The Distribution of Multifamily Mortgage Originations: What We Know and Why We Care

Three policy-relevant questions about multifamily mortgage originations (MFOs) are addressed. First, what is the annual volume of MFOs? This analysis highlights differences and problems among three publicly available multifamily lending surveys; the 1993 volume is estimated at $30 billion. Second, what is the size distribution of multifamily mortgages? Using kernel density estimation, variation in this distribution among central cities and suburbs, underserved areas, and lender type is examined. Third, what are the primary determinants of the variation in multifamily lending? A relatively simple regression model is estimated to shed light on the variables most highly correlated with multifamily lending. Tract income relative to MSA median income and minority concentrations are shown to be highly correlated with lending volume, but the largest source of variation is the number of multifamily rental units in the tract.     

INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: GOING BY THE BOOK

In the U.S., and increasingly in other countries as well, IPO securities are marketed to investors in a process known as "book-building"—one that amounts to polling institutional investors to establish a demand schedule for the issue and then allotting stock to individual investors according to the strength of their professed interest. Although book-building methods require use of discriminatory tactics that have attracted strong criticism from investors and regulators, this article defends such practices by demonstrating that book-building is more efficient than alternative methods. It effectively allows issuers to increase the net proceeds of their offerings by making better use of information about market demand conditions.
In the process of explaining the efficiency of the book-building method, this article also offers a plausible explanation for a phenomenon that has long puzzled economists: the systematic underpricing of IPOs. The key to the success of a book-building effort lies in the use of a strategic pricing and allocation policy designed to offset the investor's incentive to understate his or her interest in an IPO. By committing to favor investors who provide strong indications of interest with relatively large allocations of underpriced shares, the investment bank can limit the distortion of investor's incentives in bidding and so increase the level of proceeds the issuing firm can expect to generate from its IPO.     

Endogenous communication among lenders and entrepreneurial incentives

If banks have an informational monopoly about their clients,borrowers may curtail their effort level for fear of being exploitedvia high interest rates in the future. Banks can correct thisincentive problem by committing to share private informationwith other lenders. The fiercer competition triggered by informationsharing lowers future interest rates and future profits of banks.But, provided banks retain an initial informational advantage,their current profits are raised by the borrowers' higher effort.This trade-off determines the banks' willingness to share information.Their decision affects credit market competition, interest rates,volume of lending, and social welfare.     

A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOSED-END FUND DISCOUNTS AND EXPENSES

In this paper the role of expenses in explaining closed-end fund discounts is re-examined. A present value model is developed to illustrate the relationship between expenses and discounts. Earlier studies find that discounts are not related to management fees. In this paper, using a larger sample over a longer and different period and a better specification of the expense variable consistent with the model developed, discounts are found to be significantly related to expenses. The relationship between expenses and discounts holds in the presence of other control variables.     

A conceptual framework of anonymity in Group Support Systems

As the development and use of automated systems for collaborative work grows, the need for a better understanding of these systems becomes more important. Our focus is on one type of system, a Group Support System (GSS) and, in particular, on one important aspect of a GSS—anonymity. A conceptual framework for the study of anonymity in a GSS is presented, which describes the general classes of variables and their relationships. These variables include the factors that influence anonymity in a GSS, types of anonymity, and the effects of anonymity on a message sender, receiver, group process, and outcome. Each of these variables is discussed with working propositions presented for important group process and outcome measures. The objectives of this article are to highlight the importance and complexity of anonymity, to act as a guide for empirical investigations of anonymity, and to influence future GSS development and use.     

Search and Liquidity in Single-Family Housing

A two-stage least squares model of housing prices is estimated with data collected from 3358 single-family home transactions. The results provide evidence for an optimal marketing period and indicate that a liquidity premium is priced in single-family home sales. Consistent with the hypothesis derived from economic search models, the model shows higher selling prices for houses having longer expected marketing periods. The model also shows a price premium for houses that sell faster than expectations. This effect supports the concept that liquidity is a value-enhancing characteristic.     

Enterprise Unions in the United States

Through a case study of a large industrial company ( TRW ) , this paper examines the history and functioning of independent local unions ( ILUs ). TRW's ILU plant wages were about the same as those at affiliated union plants and higher than those at nonunion plants. The premium explains why TRW and other companies discarded ILUs in favor of a "new" nonunion model. Yet ILUs can remedy some of the defects in that model and thus belong on the policy and research agenda     

FORWARD RISK PREMIA AND THE MATURITY OF CONTRACTS: A NOTE

This paper examines the behavior of the risk premium component of currency forward rates. Analyzing forward rates of one, two and three-month maturity, we find that the power of forward rate as a predictor of future spot rate decreases with the length of contract maturity. Further, we find that the proportion of the variance of the forward premium which is due to the variation of the risk premium is larger than the proportion due to the expected spot rate change for all currencies except for the Canadian dollar. This proportion also increases with the length of maturity.