A NAASTy alternative to RAND pricing commitments

Voluntary standard setting organizations (SSOs) typically require participants to disclose their patents during the standard-setting process, and will endorse a standard only if patent holders commit to license them on reasonable and non-discriminatory or RAND terms. This policy is unworkable—the RAND standard is ambiguous and thus extremely hard to adjudicate. As an alternative, a policy of Non-Assertion After Specified Time, or NAAST pricing, is proposed. Under NAAST, technology vendors commit not to assert their patent after some previous specified time, but would be free to collect royalties as they wish up until that point. Under this proposal, technology producers would be compensated, vendors would have quick and eventually free access to standards and a large element of uncertainty due to litigation would be eliminated.     

Stable Laws and the Present Value of Fixed Cash Flows

Abstract

In this paper, the authors consider the present value of a series of fixed cash flows under stochastic interest rates. To model these interest rates, they don’t use the common lognormal model, but stable laws, which better fit in with reality. Their main intention is to derive a result for the distribution function of such a present value. However, due to the dependencies between successive discounted payments, the calculation of an exact analytical distribution is impossible. Therefore, use is made of the methodology of comonotonic random variables and the convex ordering of risks, introduced by the same authors in some previous papers.

The present paper starts with a brief overview of properties and features of stable laws, and of the possible application of the concept of convex ordering to sums of risks, which is also the situation for a present value of future payments. Afterwards, the authors show how, for the present value under investigation, an approximation in the form of a convex upper bound can be derived. This upper bound has an easier structure than the original present value, and they derive elegant calculation formulas for the distribution of this bound. Finally, they provide some numerical examples that illustrate the precision of the approximation. Due to the design of the present value and the construction of the upper bound, these illustrations show great promise concerning the accuracy of the approximation.     

Options on realized variance and convex orders

Realized variance option and options on quadratic variation normalized to unit expectation are analysed for the property of monotonicity in maturity for call options at a fixed strike. When this condition holds the risk-neutral densities are said to be increasing in the convex order. For Lévy processes, such prices decrease with maturity. A time series analysis of squared log returns on the S&P 500 index also reveals such a decrease. If options are priced to a slightly increasing level of acceptability, then the resulting risk-neutral densities can be increasing in the convex order. Calibrated stochastic volatility models yield possibilities in both directions. Finally, we consider modeling strategies guaranteeing an increase in convex order for the normalized quadratic variation. These strategies model instantaneous variance as a normalized exponential of a Lévy process. Simulation studies suggest that other transformations may also deliver an increase in the convex order.     

Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?

We investigate experimentally whether “binding agreements” can provide a solution to the social dilemma that arises in the presence of pure public goods. Signing a binding agreement can prevent players from free riding on the contributions to the public good. However, a well known theoretical result is that the outcome of the endogenous formation of agreements is not necessarily efficient. Our setting is a bargaining game in which agreements form sequentially. The individual level of contribution to the public good increases with the size of the coalition reaching an agreement and the global agreement is always the socially optimal structure. There are two equilibrium outcomes, the global agreement and an asymmetric structure, which consists of two coalitions of different sizes, the small one free riding on the contributions of the larger one. We run an experiment which lends force to the theoretical result that outcomes may be inefficient. However, subjects do not play Nash and the experimental outcome is, on average, even more inefficient than the theory predicts. Our analysis leads to the conclusion that different types of behaviour co-exist.     

Fluctuations and response in financial markets: the subtle nature of ‘random’ price changes

Using trades and quotes data from the Paris stock market, we show that the random walk nature of traded prices results from a very delilcated interplay between two opposite tendencies: long-range correlated market orders that lead to super-diffusion (or persistence), and mean revrting limit orders that lead to sub-diffusion (or anti-persistence). We define and study a model where the price, at any instant, is the result of the impact of all past trades, mediated by a non-constant ‘propagator’ in time that describes the response of the market to a single trade. Within this model, the market is shown to be, in a precise sense, at a critical point, where the price is purely diffusive and the average response function almost constant. We find empirically, and discuss theoretically, a fluctuation-response relation. We also discuss the fraction of truly informed market orders, that correctly anticipate short-term moves, and find that it is quite small.     

Discussion of Corporate Governance Reform and Executive Incentives: Implications for Investments and Risk Taking

We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the article by Cohen, Dey and Lys (CDL). Strengths include persuasive theoretical arguments for impacts of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) on corporate investment strategies and for several mechanisms through which firms influence changes in risky investments. CDL also provides intriguing opportunities for learning about impacts of external regulatory events and for enriching management accounting research and classroom discussions of management control. Weaknesses include (1) narrow scope, perhaps driven by archival data availability; (2) difficulties in implementing the research design and method; (3) possible bias of incentive and investment measures; (4) incomplete estimates of the effect of SOX on compensation, incentives, and investments; and (5) questionable control of endogeneity. We offer recommendations from extant literature to mitigate these weaknesses in future research.     

Fiscal policy and national saving

This paper uses structural vector autoregressions along with structural measures of fiscal policy to measure the dynamic impact of fiscal policy shocks on the output gap and national saving. Positive shocks to government purchases and negative shocks to real net taxes are found to increase the output gap. Positive shocks to the government's structural surplus increases national saving although the effects are small. Positive shocks to government purchases are found to substantially reduce national saving. Negative shocks to real net tax revenues as a share of potential GDP have a small negative impact on national saving.     

Economics in Institutional Perspective,Memorial Essays in Honor of K. William Kapp

In the past, the standard discussions of market failures in economics textbooks confined themselves to issues involving externalities, public goods, and common property (open access). Subsequent to George Akerlof’s famous article “The Market for ‘Lemons,’” discussions of the problems created by asymmetric information gradually became standard fare, but the issues raised by thinking of asymmetric information in economic matters extend far beyond the used car and health insurance markets that are normally used as the paradigm cases. In fact, consideration of the problems of information will inevitably lead to an examination of the problems of market manipulation and fraud, especially in light of the 2008 financial crisis. Akerlof has travelled this path himself as indicated by his recent book with Robert Shiller, Phishing for Phools (2015). Akerlof and Shiller provide a litany of examples of manipulation and deception in advertising and in many markets including financial markets. They also have a chapter on “The Resistance and its Heroes” that highlights some of the people and agencies that have worked to expose and reduce phishing, but this chapter is remarkably sparse. What this article attempts to do is to fill out some of this history by focusing on the work of American institutional economists from Veblen to Galbraith, who critically examined the issues of manipulation and deception in advertising, salesmanship, and finance. Some general considerations relating to the problem of fraud are also discussed.     

The value of delays: market- and policy-induced adjustment processes as a motivating factor in dynamic entrepreneurship

Reaching societal consensus on how to deal with new issues, e.g. agreeing on commercial law for e-commerce, takes time. Traditional economics has considered such anomalies as market imperfections. By contrast, this paper suggests perceiving such “delays” as windows of opportunity for entrepreneurs. These considerations from evolutionary economics and entrepreneurship will be explored in a case study on disease management services in Germany. It will become clear that detailed ex ante legal regulation restricts entrepreneurial room for variation. To avoid this loss of knowledge generation, the government should abstain from introducing such premature intervention without having to challenge existing meta-rules.