our empirical findings indicate that firms with erroneous financial statements indeed have an increased probability of subsequent auditor changes. Firms also tend to change from a non-Big4 auditor to a Big4 auditor in this situation, suggesting that clients increasingly seek the reputation and services of Big4 auditors. Big4 auditors in turn do not appear to refrain from taking over error-firms as new clients in the German setting, which is characterized by limited auditor liability. Additionally, auditor changes are more likely to occur before the public announcement of an error, indicating that firms take action as soon as the uncovering of an accounting error becomes sufficiently certain.     

Was für und was gegen die Neuverhandlung des NAFTA spricht

With the election of a new president in the US, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is back on the international trade policy agenda. This article sets out US motivations to push for a renegotiation and examines the pros and cons of renegotiating the agreement. While there are good reasons to update NAFTA, a new agreement or even a US withdrawal from the treaty will not meet the expectations raised in President Trump’s election campaign.     

Is competition from China so special?

Competition from China is perceived as particularly damaging. We study whether this is true for firm performance. Using the universe of Spanish export transactions, we find that an increase in competition from China does not have a more damaging effect on export revenues, prices and number of exported products than an equally sized increase in competition from other countries. We document, though, that Chinese competition raises the probability that a firm ceases to export a good to a destination more than competition from other countries. This effect declines over time. We document an omitted variable bias in studies focusing only on Chinese competition, even when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of destinations for different products within firms.     

The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia

We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge urban–rural gap. In contrast to previous experiments we find no cooperation-enhancing effect of punishment. An important reason is that there is punishment of contributors in all four subject pools. Thus, punishment can also undermine the scope for self-governance in the sense of high levels of voluntary cooperation that are sustained by sanctioning free riders only.     

Private Debt and Timely Loss Recognition

Abstract

In this study, we investigate whether private debt contracting provides incentives for borrowers to recognize economic losses earlier in accounting earnings. Focusing on the window around firms' issuances of private loans, we document that timely loss recognition significantly increases following an issuance. This effect is significantly stronger for debt contracts that include performance covenants acting as trip-wires when firm performance deteriorates. We also find that timely loss recognition is particularly used when writing debt contracts is hampered by uncertainty about a firm's future development. These findings are consistent with timely loss recognition being used to increase contract efficiency by facilitating state-contingent control allocation based on a borrower's performance over the loan term.     

How to speed up the quantization tree algorithm with an application to swing options

In this paper, we suggest several improvements to the numerical implementation of the quantization method for stochastic control problems in order to obtain fast and accurate premium estimations. This technique is applied to derivative pricing in energy markets. Several ways of modeling energy derivatives are described and numerical examples including parallel execution on multi-processor devices are presented to illustrate the accuracy of these methods and their execution times.