Casino regulations and economic welfare

Abstract This paper studies the entry and tax regulation of oligopolistically competitive privately run casinos and government‐run casinos in a jurisdiction. We highlight three important external effects from casino‐style gambling: non‐casino income creation, social disorder costs, and cross‐border gambling. The laissez‐faire equilibrium need not be overcrowding compared with regulated or government‐run regimes. Entry regulation may lead to higher jurisdiction welfare than tax regulation. Government‐run casinos always operate on a larger scale and achieve higher welfare than other regimes, given the same number of casinos. With an endogenous fraction of external gamblers, a dispersed casino configuration yields higher welfare than a centralized one.     

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT ON GROWTH CONVERGENCE

This paper investigates whether the impacts of financial development on growth convergence vary with the stage of real development. We implement this analysis through the instrumental variable threshold regression approach proposed by Caner and Hansen. Our empirical evidence shows that financial intermediary development leads to long‐run convergence in growth of both economic activity and productivity. Moreover, such convergence‐enhancing effects of financial intermediation are stronger for less‐developed countries than for the more industrialized. In addition, the data reveal that stock market development assists growth convergence only in low‐income countries.     

Existence of a Condorcet Winner When Voters Have Other‐Regarding Preferences

In standard political economy models, voters are “self‐interested” that is, care only about “own” utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have “other‐regarding preferences” (ORP), that is, in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit “envy” and “altruism,” in addition to the standard concern for “own utility.” We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.     

Debt Stabilizing Fiscal Rules

Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be stabilized around a certain target level of debt by adjustments in various fiscal instruments, like government spending, transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of debt stabilizing rules which link the needed budgetary adjustments to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the magnitude of the target level of long‐run debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type that can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical target level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the target level of debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework that tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level.     

Measuring Stakeholder Integration: Knowledge,Interaction and Adaptational Behavior Dimensions

Stakeholder Theory combines the pursuance of business goals and responsibility toward a firm’s stakeholders. Despite the wealth of research on Stakeholder Orientation, we still have much to learn about specific measurements for several related constructs. In this study, we draw on two samples of 129 and 151 Spanish firms, respectively, to investigate CEOs’ perceptions on Stakeholder Integration (SI), leading to the identification of three dimensions of the construct. In this respect, our study suggests that Knowledge of Stakeholders, Interactions between a firm and its stakeholders, and the adaptation of a firm’s behavior to stakeholders’ demands constitute the main dimensions of SI. This construct has the potential to connect the stakeholder and strategy literatures.     

Governance of Knowledge‐Intensive Firms in the Modern Market Economy

We model contracting for joint production between workers and shareholders when investment in knowledge is non‐verifiable and the resulting specific human capital embedded in the workers is non‐tradable. The model explains how the effective cost of human capital services will vary depending on whether the investment in knowledge is financed by the workers or by the shareholders. We apply the results of the modeling to identify which firms are expected to gain and which to lose from posted trends in higher employability and lower empowerment of workers in modern market economies. Finally, we present conditions on the self‐interest of current shareholders to empower workers as a way to stimulate their investment in firm‐specific human capital.     

Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance

We study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Interestingly, incentives under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies are the same that in the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance can increase firms’ incentives to invest, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.     

Why some firms adopt telecommuting while others do not: A contingency perspective

Using a contingency perspective and data from 122 CEOs of Spanish firms, this paper examines what makes a firm likely to adopt telecommuting. We hypothesized that employer adoption of telecommuting would depend on organizational constraints (age and size of the firm), the international composition of the workforce, and the top executives' leadership style. In turn, we argue that firms adopting telecommuting would emphasize outcome‐based control systems. Our empirical evidence showed that telecommuting correlated with small organizational size, a high proportion of international employees, and variable compensation. A contingent reward leadership style at the top moderated the effects of firm age and internationalization on the adoption of telecommuting. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The pros and cons of rewarding social responsibility at the top

Overemphasis on financial performance criteria to award incentives for CEOs has often been mentioned as one of the main culprits behind recent corporate scandals. In response, there is a growing chorus for inclusion of social performance criteria in the design of executive compensation schemes. To date, however, very little is known about the true benefits of this practice. This article critically discusses the potential advantages and pitfalls of this recommendation. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Profit‐sharing plans and affective commitment: Does the context matter?

This article analyzes the relationship between profit‐sharing plans (PSP) and affective commitment and how it is affected by the context of the PSP application. Overall, there is a positive relationship between profit sharing and commitment that is strongest in very small firms. The efficacy of a PSP in improving employees' affective commitment appears to be greatest in firms with low job‐related employee participation. Its application in workplaces where employees enjoy high levels of participation appears to have little impact and may even result in slight declines in affective commitment. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.