Bank Loan Supply in the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Role of Political Connection

We investigate the changes in bank loan supply during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, with particular focus on the influence of political connections. We demonstrate that although political connections can help firms obtain lower loan rates during the precrisis period, such benefits disappear in the postcrisis period. Moreover, the loan acceptance ratio for politically connected firms is enhanced in the postcrisis period, especially for the politically connected firms with high risks. Evidence reveals that the focus of the benefits for politically connected firms is more likely to shift from the loan rate to the loan acceptance ratio during the postcrisis period.     

How Do Land Auction Formats Influence the Market Structure and Aggregate Surplus of Real Estate Development?

This article proposes a duopoly dynamic game theoretic model to investigate the market structure and aggregate surplus of real estate development when land is sold in a sealed‐bid first price auction vis‐à‐vis an open English auction. It relaxes the assumption of symmetric bidders. The land values have common value and private value components. We find that the sealed‐bid first price auction introduces competition in the real estate development market. The open English auction leads a monopoly market. State agencies are recommended to increase the aggregate surplus of real estate development by publishing past bidding information under the sealed‐bid first price auction and reducing information asymmetry between bidders.     

The impact of consumer inattention on insurer pricing in the Medicare Part D program

The Medicare Part D program relies on consumer choice to provide insurers with incentives to offer low‐priced, high‐quality pharmaceutical insurance plans. We demonstrate that consumers switch plans infrequently and search imperfectly. We estimate a model of consumer plan choice with inattentive consumers and show that high observed premiums are consistent with insurers profiting from consumer inertia. We estimate the reduction in steady state plan premiums if all consumers were attentive. An average consumer could save $1050 over three years; government savings in the same period could amount to $1.3 billion or 1% of the cost of subsidizing the relevant enrollees.     

Uncertainty, co-ordination and path dependence

Our objective is to assess whether dynamics hinder or assist co-ordination in a game with strategic complementarities. We study two dynamic aspects: different agents make decisions at different points in time; and extra information about a payoff-relevant state of nature becomes available over time. We find that the dynamic resolution of information matters most for uniqueness of equilibrium. This is demonstrated by showing that the condition for uniqueness is weaker when learning occurs. We also analyse how successfully agents co-ordinate when there is a unique equilibrium. Finally, we show that path dependence occurs: the order in which signals arrive matters, as well as the total amount of information received.     

Insiders maintain voice: A psychological safety model of organizational politics

We present a psychological safety model of organizational politics to account for the effects that exposure to organizational politics has on voice behavior. In particular, we hypothesize that psychological safety mediates the negative relation between organizational politics, as perceived by employees, and their voice behavior. Moreover, we examine the extent to which perceived insider status alleviates the main effect of organizational politics and the indirect effect of psychological safety. Using a sample of 283 supervisor–subordinate dyads in six electronic companies at two time points in China, our results fully support the hypotheses and provide new directions for politics and voice research.     

A dynamic oligopoly game of the US airline industry: Estimation and policy experiments

This paper studies the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic factors to the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks in the US airline industry. Our results are based on the estimation of a dynamic game of network competition using data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey with information on quantities, prices, and entry and exit decisions for every airline company in the routes between the 55 largest US cities. As methodological contributions of the paper, we propose and apply a method to reduce the dimension of the state space in dynamic games, and a procedure to deal with the problem of multiple equilibria when implementing counterfactual experiments. Our empirical results show that the most important factor to explain the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks is that the sunk cost of entry in a route declines importantly with the number of cities that the airline connects from the origin and destination airports of the route. For some carriers, the entry deterrence motive is the second most important factor to explain hub-and-spoke networks.     

Coping with Workplace Ostracism: The Roles of Ingratiation and Political Skill in Employee Psychological Distress

The study reported here examined the relationship between workplace ostracism and employee psychological distress (i.e. job tension, emotional exhaustion, and depressed mood at work) by focusing on the joint moderating effects of ingratiation and political skill. Data from a two‐wave survey of 215 employees in two oil and gas firms in China indicated that as predicted, workplace ostracism was positively related to psychological distress. Moreover, the findings showed that when employee political skill was high, ingratiation neutralized the relationship between workplace ostracism and psychological distress, but when it was low, ingratiation exacerbated the relationship.     

Analysts’ recommendations: from which signal does the market take its lead?

The stock market may respond to the difference between an analyst’s recommendation and that analyst’s previous recommendation and/or to the difference between the analyst’s recommendation and the consensus recommendation. We show that for the short-term market response the former is the clearer signal when both are examined simultaneously. We also show that the market’s reaction is strongly influenced by the analyst’s reputation, the divergence of opinion among analysts and the number of analysts following the stock. Previous studies have been hampered by having a low proportion of negative recommendations. We overcome this deficiency by studying the Australian market, in which institutional differences lead to analysts releasing many more negative recommendations.

Equilibrium Unemployment and Endogenous Public Sector Employment

This paper develops a model of the equilibrium rate of unemployment with an endogenous share of public sector employment. We show how various macroeconomic shocks drive up the equilibrium rate of unemployment, accompanied by predictable variations in the public sector share of employment. In particular, under the empirically plausible assumptions that the public sector is relatively labor-intensive and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than unity, public sector employment is shown to be countercyclical. When the equilibrium unemployment rate rises over a prolonged time period, the public sector share of employment also rises.     

The Termination of Subprime Hybrid and Fixed‐Rate Mortgages

Adjustable‐rate and hybrid loans have been a larger component of subprime mortgage lending in the mortgage market than prime lending. The typical adjustable‐rate loan in subprime is a hybrid of fixed and adjustable characteristics in which the first 2 years are fixed and the remaining 28 years adjustable. Hybrid loans terminate at elevated probabilities even before the first adjustment date. Hybrid loan terminations are sensitive to interest rates and teaser rates (payment shocks). Default probabilities increase dramatically when payment shocks are mixed with low or no equity in the home. This is the mixture of events that helped to trigger the 2007/2008 subprime mortgage crisis.