Industry Self‐Regulation: A Game‐Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

We analyse the possibility of successful industry self‐regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this article presents a game‐theoretic typology of generic self‐regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. We discuss the advertising, press and life insurance industries in the UK as examples of the scenarios. Conclusions for corporate and public policy are offered.     

Agency Problems,Equity Ownership,and Corporate Diversification

We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.     

CASELOAD IMPACTS OF WELFARE REFORM

A welfare reform demonstration program designed to reduce Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recidivism through increased employment and training services resulted in significantly higher short-term caseload growth. Demonstration sites attracted proportionally more households onto assistance early in the demonstration than did comparison sites. These entrants tended to have more extensive previous employment histories. This result suggests that the demonstration attracted individuals who previously qualified for AFDC but did not apply for benefits and/or individuals who reduced their employment to qualify for AFDC. Exits from AFDC also were delayed under the demonstration, suggesting that the more intensive services provided through the demonstration required more time to complete. Finally, certain groups—nonwhites and those with language problems, for example—apparently avoided the demonstration by not migrating into demonstration sites or by migrating out of demonstration sites. These results have important implications for the likely costs of state welfare reform efforts under the Family Support Act of 1988 .     

Endogenous Life‐Cycle Housing Investment and Portfolio Allocation

This paper develops a life‐cycle portfolio allocation model to address the effects of housing investment on the portfolio allocation of households. The model employs a comprehensive housing investment structure, Epstein–Zin recursive preferences, and a stock market entry cost. Furthermore, rather than resorting to calibration we estimate the value of the relative risk aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The model shows that housing investment has a strong crowding out effect on investment in risky assets throughout the life‐cycle. We further find that the effect of the presence of housing investment on households portfolio allocation is larger than the effect of having EZ recursive preferences.     

The Effect of State Workers’ Compensation Program Changes on the Use of Federal Social Security Disability Insurance

In addition to traditional forms of private and public medical insurance, two other large public programs help pay for costs associated with ill health. In 2008, Workers’ Compensation (WC) insurance provided $57.6 billion in medical care and cash benefits to employees who are injured at work or contract a work‐related illness, and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) provided $106 billion to individuals who suffer from permanent disabilities and are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. During the 1990s, real DI outlays increased nearly 70 percent, whereas real WC cash benefit spending fell by 12 percent. There has been concern that part of this relationship between two of the nation’s largest social insurance programs may be due to individuals substituting toward DI as state WC policies tightened. We first show that this negative correlation between the national series does not hold over time within states, the level at which a causal relationship should operate. We then test for a causal effect of changes in WC enrollment on DI applications and new DI cases within states over time, using state policy (the maximum WC benefit) as an instrument for WC enrollment. Despite a strong first stage fit, we find no statistically significant evidence that WC tightening caused DI rolls to increase, although the standard errors are large enough that we cannot reject effects of substantial magnitude. We conclude it is unlikely that state WC changes were a meaningful factor in explaining the rise in DI during our study period of 1986–2001, although further study using individual level data is warranted.     

Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments

This paper explores the dynamic properties of price‐based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogeneity that disappears in the long run. Therefore, at the steady state, usual intuitions from static settings apply: identical jurisdictions inefficiently underinvest, calling for public subsidies. In the short run, however, counterintuitive properties are established: (i) the evolution of capital stocks can be nonmonotonic and (ii) one jurisdiction can be temporarily taxed, even though it should increase its investment, whereas the other is subsidized. It is shown how these phenomena are related to initial conditions and the kind of interactions between infrastructure capitals, complementarity or substitutability.     

The Cost of Capital and the Relevance of Non-diversifiable Risk

The conventional solutions to the corporate investment decision have been seriously challenged by recent developments in portfolio theory. In this paper, the author argues that, assuming the security market is composed of efficient diversifiers, there is no need, in the evaluation of investment projects, to adjust the time value of money to take account of risk. He concludes that the appropriate cut-off rate for any investment is equal to the yield on a 'risk-free' security such as undated or long-dated Government Stock.     

Bidding into the Red: A Model of Post-Auction Bankruptcy

This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second‐price auction induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first‐price auction. Second, we show that the cost of bankruptcy critically affects the seller's preference over the choice of auction. If bankruptcy is very costly, the seller prefers the first‐price auction over the second‐price auction. Alternatively, if the bankrupt assets are resold among the losers of the initial auction, the seller prefers the second‐price auction.