Innovation Process 'Fuel Cell Vehicle': What Strategy Promises to be Most Successful?

Many car manufacturers recognize fuel cell vehicles as future substitutes for conventional cars with internal combustion engines. According to press releases and brochures, different strategic approaches of the automobile companies to fuel cell technology can be identified. These strategies match to a high degree the market entry strategies known from strategic marketing literature. A system dynamics model that reflects the beginning innovation process and the strategic approaches of a pioneer (first to market), an early follower (early to market) and a late follower (late to market) has been built. It examines the future prospects of the car manufacturers' strategies in three different scenarios, which illuminate possible future developments of external influences like politics or fuel infrastructure.     

The effect of option trading at the DTB on the underlying stocks' return variance

The effects of option trading at the DTB on the variance of the underlying stocks are examined. We use a new distribution free test being based on the empirical distribution functions. The evidence indicates that stock return variance increased after the introduction of the DTB. This effect can be partly explained by the strong increase in trading volume for option listed stocks. Our results stand in stark contrast to prior studies of both American and European financial markets.     

Bayesian games with unawareness and unawareness perfection

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz et al. (Games Econ Behav 77:100–121, 2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents’ awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness.     

The German Unemployment Compensation System: Effects On Aggregate Savings And Wealth Distribution

The effects of the German unemployment compensation system on aggregate savings and the distribution of wealth are studied in a general equilibrium 60–period OLG model. The distribution of wealth is derived as an endogenous function of the parameters characterizing the unemployment compensation system, which comprises unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), and welfare payments (Sozialhilfe), the latter two being subject to a means test. As our main results: (i) both aggregate savings and wealth equality are a monotone decreasing function of unemployment benefits; (ii) optimal unemployment compensation declines over the spell of unemployment; (iii) asset–based means tests are shown to reduce welfare if the allowable wealth level is below the average wealth in the economy.     

Interactive expectations

In modeling expectation formation, economic agents are usually viewed as forming expectations adaptively or in accordance with some rationality postulate. We offer an alternative nonlinear model where agents exchange their opinions and information with each other. Such a model yields multiple equilibria, or attracting distributions, that are persistent but subject to sudden large jumps. Using German Federal Statistical Office economic indicators and German IFO Poll expectational data, we show that this kind of model performs well in simulation experiments. Focusing upon producers' expectations in the consumption goods sector, we also discover evidence that structural change in the interactive process occurred over the period of investigation (1970–1998). Specifically, interactions in expectation formation seem to have become less important over time. RID="*" ID="*"We would like to thank Ulrich Witt, Director of the Evolutionary Economics Unit, The Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Jena, Germany, for providing the intellectual stimulus for this project and arranging the necessary financial support from the Max Planck Society to facilitate our collaboration. Thanks are also due to the IFO Institute for providing the data for this study. However, the usual caveat applies.     

A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium

It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves discontinuously when finite (discrete) action games approach an infinite (continuous) action game in the limit. Furthermore, it is argued that from a model-theoretic point of view evolutionary stability in prices (i.e. in the Bertrand model) is quite different from evolutionary stability in quantities (i.e. in the Cournot model).