Trade protection and balance of payments problems

A model to be used for planning short-term in-patient medical care is presented. The individual clinic is treated as a production unit which produces different kinds of treated wardcases with a given technique of production (given production-cost-structure). It is assumed to maximize the yearly number of treated wardcases under the constraints of (1) The yearly demand for different kinds of treated wardcases, which is assumed to be proportional to the number of citizens within the area which the clinic serves (the clinics population), (2) The yearly budget which is assigned by public authorities and has to cover all costs as the medical care is supplied free of charge, (3) The clinics physical capacity, measured by the number of beds.

The model has been applied to the branch of general medicine using the estimated production-cost-structure at an existing clinic within this branch. The kind of information that one can get is illustrated, for example: Given a clinic with a certain technique of production (production-cost-structure) which optimizes its production in the way that the model assumes, what is the marginal effects of changes in the size of budget, physical capacity or the size of population? In the case of an existing clinic, perhaps it serves too big a population (the marginal effect of reducing this constraint is zero)? or, when establishing a given kind of clinic what is the best combination of population size, size of budget and physical capacity? How much of the demand will be unsatisfied with different combinations, i.e. how large will the queues become?     

Simple Monetary Policy Rules Under Model Uncertainty

Using stochastic simulations and stability analysis, the paper compares how different monetary policy rules perform in a moderately nonlinear model with a time-varying NAIRU. Rules that perform well in linear models but implicitly embody backward-looking measures of real interest rates (such as conventional Taylor rules) or substantial interest rate smoothing perform very poorly in models with moderate nonlinearities, particularly when policymakers tend to make serially-correlated errors in estimating the NAIRU. This challenges the practice of evaluating policy rules within linear models, in which the consequences of responding myopically to significant overheating are extremely unrealistic.     

WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE: EVIDENCE FROM A CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY

If communities living adjacent to the elephant see it as a burden, then they cannot be its stewards. To assess their valuation of it, a contingent valuation method study was conducted for one CAMPFIRE district in Zimbabwe. Respondents were classified according to their preferences over the elephant. The median willingness to pay for the preservation of 200 elephants is ZW$260 (US$4.73) for respondents who considered the elephant a public good and ZW$137 (US$2.49) for those favouring its translocation. The preservation of 200 elephants yields an annual net worth of ZW$10,828 (US$196) to CAMPFIRE households. However, the majority of households (62%) do not support elephant preservation. This is one argument against devolution of elephant conservation. External transfers constitute one way of providing additional economic incentives to local communities.     

Driving Forces behind Exiting from Farming in Western Europe

This study examines the exit process of Western European farmers. Using a simple theoretical model of structural change, we examine empirically the impact of farm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and policy intervention on farm exits during the 1990s. Econometric estimates using regional data for 110 regions in Western Europe indicate that exits from farming are strongly influenced by farm characteristics and policy conditions. In particular, exit rates are higher in regions with smaller farms and are closely related to production structures. Exit rates are lower in regions with more part‐time farming, high subsidy payments and high relative price increases for agricultural outputs, indicating that off‐farm income and government intervention slow down structural change in European agriculture.     

‘SMART GOODS’ AND MOBILE RFID A CASE WITH INNOVATION FROM VOLVO

This paper presents a case from Volvo that explores an innovative RFID solution that leverages the exiting infrastructures of mobile usage. ‘Smart goods’ is used to explain features applied through Radio Frequency IDentification, utilization of cellular networks (GSM/GPRS) and web technology together with collaboration among supply chain actors. This has reduced traditional barriers of entry. An empirical case provides the basis for evaluation from the perspectives of operational reliability, usability and productivity.     

On East-West Economic relations: Does EEC discriminate?

Conclucions The field is still wide open for all kinds of speculations about the content of future EEC discriminations against the communist countries, but so far there is very little substance to the accusations that EEC is discriminating against them. Neither strategic export controls nor credit discrimination seems to have been affected at all by the creation of EEC. On non-oil products a few individual cases of protection can be cited, and the consultation procedure may conceal some discrimination. But it is important to stress that the reasons for this discrimination are of the same protectionist nature as those behind the chicken war and other protectionist measures against USA, EFTA and other third nations. That the procedures are different-consultations and quotas against the communists and mainly tariff protection against the Western nations-is motivated more by the communist state trading system and its consequences than by special EEC policies.The only case where some EEC discrimination for non-commercial, political reasons can be suspected is for oil and oil products. The present strict mutual scrutiny of the import policies of the different member countries is likely to continue and to develop into some form of common policy, where security considerations may influence the setting of upper import limits of Soviet oil. But so long as this policy is not made official it is impossible to pinpoint any discrimination.In summary it can be said that the communist accusations, implying that EEC constitutes an endeavour to hurt the Soviet Union and the socialist camp through a discriminatory trade policy, are based more on the possibility that such a discrimination can come into existence than on any evidence that it actually has done so. These accusations are in fact very much akin to the Western exaggerations of actual Soviet economic warfare, based on the fact that the Soviet trade system indeed makes it possible to hide any kind of political warfare considerations inside the system.NOTE: The present article does not deal explicitly with economic planning problems or the socialist countries. However, we think the political problems discussed in this article are an interesting aspect of the relations between centrally planned economies and the market economies.

---