Trade Gains in Chaotic Equilibria

It is shown by means of an overlapping-generations (OLG) example that free international trade may be both deterministically chaotic and gainful in the sense of Pareto to a participating country.     

IMPOVERISHING TECHNICAL AND PREFERENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS

Abstract.  Edgeworth showed that a free-trading country might be impoverished by its own technical improvements if they are confined to the export industry and if no good is inferior in consumption. More recently it has been shown that improvements confined to the country's import competing industry can never be impoverishing if, in that country, no commodity is inferior in consumption. However, in all available proofs of these propositions, it has been assumed that for each country there exists an autarkic equilibrium. It will be shown that, without that assumption, the second proposition must be severely qualified.     

A Second Elementary Proposition Concerning the Formation of Customs Unions

The conclusions of the 1976 Kemp–Wan proposition are shown to be valid even if, after the formation of a customs union, the tariff vectors of some non-member countries are optimally chosen.
JEL Classification Numbers: F02, F12, F13, F15.     

A Theory of Voluntary Unrequited International Transfers

This paper proposes a theory of voluntary unrequited international transfers which explicitly allows for an international externality such that the well being of each country is influenced by the well being of other countries. Formulating a simple two–country and two–commodity model, this paper shows that (a) either neither country extends aid to the other, or one country extends aid and both countries benefit from the aid; and (b) there exist acceptable (Arrow–Debreu) economies such that neither country extends aid to the other, and there exist acceptable economies such that one country extends aid to the other.
JEL Classification Numbers: F11, F35.     

Factor Price Equalization in a World of Many Trading Countries

Conditions sufficient for factor price equalization within any non‐trivial subset of trading countries are provided. The conditions are that (a) the factor endowment ratios of countries in the subset are all bounded by the factors‐in‐use ratios in an equilibrium of the hypothetical world economy in which factors are perfectly mobile within the subset, and that (b) in dimensions higher than two, either the rank of the factors‐in‐use matrix is 2 or products do not outnumber factors and the factors‐in‐use matrix is of full rank.     

Party realignments and the growth of federal economic regulation, 1861–1986

This article explains when and why the federal government passed laws with the intended goal of maintaining or improving a particular industry or segment of an industry. The adoption of regulatory laws across time will be described, and the surges and declines in the distribution explained. The empirical analysis covers the years 1861–1986.This article is an abbreviated version of a paper prepared for the 1988 Conference Perspectives on Banking Regulation, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, November 3–4, 1988. I am very indebted to George J. Benston who allowed me to revise the paper in response to his criticisms.     

Population growth and the pattern of trade: A Neo-Ricardian approach

If the young and old provide economically distinct factors of production then the rate of growth of the population determines the factor endowment ratios and therefore both the composition of output and the pattern of foreign trade.