Contraction of the coal industry and the local economy

The coal industry has contracted significantly during the 1980s. Further decline will take place in the 1990s as a result of the privatization of the electricity supply industry (ESI), the relaxation of planning regulations on opencast mining, and increasing productivity in the pits.

This article looks at the actual and anticipated impact on local economies of this decline and considers the policy implications for those local authorities most affected by the future restructuring of the energy sector.     

The Government's Deregulation Initiative

The Government is undertaking a range of measures to tackle the burden of excessive red tape on business, This is a continuing programme requiring inputs from both government and business.     

Firm management of scientific information: Some predictors and implications of openness versus secrecy

This paper presents a model that seeks to understand and explain R&D performance differences in research-intensive companies. The primary theoretical model builds on the well-established theory of science as a public good but augments it with a game-theoretic argument for individual firm choices of scientific information openness or secrecy. The first research question we address is how a firm's scientific information openness, as measured by its research publications, impacts the firm's stock of technical knowledge. Additionally, we explore two predictor variables of scientific information openness: research lab and top management team demographics. The possible economic effects and other managerial implications of this model are also discussed.     

The political economy of transient “New” protectionism

Zusammenfassung Die politische ?konomie des vorübergehenden “neuen” Protektionismus. - Der Verfasser zeigt, da\ der Protektionismus im internationalen Handel mit Schuhwaren von 1970 bis 1977 niedrig war, dann infolge der Einführung von nichttarif?ren Ma\nahmen zwischen 1978 und 1982 betr?chtlich anstieg und in letzter Zeit fast verschwunden ist. Die Exportbeschr?nkungsabkommen, die die USA zwischen 1977 und 1981 mit Japan und Südkorea abgeschlossen hatten, l?sten eine Welle des Protektionismus in Europa aus. Als aber diese Abkommen 1981 ausliefen, wurde die Protektion in Europa abgebaut. Die Protektion für Schuhwaren verschwand schnell, weil es den Arbeitskr?ften offenbar verh?ltnism?\ig leicht fiel, eine neue Besch?ftigung zu finden, und weil die Gewinne in der Branche hoch blieben, und zwar insbesondere für Hersteller in den USA und Europa, die Importeure von Schuhwaren wurden. Dies ergibt sich nach einer Analyse von sieben Standardhypothesen aus der Literatur zur Polit?konomie des Protektionismus.

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Resumen La economia politica del “nuevo” proteccionismo transitorio. - El autor demuestra que la protección en el comercio international del calzado fué baja en el período 1970–1977, aumentó significativamente a raíz de la introductión de medidas no-arancelarias entre 1978 y 1982 y casi desapareció en los últimos a?os. Los “orderly market agreements” entre los EE.UU., Japón y Corea del Sur entre 1977 y 1981 dieron lugar a una ola de proteccionismo en Europa. Cuando estos acuerdos expiraron en 1981, empero, se redujo la protection en Europa. La protección al calzado desapareció rápidamente, aparentemente porque los trabajadores tenían facilidad de encontrar un empleo nuevo, y porque las ganancias permanecieron altas en esta industria, particularmente para productores de los EE.UU. y europeos, quienes pasaron a ser importadores de calzado. Estos son los resultados después de haber examinado siete hipótesis standard sobre la economía política del proteccionismo.

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Résumé L’économie politique du transitoire ?nouveau? protectionisme. - L’auteur démontre que le protectionisme au commerce international de l’industrie de la chaussure a été très bas pendant les années 1970–1977, mais s’est accru signif?cativement par l’introduction des mesures non-tarifaires pendant les années 1978–1982 et a presque disparu les dernières années. Les ?orderly market-agreements? des Etats-Unis avec le Japon et la Corée du Sud entre les années 1977 et 1981 ont déclenché une vague de protectionisme en Europe; mais quand les règlements américains ont expiré en 1981, la protection en Europe a été abrogée. La protection de l’industrie de la chaussure a disparu rapidement, évidemment parce que les ouvriers n’ont pas eu de difficulté de trouver de nouveaux emplois et parce que les profits de l’industrie sont restés hauts, particulièrement pour les producteurs des Etats-Unis et de l’Europe qui sont devenus des importateurs de chaussures. Ce sont les résultats après l’examen de sept hypothèses de la littérature qui s’occupe de l’économie politique du protectionisme.

     

The Market Value of Reducing Cancer Risk: Hedonic Housing Prices with Changing Information

In this paper, we use housing price changes occurring after the release of a regulatory agency's environmental risk information to estimate the value people place on cancer risk reduction. Using a large original data set on the repeal sales of houses, matched with detailed data on hazardous waste cancer risk and newspaper publicity, we find that housing prices respond in a rational manner to changes in information about risk. Since the new information indicated that the sites in our sample pose relatively low cancer risk, the informational release led residents to lower their risk beliefs, resulting in an average housing price increase of $56 to $87. This price change implies a statistical value per case of cancer of $4.3 million to $8.3 million, which is similar to the estimates obtained in labor market studies of the value of a statistical life. Newspaper publicity about the local sites increased housing prices, suggesting that residents perceived the news as good.     

Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly

A model of duopoly competition in nonlinear pricing when firms are imperfectly informed about consumer locations is analyzed. A continuum of consumers purchase a variable amount of a product from one of two firms located at the endpoints of the market. At the Nash equilibrium in quantity-outlay schedules, consumers buy the same quantities as they would from the same firm if it were a monopolist facing the same informational asymmetries, but they receive greater surplus. Hence, no efficiency gains result from competition. If consumers have the option to reveal their locations and have the firms deliver the goods, all consumers choose to reveal their locations in equilibrium. Thus, the inefficiencies from information asymmetries may not arise because firms can deliver the good to consumers. In contrast, with a monopoly seller, consumers have no incentives to reveal their locations.