Bedeutungswandel der Internen Revision in der internationalen Literatur: Corporate Governance,Risikomanagement und Bilanzskandale

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Bestimmung von Kapitalkosten in diversifizierten Unternehmungen: Verfahrensvergleiche und Anwendungsempfehlungen

Die Notwendigkeit zur wertorientierten Führung und Steuerung von Unternehmungen gewinnt durch die zunehmende Professionalisierung der Kapitalmarktteilnehmer, die Basel-II-Richtlinien für Banken sowie die Neuregelung zum Goodwill Impairment weiter an Dynamik. Innerhalb der Wertkonzepte nehmen Kapitalkosten als zentraler „value driver“ eine herausragende Bedeutung ein. Vor diesem Hintergrund werden die unterschiedlichen Verfahren zur Ermittlung von Kapitalkosten, darunter auch das erst kürzlich vorgestellte Market-derived Capital Pricing Model, diskutiert und mittels eines zu entwickelnden Kriterienrasters systematisch miteinander verglichen. Schlie?lich entwickelt der Beitrag aus den Erkenntnissen des Verfahrensvergleichs sowie einer Expertenbefragung praktische Anwendungsempfehlungen.     

Characterizations of negative multinomial distributions based on conditional distributions

In this paper characterizations of negative multinomial distributions based on conditional distributions have been studied.     

Gestaltung der Abschlussprüferhaftung – Implikationen theoretischer Modelle

Business scandals such as Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat have sparked intense discussions on the quality of corporate governance as well as the trustworthiness of statutory auditors. It is therefore no surprise that regulators have issued a large number of new regulations concerning auditing. The civil liability of external auditors has not changed in Germany, but such changes have already been announced by the German government. An increase in the existing liability cap in cases of negligent misconduct and extended third-party liability are planned. As a consequence, the results of analytical research on this topic are highly relevant. This paper summarises and comments on prior analytical research, in particular its assumptions and results, and focuses on important elements for the design of a liability regime. To this end, the paper addresses the questions of joint–and-several vs. proportionate liability rules, negligent vs. strict liability regimes, the extent of third party liability, and limited vs. unlimited liability.     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

The long-run relationship between private and public savings: An empirical note

This empirical note extends the recent work by Holmes (2006) in examining the long-run relationship between private and public savings in the U.S. over the post-World War II period. Standard Engle-Granger cointegration tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration; however, once allowance is made for an endogenous break in the cointegrating relationship, the weak form of the Ricardian equivalence proposition is supported.     

Party alternation,divided government,and fiscal performance within US States

The literature on US state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature. Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Public Choice Society Meetings. The authors would like to thank the conference participants, William Shughart, Charles Register, Jocelyn Evans, John D. Jackson, Amihai Glazer, and two anonymous referees for their comments. We would also like to thank Craig R. Stiller for his help in the collection of data. Any remaining errors remain the responsibility of the authors.     

Information value and efficiency measurement for risk-averse firms

This paper has three goals. First, we demonstrate that standard arguments and methods from production and duality analysis can be used to provide a comprehensive and general treatment of the value of information for a risk-averse firm with expected-utility (linear-in-probabilities) preferences and a general stochastic technology. Second, we place bounds on the value of information for a risk-averse firm and relate these bounds to characteristics of the technology and the producer’s preferences. The third and final goal is to derive the implications that information differences can have for measured efficiency differences and to relate the bounds on the value of information to those measured differences.      

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.