全文获取类型
收费全文 | 4643篇 |
免费 | 157篇 |
国内免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 588篇 |
工业经济 | 296篇 |
计划管理 | 783篇 |
经济学 | 1052篇 |
综合类 | 27篇 |
运输经济 | 46篇 |
旅游经济 | 61篇 |
贸易经济 | 885篇 |
农业经济 | 156篇 |
经济概况 | 903篇 |
邮电经济 | 4篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 32篇 |
2022年 | 24篇 |
2021年 | 51篇 |
2020年 | 94篇 |
2019年 | 128篇 |
2018年 | 176篇 |
2017年 | 193篇 |
2016年 | 192篇 |
2015年 | 97篇 |
2014年 | 137篇 |
2013年 | 509篇 |
2012年 | 218篇 |
2011年 | 227篇 |
2010年 | 154篇 |
2009年 | 177篇 |
2008年 | 162篇 |
2007年 | 154篇 |
2006年 | 130篇 |
2005年 | 165篇 |
2004年 | 151篇 |
2003年 | 113篇 |
2002年 | 81篇 |
2001年 | 71篇 |
2000年 | 60篇 |
1999年 | 79篇 |
1998年 | 57篇 |
1997年 | 52篇 |
1996年 | 49篇 |
1995年 | 41篇 |
1994年 | 40篇 |
1993年 | 37篇 |
1992年 | 33篇 |
1991年 | 31篇 |
1990年 | 32篇 |
1989年 | 29篇 |
1988年 | 26篇 |
1987年 | 31篇 |
1986年 | 25篇 |
1985年 | 30篇 |
1984年 | 26篇 |
1983年 | 25篇 |
1982年 | 32篇 |
1981年 | 26篇 |
1980年 | 39篇 |
1979年 | 24篇 |
1978年 | 25篇 |
1977年 | 19篇 |
1975年 | 23篇 |
1969年 | 18篇 |
1963年 | 18篇 |
排序方式: 共有4801条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
Charles J. Corbett Frank J. C. Debets Luk N. Van Wassenhove 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(3):287-305
Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable. 相似文献
62.
63.
64.
This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best. 相似文献
65.
Bias is a much-debated issue in survey research. Answer effects (respondents claim to have behaved differently than they did in reality), nonresponse bias (nonrespondents differ on important variables from the respondents) and stimulus effects (by participating in a previous wave of a study, respondents change their behavior or attitude) can seriously distort the results of survey research. By using data from the 1998 Dutch National Election Study the authors show that the results of election research can indeed be affected by bias. Not only are significant effects found in the distribution of political attitude and voting behavior variables as a result of both nonresponse bias and stimulus effects, it is also shown that relations between variables change as a result of bias. 相似文献
66.
Technology-forcing through environmental regulation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Andries Nentjes Frans P. de Vries Doede Wiersma 《European Journal of Political Economy》2007,23(4):903-916
This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard. 相似文献
67.
In this paper I analyze the impact of regulatory policy on prices and demand for mobile telecommunications services across the European Union. I estimate a reduced form model of the mobile industry using panel data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002. Among others, I find the following effects: liberalization of fixed telephone lines has a negative impact on prices and a positive impact on the demand for mobile services, and the introduction of mobile number portability has a negative impact on prices.*I am grateful to Toker Doganoglu, Gerd Hansen, Eric Kodjo Ralph, Guido Friebel, participants at the 30th EARIE Conference 2003, the 2nd International Industrial Organization Conference 2004 and the 19th Annual Congress of the EEA 2004, and anonymous referees for valuable comments. I would like to acknowledge the generous financial support from the Volkswagen Stiftung and the Munich Graduate School of Economics which made this research possible. All errors are mine.1 Source: European Commission (1994). 相似文献
68.
69.
The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win. 相似文献
70.
Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous
and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem
stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social
value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because
of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems
often studied in macroeconomics.
Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due
to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful
comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235
“Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization
for public policy and industry regulation”).
Correspondence to: C. Le Van 相似文献