III. Weltwirtschaft und Wirtschaft einzlner Länder und Gebiete

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Protectionism and international banking : Sectorial efficiency, competitive structure and National policy

This paper deals with barriers to trade in services. More specifically, the paper deals with competition and its absence in the provision of international intermediation services by banks. Section 2 of the paper examines the substitutability of international trade and FDI (foreign direct investment) in the services sector as a basis for international competition. It also considers the overlap between commercial policy measures and regulations governing the entry and operations of foreign affiliates. Section 3 describes the types of restrictions imposed on foreign banks and evaluates their effects. Existing practices in some countries are outlined in the fourth section. The countries are the U.S., the U.K., Switzerland, Australia, Brazil and Taiwan. Section 5 evaluates competitive conditions in offshore banking centers, and compares them with conditions in onshore markets. The last section evaluates the costs and the benefits of an ‘open’ (free-trade) banking system. Such a system will tend to improve world welfare as well as the welfare of those countries who have a comparative advantage in international banking. The results are not clear with regard to the countries who have a comparative disadvantage in banking.     

What Determines Demographic Similarity Between Incumbent CEOs and Their Successors? A CEO Informal Power Perspective

As CEOs reach the end of their tenure, they attempt to influence the decision about who will replace them in order to safeguard what they have put in place. This prompts them to favor candidates who share similar demographic profiles whom they believe will carry on where they leave off. We suggest that as CEOs are not usually given the authority to name a successor, they make use of informal power to exert their influence. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 137 CEO successions in 67 German diversified companies between 1985 and 2007 and find strong support for our theoretical reasoning that the more informal power incumbent CEOs have, the greater the demographic similarity between them and their successors. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Caught in organized ambivalence: institutional complexity and its implications in the German hospital sector

Worldwide, public service-providing organizations confront regulatory hybridization. While their societal mission persists, they are expected to become more business-like. Drawing on theory concerned with institutional complexity and ambivalence in organizations, this article illuminates the case of German acute care hospitals. We depict the emergence of market orientation in this industry, its structural impact and major sensemaking patterns at the site level. In our multiple case study, we find ‘organized ambivalence’ shaping the institutional context and affecting the undertakings’ internal life. Thus, regulatory hybridization tends to create certain traps – which challenges ideas according to which it helps improve public management.     

Rank friction: an ordinal approach to persistent profitability

We present an ordinal method for studying persistence in firm profitability. The method is based on the degree of stability in a ranked performance distribution over time. The method gives a numerical index of rank friction (Rf) that can be applied to any ranked data over any period of time. Rf is nonparametric and can be used to test theoretical assumptions in strategic management. We illustrate the method in an empirical study of 40 years of profit data in 12 industries. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Fiber investment and access under uncertainty: long-term contracts,risk premia,and access options

Journal of Regulatory Economics - Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk...     

Has Europe missed the endgame of telecommunications policy?

The European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) is a major milestone in the EU's telecommunications policy. But is it such a step forward and are the technical and market developments such that the EECC is the endgame? An endgame would mean that sustainable competition is reached in all telecommunications markets. The current paper argues that the EECC's new policy goal of investment in very high capacity connectivity could actually lead to policies that end in sustainable infrastructure competition. The EECC's policies, however, are not courageous enough to reach this goal. This lack of courage also characterizes the EU's gatekeeper policies on call terminations and net neutrality. In both these areas an endgame with sustainable competition is possible.