Comparing Alternative Predictors Based on Large‐Panel Factor Models

This article compares the predictive ability of the factor models of Stock and Watson (2002a) and Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2005) using a ‘large’ panel of macroeconomic variables of the United States. We propose a nesting procedure of comparison that clarifies and partially overturns the results of similar exercises in the literature. Our main conclusion is that with the dataset at hand the two methods have a similar performance and produce highly collinear forecasts.     

The early stages of reform in Polish manufacturingStructural adjustment, ownership and size

This paper argues that a significant adjustment process has taken place in Polish industry in the early stages of the market-oriented reforms. We analyse comprehensive data on two-digit and three-digit manufacturing industries, disaggregated by firm ownership and size. By focusing on a decomposition of labour productivity growth, we obtain results which suggest that structural determinants of the recovery have outweighed cyclical ones. With regard to firm ownership and economic performance, we find that the productive response of state enterprises has been markedly different from that of private firms, with the latter outperforming the former. Finally, our results indicate that size matters, at least among private firms, and our results provide mild evidence of increasing returns.
JEL classification: D21, E63, P21.     

A Martingale Characterization of Consumption Choices and Hedging Costs with Margin Requirements

This paper examines optimal consumption and investment choices and the cost of hedging contingent claims in the presence of margin requirements or, more generally, of nonlinear wealth dynamics and constraints on the portfolio policies. Existence of optimal policies is established using martingale and duality techniques under general assumptions on the securities' price process and the investor's preferences. As an illustration, explicit solutions are provided for an agent with ‘logarithmic’ utility. A PDE characterization of the cost of hedging a nonnegative path‐independent European contingent claim is also provided.     

Manager‐Union Bargaining Agenda Under Monopoly and with Network Effects

This paper investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a unionised monopoly with managerial delegation (MD). In contrast to the conventional wisdom, monopoly profits with MD under sequential Efficient Bargaining (SEB) exceed those under Right‐to‐Manage (RTM), while the union can prefer RTM to SEB: paradoxically, a conflict of interests between the parties may still exist but for reversed choices of the agenda. Consumption externalities change the picture. The monopolist still prefers SEB; however, provided that network effects are sufficiently strong, the union prefers SEB even for a relatively low bargaining power. Thus, the parties endogenously choose the SEB agenda which is also Pareto‐superior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate social responsibility,profits and welfare with managerial firms

This paper analyses the equilibrium outcomes in a duopoly market where firms follow corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviours under managerial delegation. It is shown that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, both firms emerge as CSR-type, and the firms’ profitability (resp. the welfare of consumers and society) are beneficiated (resp. harmed) by the CSR behaviour. This result is in sharp contrast with the conventional result (established under non-managerial firms) that the higher the CSR sensitivity to consumer surplus, the lower (resp. higher) the firms’ profitability (resp. the consumer surplus and social welfare).     

Price stickiness and the contractionary effect of technology shocks

We derive a measure of technological change from a dynamic cost minimization model that controls for imperfect competition, increasing returns and unobserved factor utilization. We estimate this measure using highly detailed panel data of a representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms for the period 1984-1997. Our key finding is that technological improvements result in a contraction of labor input on impact. In principle, this result can be reconciled with the transmission mechanism of flexible-price models by resorting to reorganization and reallocation effects. On the other hand, however, it is consistent with the predictions of a sticky-price model. Using survey information on the frequency of price revisions, we corroborate the latter interpretation, by showing that the contractionary effect of technology shocks is much stronger for firms with stickier prices.     

Corrigendum to “The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda” [Int. J. Ind. Organ. 17 (1999) 1029-1040]

Assuming Cournot competition, Bughin (1999, 'The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda', International Journal of Industrial Organization) states that in a unionized oligopoly with firm specific negotiations, Efficient Bargaining (EB) is always the industry equilibrium both under blockaded and non-blockaded market structures. Extending Bughin's (1999) framework to a conjectural variation model, this note shows that EB emerges as equilibrium only for entry deterrence reasons. In all other cases, conflict of interests among the bargaining parties arise due todifference in dominant strategies, whatever is the degree of competitiveness of the industry.     

Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management

This paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio. The contract parameters, the extent of delegation, and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider. Symmetric (fulcrum) performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the Sharpe ratios. Asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and Sharpe ratios, with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds' excess performance.     

Markups and the Business Cycle: Evidence from Italian Manufacturing Branches

This paper investigates the markup of price over marginal cost in Italian manufacturing branches. The approach used is an extension of Hall's model that addresses some measurement shortcomings and theoretical limitations that may affect this class of model. The hypothesis of perfect competition is rejected in the majority of sectors over the period 1977–1995. The cyclical behavior of markups is found to vary significantly across branches, thereby helping to explain the contradictory evidence regarding the whole manufacturing sector reported in the literature. At branch level, industry concentration is found to be associated with countercyclical markups, providing scope for real effects of aggregate demand shocks. Finally, the size of the markup is negatively affected by both domestic and foreign competitive pressure.