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61.
An annual loss is essentially a necessary condition for dividend reductions in firms with established earnings and dividend records: 50.9% of 167 NYSE firms with losses during 1980–1985 reduced dividends, versus 1.0% of 440 firms without losses. As hypothesized by Miller and Modigliani, dividend reductions depend on whether earnings include unusual items that are likely to temporarily depress income. Dividend reductions are more likely given greater current losses, less negative unusual items, and more persistent earnings difficulties. Dividend policy has information content in that knowledge that a firm has reduced dividends improves the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings. 相似文献
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CASUAL EMPLOYMENT IN AUSTRALIA: INCIDENCE AND DETERMINANTS 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Casual employment as a fraction of the employed labour force has expanded substantially during the period 1984 through 1993. This paper examines the incidence of this growth by gender, sector and industry. Separate shift-share and econometric procedures analyse ABS pooled time-series, cross-section data for the period 1984 through 1992. The shift-share analysis decomposes intra-industry growth. The fixed effects estimation results suggest recent casual employment growth in Australia is demand determined. 相似文献
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LINDA M. SCHILLING 《The Journal of Finance》2023,78(6):3621-3675
This paper analyzes a regulator's optimal strategic delay of resolving banks when the regulator's announcement of the intervention delay endogenously affects the depositors' run propensity. Given intervention, the regulator either liquidates the remaining illiquid assets (“prompt corrective action”) or continues managing the assets at a reduced skill level (“resolution under receivership”). In either case, I show that if the regulator tolerates fewer withdrawals until intervention, the depositors may react by preempting the regulator: they run on the bank more often ex ante. A policy of never intervening can leave the bank more stable than a conservative intervention policy. 相似文献